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Chapter 1
Introduction
Liquidity is an elusive and multifaceted concept. Generally it is the ability of trading an asset
quickly, at low cost and without causing significant movement in the market price. In practice,
whenever an investor considers a potential investment in an asset, he would also consider the
ability to sell it again and the cost to trade it in the future. No asset is perfectly liquid. Three
sources of illiquidity are defined in the market microstructure literature:
(i) Exogenous transaction cost: This is the explicit cost that a buyer and/or seller pays every
time a security is traded. It could be order-processing cost, brokerage fee, or transaction
tax.
(ii) Inventory risk: Different from the ideal market model, not all investors are present in
the market at all time. Supply and demand imbalance arises when investors cannot find
the counter party at the time they need to trade. For example, an investor needs to sell a
security quickly, but buyers may not be available at that moment. As a result, the seller
may sell to a market maker who buys in anticipation of being able to lay off the position
later. Then the market makers are exposed to the risk of holding a suboptimal inventory
position and price moving against them. Inventory cost is the compensation for this risk.
(iii) Asymmetric information: Investors process different information sets in the market. Some
investors are better informed than others. For example, the buyer of a stock may worry
that a potential seller has private information that the company is losing money, and the
seller may be afraid that the buyer has private information that the company is about to be
taken over. If informed traders are correct, they gain a profit and who is on the other side
of their trades losses. In addition to private information about the fundamentals of the
security, some investors can also have private information about order flow. For instance,
if a trading desk knows that a hedge fund needs to liquidate a large position which will
depress prices, then the trading desk can sell early at relatively high prices and buy back
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later at lower prices. Asymmetric information cost represents the risk that the counter
party of a trade can be superiorly informed about the fundamental value or order flow.
Liquidity is important to all market participants, stock exchanges and regulators. Investors
demand liquidity because it allows them to implement their trading strategies at low cost. Stock
exchanges endeavor to improve liquidity since it is one of the most important characteristics of a
well-functioning market and a liquid market attracts more investors. Regulators also pay much
attention to liquidity as it is an important factor for a stable market. This dissertation studies
liquidity from two aspects. In Chapter 2 and 3, I look at liquidity and asset prices with a focus
on liquidity leak events and downside liquidity respectively. In Chapter 4, I look at liquidity
and institutional design where I examine the value of designated market makers.
1.1 Liquidity and asset prices
Liquidity asset pricing deviates from standard asset pricing by relaxing several unrealistic as-
sumptions, for example the zero cost assumption, the assumption of price-taking behavior, the
assumption that all investors are equally informed and that all investors are present in the mar-
ket at all time. In this section I review the theories on how liquidity is priced and the empirical
studies that test these theories. Then I discuss the contribution of my dissertation in this field.
It is well accepted that liquidity is an important feature and a desirable property for an asset.
Other things being equal, investors would prefer assets which can be traded faster, at lower cost
and with smaller price impact. However, is liquidity valuable enough to affect asset returns?
Over a short period of time, higher levels of transaction costs must lower the return available
to investors, and lower the price that investors are willing to pay for the asset. However, given
a long enough time horizon, are these effects of liquidity still large enough to actually affect
returns?
The answer from the traditional view in asset pricing would be “no”. For example, Con-
stantinides (1986) shows theoretically that transaction costs can only have a second-order effect
on the liquidity premium implied by the equilibrium asset returns in an inter-temporal portfolio
selection model. A similar conclusion is drawn by Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Heaton and
Lucas (1996), and Vayanos and Vila (1999). These authors all argue that the transactions costs
are just too small relative to the equilibrium risk premium to make any real difference.
The counter-argument is first brought forward by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who pro-
posed a single-period model with non-stochastic level of liquidity. In their setting, investors try
to maximize the present value of expected cash flows and they have different expected holding
periods. They proxy illiquidity by the bid-ask spread, so higher spreads result in lower over-
all returns for investors. While all investors prefer assets with low spreads, these assets are
more valued by short-term investors who incur transaction costs most frequently. Long-term
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investors then choose for assets which bring them the greatest advantages, namely those that
are most costly to trade. As a result only investors with long horizons will hold illiquid as-
sets, and they will demand compensation for doing so. Therefore, their model suggests that in
equilibrium assets with low liquidity (high bid-ask spread) will command a return premium.
Recently theorists argue that not only the absolute level of liquidity commands a return
premium, but also the risk of systematic shocks to liquidity might lead to important liquidity
risk premiums as well. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive a liquidity-adjusted capital asset
pricing model where they view liquidity as a stochastic variable. In equilibrium, a stock’s
required return depends on the expected liquidity level as well as three dimensions of liquidity
risks, i.e. commonality in liquidity, return sensitivity to market liquidity and liquidity sensitivity
to market return. The first effect is that the return increases with the covariance between the
asset’s illiquidity and the market illiquidity. This is because investors want to be compensated
for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the market becomes illiquid. The second effect
is usually negative because investors are willing to accept a lower return on an asset which has a
high return in times of low market liquidity. The third effect on required returns is also negative
for most stocks. When the market declines, marginal utility of consumption is high and the
ability to sell easily is especially valuable. Thus, an investor is willing to accept a discounted
return on stocks with high liquidity level in the state of low market return.
Moreover, Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) model how liquidity betas and liquidity risk
premium change over time. They propose a model that relates preference uncertainty to time
variation in liquidity betas and liquidity risk premium. Specifically, the model implies that in
the state of high (low) preference uncertainty, liquidity betas are high (low) and liquidity risk
premium goes up (down).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) provide a model that links an asset’s liquidity and traders’
funding liquidity. They show that there can be multiple equilibria in the market. In one equi-
librium, market is liquid and margin requirements are favorable for speculators, so speculators
are in general liquidity suppliers in the market. In another equilibrium, market is illiquid with
higher margin requirement, then speculators turn to be liquidity demanders instead of suppliers.
A large market shock can lead to losses for speculators. When their capital is reduced to a
certain level, the market will eventually switch to a low-liquidity/high-margin equilibrium.
There is a number of empirical literature that studies the existence of a liquidity effect. Here
we only look at the empirical investigations that examine the relationship between liquidity and
asset prices for stocks. The first study is initiated by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) where
they test two major predictions derived from their model. First, average portfolio risk-adjusted
returns increase with their bid-ask spread. Second, the slope of the return-spread relationship
decreases with the spread. They use monthly stock returns over the period 1961-1980 and
quoted bid-ask spread of the years 1960-1979 for NYSE stocks. Their findings provide sup-
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portive evidence for both predictions. Specifically, the difference in the monthly excess return
between the two extreme spread groups is 0.857% when estimated by OLS and 0.681% when
estimated by GLS. Many other empirical studies use different measures of liquidity and find
significant relation between stocks returns and these measures of liquidity. For example, Bren-
nan and Subrahmanyam (1996) uses Kyle (1985) λ as the measure of liquidity, estimated from
intraday trade and quote data. Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) take the stock’s
dollar trading volume as a measure of liquidity. Amihud (2002) propose an illiquidity measure
as the ratio of the absolute return to the trading volume. All of these studies find positive and
significant effect of illiquidity on stock returns, after controlling for different kinds of other
well-known firm characteristics and risk factors.
In addition, another line of empirical research tests whether liquidity risk is systematic and
whether systematic liquidity risk is priced in the cross section of stock returns. For example,
Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2000) demonstrate that liquidity has a common system-
atic factor. They show that quoted spreads, quoted depth, and effective spreads co-move with
market-wide and industry-wide liquidity. After control for well-known individual liquidity de-
terminants, common influences remain significant and material. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
provide evidence that asset prices reflect a premium for the sensitivity of stock returns to market-
wide liquidity. From 1966 through 1999, the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to
liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5% annually. Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) test the cross-sectional predictions of their liquidity-adjusted CAPM model using NYSE
and AMEX stocks over the period 1963 to 1999. Under the models restrictions, liquidity risk
contributes on average about 1.1% annually to the difference in risk premium between stocks
with high expected illiquidity and low expected illiquidity while the premium for liquidity level
is 3.5%.
Over time, both liquidity level and the premium required per unit of liquidity level have
declined as evidenced by Amihud (2002), Jones (2005), and Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl
(2009). For example, Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl (2009) use NYSE common stocks over
1964 and 2007 and three measures of liquidity, i.e. Amihud’s ILLIQ measure, annual dollar vol-
ume and annual turnover. Their results show that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and
liquidity level premium have significantly declined over the past 40 years. Moreover, the prof-
itability of trading strategies of buying illiquid stocks and selling liquid stocks has dramatically
decreased.
Has the level premium decline made liquidity unimportant for asset pricing? Chapter 2
explores a new dimension of liquidity inspired by the disaster risk literature, e.g., Rietz (1988)
and Barro (2006). Investors might care little about liquidity in normal market conditions, but
high transaction cost might become a first order concern if the stock hits a ‘disaster’ liquidity
state. An example is a self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up if all believe others will not show up for
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trade or, in other words, a negative manifestation of the liquidity externality (see, e.g., Pagano
(1989)). Such dry-up is particularly painful if this state is so persistent that waiting a day will
not restore liquidity. We refer to these events as liquidity leaks or liquileaks.
In order to test whether liquidity leaks are priced, we need a measure that recognizes (i) the
frequency of hitting an illiquid state and (ii) the duration of that state. Liquileaks are expected to
hurt only if both of these are substantial. That is, securities that hit illiquid states frequently but
revert in a day or securities that stay for a prolonged period in an illiquid state but almost never
hit these state are not painful for an investor. We operationalize this idea by estimating a Markov
regime-switching model where the transition probability matrix identifies these two dimensions.
The measure for a liquidity leak event is then defined as the (unconditional) probability that one
finds the security in the illiquid regime for more than a week. This is essentially a ‘product’ of
frequency and duration, which captures the idea that both need to be large for liquidity leaks to
hurt. Our findings show that a trading strategy that is long in high liquileak stocks and short in
low liquileak stocks yields a significant average annual excess return of approximately 3.36%.
Conducting Fama-MacBeth regressions that control for other return determinants, we further
find that one standard deviation increase in liquileak probability yields an additional required
return of 1.33% annually. Moreover, the premium of liquileak probability has increased over
time.
While liquidity level and risk are important to investors in general, they can be particularly
important in a declining market. Chapter 3 differentiate market downside and upside explicitly.
We examine the relationship between liquidity and stock returns, with a particular focus on the
downside market. Investors value downside losses differently from upside gains since they are
not only risk averse but also loss averse. Liquidity is especially important in a declining market.
Investors could hit their capital constraints and are forced to liquidate. At this time stocks with
low liquidity level and/or high liquidity risk in a downside market are particularly undesirable
and investors would demand a higher return for holding them. We measure the downside illiq-
uidity level and beta conditioning on the market return. Moreover, we present evidence for a
positive cross-sectional relation between stock returns and the downside illiquidity level and
beta. An increase of one standard deviation in the downside illiquidity level would increase
yearly returns by approximately 1.8%. This effect is both statistically and economically signif-
icant. When the downside illiquidity level and beta are jointly included in the cross-sectional
regression, only the downside illiquidity level has a significantly positive return premium.
1.2 Liquidity and institutional design
Liquidity and institutional design are closely related. The structure and design of trading mech-
anism has been subject to dynamic changes in the last few years. Fierce competition for order
flows and IPOs urges stock exchanges to take various actions to enhance liquidity and attract
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investors. One noticeable phenomenon is the increasingly important role of market makers,
even in today’s electronic era. In this section I first present the classification of market making
systems based on market makers’ characteristics and trading mechanisms. Then I go through
the theoretical and empirical research about market making. Finally I explain in which way my
dissertation extends the existing literature.
Since the inception of stock markets, financial intermediaries has played a significant role
in the stock market design. Recently, due to advances in communication and computing tech-
nology, the needs for human participation in tasks such as order submission or information
dissemination have significantly reduced. Meanwhile, automated trading system has prolifer-
ated worldwide. However, market makers are continue to be widely used in one form or another
as liquidity providers and market stabilizers. Most stock exchanges, while mainly organized as
limit order markets, have market makers as part of their market design. Although the main
purpose of market making is the same, the way that market makers are integrated to the trading
system can differer significantly across exchanges. In general, we can identify three types of
market makers based on trading systems and the characteristics of market makers:
(i) Dealers in a quote-driven market: In a quote-driven market, dealers arrange all the trades
and supply most, if not all, of the liquidity in the market. Normally each security has
multiple dealers, who are responsible to quote continuously two-sided markets. Since
dealers are profit-motivated traders, they attract order flow primarily by quoting aggres-
sively price, accepting large sizes, providing high-quality service, etc. (Harris (2003)).
The most well-known example is the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotation (NASDAQ) dealer.
(ii) Market makers with privileges in a order-driven market: One important feature of this
system is the use of single market maker and its inherent advantage in terms of unique
information over other traders on both the market orders and the limit order book. Stock
markets that apply this market making system are NYSE and German Deutsche Bo¨rse.
(iii) Competitive market makers in a order-driven market: Market makers in this system have
affirmative obligations of submitting continuous bid and ask orders by trading on their
own account. They do not possess any monopolistic information and have to compete
with investors for order flows. They are usually, in many cases only, hired by small and
mid caps with inactive-traded stocks and are subsidized by direct payment from the listed
firms. Such kind of market makers can be found in Euronext, where they are called
Designated Market Makers.
There are many theoretical models that study the behavior of market makers. Glosten (1989)
provides a model of a monopolist market maker, motivated by the specialist in NYSE. He ex-
tends the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) analysis to allow for both large and small trades, and for
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monopolistic as well as competitive market making. His key finding is that for some parameters
the monopolistic market maker is willing to incur losses on the large trades favored by informed
traders, while earning profits on small trades. The monopolist structure is therefore more ro-
bust, in the sense that the market may remain open even at times when trading is dominated by
informed investors, and where a fully competitive market would shut down. Rock (1996) and
Seppi (1997) extend the analysis by allowing for limit orders that compete with a single market
maker. In Rock’s model, risk neutral limit order traders have an advantage against risk-averse
specialists, countered by an information advantage to the specialist. In the Seppi’s model, limit
order submitters incur a cost, so that competition from the limit order book is mitigated, allow-
ing the specialist to have a degree of monopoly power. Seppi uses this framework to assess the
effect of a change in the minimum price increment, which alters relative importance of market
price and time priority rules, on market quality.
In the literature cited above, the emphasis is on the first two kinds of market makers in our
classification. Among limited models that incorporate affirmative market making obligation of
the third kind of market makers, Sabourin (2006) models price formation and order placement
strategies in a centralized limit order market with designated non-monopolist market makers.
She shows that the clearing frequency is higher in a limit order market with designated market
makers. The best quotes in a limit order market with designated market makers are more attrac-
tive than in a pure limit order market when the best quotes are placed by investors. Moreover, the
presence of market makers in limit order markets can result in more or less favorable expected
best quotes depending on the asset volatility and the differences in valuation among traders.
Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon (2007) identify two reasons that the affirmative obligation of
market makers can improve welfare. The first relies on the insight that the informational com-
ponent of the competitive bid-ask spread represents a transfer across traders, not a social cost
to completing trades. Therefore, this trading cost dissuades efficient trading, while a restriction
on spread encourages efficient trading. Secondly, a restriction on spread encourages traders to
become informed, which speeds the rate at which market prices move toward true asset values
in the wake of information events.
Empirically, a number of studies has been conducted to examine the behavior and impact
of market makers in the first two categories. For example, Madhavan and Smidt (1993), Mad-
havan and Sofianos (1998), Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) study various issues related
to the performance of NYSE specialists. Neal (1992), Mayhew (2002) and Anand and Weaver
(2006) examine the value of a specialist in the options market. A number of other studies com-
pare execution costs and depth on market maker and specialist (NYSE) systems (for example
Grossman and Miller (1988), Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), and Bessembinder (1999)).
Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) compare the performance of a pure order driven market with
a hybrid order driven market that consists of specialist and limit order book, and find that the
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hybrid system improves market quality of thinly-traded stocks.
Compared with the first two kinds of market makers, the third kind of market makers has
not been intensively investigated since they are only introduced during recent market structure
evolution. Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) examine the benefits of designated dealers to a
sample of low-liquidity firms that are traded twice a day in a call caution on the Paris Bourse.
They find that firms with designated dealers exhibit better market quality, namely lower book
imbalance, more frequent auction clearing, and less variability in returns and trading volume
than firms without a dealer. They document that younger firms, smaller firms, and less volatile
firms prefer a designated dealer. Moreover, they find evidence that there is an average cumu-
lative abnormal return of nearly 5% around the announcement of dealer introduction. Anand,
Tanggaard, and Weaver (2009) study the Stockholm Stock Exchange where firms have privi-
lege to negotiate the level of liquidity provision with liquidity providers. They find that quoted
spreads decline and quoted depths increases for stocks that arrange market making service. In
addition, committed liquidity providers lead to a decline in both inter and intraday volatility,
and an increase in trade size. Consistent with Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007), they also
document significant abnormal returns. Finally, they examine the relationship between contract
costs to the contractual improvement in market quality, firm specific characteristics and existing
relationships with liquidity provision firms. Results suggest that all three groups of factors are
priced in the contracts.
Chapter 4 of this dissertation studies the impact of ‘designated market maker’ on small-caps
in Euronext Amsterdam Exchange. On October 29 2001, Euronext rolled out their Paris limit
order market system to the Dutch equity market. Arguably the most significant change was the
possibility for small-caps to hire a designated market maker. The so called ‘designated market
maker’ studied in this dissertation belongs to the third category of the classification mentioned
above. They commit to provide a liquidity supply at all time in the market. We conduct an event
study and, contrary to previous work, focus on liquidity risk in addition to liquidity level, since
the minimum liquidity supply insures liquidity demanders against extreme illiquidity events. In
essence, a broker is paid to be a “supplier of last resort” to insure current shareholders against
the idiosyncratic risk of having to trade when liquidity is low. It also mechanically reduces
covariation with market return and market liquidity and therefore reduces systematic liquidity
risk (see Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). The value is realized when the supply constraint binds,
and shareholders realize a gain from trade that otherwise might have met too high transaction
cost (in the absence of the minimum supply guarantee). This effect shows up in the data by
more volume and higher DMM participation in these extreme market conditions.
The contribution to existing literature is two-fold: (i) an analysis of liquidity risk changes
associated with DMM introductions and (ii) empirical identification of the channel that DMMs
are “liquidity suppliers of last resort.” Anand, Tanggaard, and Weaver (2009) is most related to
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our study. They find that DMM introduction in Sweden increases the liquidity level, produces a
positive CAR, increases volume, and leads DMMs to trade more in the stocks that they contract
for. Our findings are consistent with theirs. We contribute by exploring the “liquidity risk chan-
nel” which is closer to the spirit of a DMM contract, i.e., it guarantees a minimum for liquidity
supply that is stochastic in nature. Liquidity risk changes around DMM introductions are ana-
lyzed and the liquidity insurance channel is explicitly tested by comparing DMM participation,
DMM trading profit, and overall volume across days where the constraint binds and days where
it does not.
1.3 Liquidity measures and data
One of the biggest challenge of empirical studies in market microstructure is how to measure
liquidity (and to some extent, how to define liquidity). As mentioned before, liquidity is a
concept that has many facets. Therefore, a single measure can hardly capture all of its aspects.
Moreover, empirical investigations are also constrained by data availability. Basically liquidity
measures can be classified based on the frequency of data.
Examples of liquidity measures calculated by high-frequency data are quoted spreads and
effective spreads. The quoted bid-ask spread is the difference between the lowest ask price and
the highest bid price for a security. For small orders, the quoted spread is a good indication
of the execution cost for a trade. For large orders, however, it may not fully represent the
cost. Effective spread is defined as twice the difference between the actual execution price and
the market quote at the time of order entry. The effective spread better captures the cost of
a round-trip order by including both price movement (dealers coming in to execute orders at
a better price than previously quoted) and market impact (spread widening due to the size of
the order itself.) The effective spread can be decomposed into two components using standard
techniques. The adverse selection component captures the average loss of liquidity suppliers
due to informationally-motivated market orders (suppliers are on the wrong side of the trade in
these transactions). The realized spread component is the remaining part and therefore captures
the gross profit to liquidity suppliers. These two components are identified through an estimate
of the average information in a (signed) market order, which is revealed through post-trade mid-
quotes. That is, if we wait long enough we find how much permanent price impact the market
order has. In the implementation (as in Chapter 4 of this dissertation), we use 15 minutes to
allow the market to settle on the permanent price impact of the order.
However, high-frequency data is only available recently and mainly in the U.S.. The first
limitation is then the relatively short period of sample time. Second, the availability of high-
frequency data in other stock markets is not as high as in the U.S.. Moreover, studies that
examine the relationship between liquidity and expected stock returns usually use realized re-
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turns whose variance around the expected return is high. As a result, a long sample period is
needed to increase the power of the tests. In order to solve these problems, researchers then
go for low-frequency data, such as daily return and volume, and find substitute measures of
liquidity. Here I discuss two often-used measures, which are also used in this dissertation.
The first one is proposed by Amihud (2002) and is used in many empirical studies (e.g.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008),
etc.). Amihud illiq measure is defined by the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the
(dollar) trading volume on that day. Specifically, for each stock i and day d, the Amihud illiq-
uidity measure is given by:
illiqid =
|rid|
dvolid
where rid is the daily return of stock i on day d. dvol
i
d is the daily dollar volume of stock i on day
d. In effect, this measure gives the percentage daily price change per dollar of daily volume,
or the daily price impact of the order flow. Hasbrouck (2009) demonstrates that among many
daily proxies of liquidity, the Amihud illiquidity measure is most strongly correlated with the
TAQ-based price impact coefficient. In addition, we normally need a filtering procedure for this
measure based on the purpose of the study. For example, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation we do
not follow the existing filtering procedure since the focus of that chapter is on liquidity leaks,
which are in general extreme situations.
The second measure is developed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) where they use a variant
of a volume-linked price change as the liquidity measure. Specifically, they define liquidity for
stock i in month t as the OLS estimate of γi,t in a regression as follows:
ri,d+1,m = θi,m+φi,mri,d,m+ γi,msign(ri,d,m)vi,d,m+ εi,d+1,m (1.1)
where ri,d,t is the excess return of stock i on day d in month t; vi,d,t is the dollar volume (in
million dollars) of stock i on day d in month t. Two filters are imposed to compute this liquidity
measure in each year: (1) A stock should have at least 100 observations in a year; and (2) A
stock should have a share price between $5 and $1000 at the end of the previous year. The
monthly liquidity measure, which is the coefficient γi,y, measures the expected price reversal for
a given dollar volume. The idea is that a big buy order in an illiquid stock at day d will result in
large volume and negative return. If it really was price impact, and not news, we should see an
unusually large return the next day (correcting for any typical serial correlation with the φ term),
as the price bounces back. Thus when a stock’s liquidity is lower, γi,y is expected to be negative
and large in absolute magnitude. This is a return reversal measure, which captures order-flow
induced temporary price fluctuations.
In Chapter 2 the liquileak identification requires a daily measure of liquidity and the natural
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Pastor-Stambaugh alternative to the daily Amihud ILLIQ measure is1 :
psilliqi,d =−
(
ri,d+1,y− θˆi,y− φˆi,yri,d,y
sign(ri,d,y)vi,d,y
)
(1.2)
where θˆi,y and φˆi,y are obtained by estimating the model in equation (6.1) on a sample of daily
observations for stock i in year y. This psilliq measure replaces the illiq measure in the “Ap-
pendix: Liquileaks” where all empirical analyses are redone.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, daily and monthly data of stock prices, returns, volume, shares
outstanding, and dividend are obtained from CRSP, with a sample period from December 31,
1962, through December 31, 2008. Following Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2000) and
Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we utilize only common stocks (CRSP share code 10 and
11) listed on NYSE/AMEX (CRSP exchange code 1 and 2). Moreover, we obtain the daily
and monthly risk-free rate and the daily Fama and French three factors from Kenneth French
at Dartmouth College. In addition, Chapter 2 also uses fundamental data from COMPUSTAT,
including stockholder’s equity, total assets, total long-term debt, net income, and book value
per share. In the main text of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we use Amihud illiq measure as the
measure of liquidity. Furthermore, we also consider the alternative measure of liquidity level,
developed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), for robustness check in Chapter 2 .
Chapter 4 uses three datasets for the empirical analysis. First, we have an intraday dataset
for 11 months before and after the introduction day which contains (i) the best bid and ask quote
and (ii) the price and size of all transactions along with a label that indicates whether or not a
DMM was involved in the transaction (only their own-account trades are considered) and, if
so, on which side of the trade. Second, we have daily data for the same period that includes
market capitalization for each stock. Third, we have a file that for all DMM stocks contains
the initiation and termination date of a DMM service. In this chapter we use three liquidity
measures: the effective spread and Amihud’s illiq measure as ex-post measures of liquidity and
quoted spread as an ex-ante measure of liquidity.
1.4 Dissertation outline
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we propose a mea-
sure of liquidity that captures the feature of liquidity leaks, and we examine its pricing in the
cross-section of stock returns. Previous literature suggests that liquidity is time-varying and
there are good reasons to believe that there exists an illiquid regime and a liquid regime. When
a stock has a long life of the illiquid regime, we say it is stuck in a liquidity leak (or liquileak)
1A Pastor-Stambaugh illiquidity (instead of liquidity) measure is trivially defined as minus γ.
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situation. Liquidity leaks thus have two dimensions, a low liquidity level and a long duration
of illiquidity. Risk-averse investors should demand a high return to compensate for the losses
they may incur in a liquidity leak. We propose to measure liquidity leaks by the liquileak prob-
ability, which is the probability that a stock remains in the illiquid regime for five consecutive
trading days, estimated by the Markov regime switching model. We present evidence for a pos-
itive cross-sectional relation between stock returns and liquileak probability. This effect is both
statistically and economically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in liquileak
probability would increase yearly returns by approximately 1.33%. Moreover, the return pre-
mium of liquileak probability has increased over time.
Chapter 3 investigates the pricing of the downside liquidity. We argue that investors regard
downside market differently from upside market, and stocks that have a high liquidity level
and low liquidity risk in downside market are especially valuable to investors. In a declining
market, investors are very likely hit their funding constraint and have to liquidate their stocks.
Thus they prefer to hold stocks that can be executed at a low cost during the market downturns
and would demand higher returns for stocks that have high downside liquidity. We define the
downside illiquidity level and the downside liquidity beta (comovement of stock’s illiquidity
with market illiquidity) conditioning on the market average return. We find a significantly
positive return premium for the downside illiquidity level and beta. An increase of one standard
deviation in the downside illiquidity level would increase yearly returns by approximately 1.8%.
Moreover, the statistical significance of the downside liquidity beta disappears in the presence
of the downside illiquidity level, implying that it is the downside illiquidity level that has the
major explanatory power for the cross-sectional returns.
In Chapter 4, we examine the effect of designated market maker on small-caps in Euronext
Amsterdam market. Firms care about stock liquidity as it affects their cost of capital. Small-caps
care most as their stock exhibits lowest liquidity level and highest liquidity risk. Euronext allows
them to contract with designated market makers (DMMs) who then have to supply minimum
liquidity unconditionally. In Amsterdam, 74 small-cap firms sign up on the introduction day.
We find that this improves liquidity level and reduces liquidity risk, both in an absolute sense and
relative to non-DMM stocks. Moreover, it creates value as (i) DMM stocks enjoy an average
abnormal return of 3.5% around the announcement day and (ii) both liquidity level and risk
changes explain the cross-sectional dispersion in abnormal returns. We further find that DMMs
participate in more trades and their gross trading revenue turns to a loss on high quoted spread
days, i.e. days when they are likely to be constrained by their contract.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. I first summarize the most important findings of this
dissertation. Then I present the policy implications for market participants, stock exchange and
regulators.
Chapter 2
Liquileaks
This chapter is based on Menkveld and Wang (2010).
2.1 Introduction
A participation externality makes asset liquidity inherently unstable. If investors believe that
others participate in the market, they ‘pay’ the participation cost and the market becomes liquid.
If, however, they believe others do not participate, they choose not to do so either and the market
becomes extremely illiquid (see, e.g., Pagano (1989)). If, in addition, some agents are subject
to institutional constraints such as loss limits one would observe negative liquidity spirals (see,
e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).1
This chapter studies such liquidity leaks empirically, i.e., a prolonged state of illiquidity.
Most evidence on the pricing of liquidity is based on the equity market. In the cross-section
of stocks, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) are the first to show that average liquidity (liquidity
level) is priced.2 More recently, time variation in liquidity (liquidity risk) has been shown
to matter for returns to the extent that it correlates with a systematic factor (see Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen
(2005) provide an extensive review of the literature on asset pricing and liquidity.
The magnitude of a liquidity premium in required returns for equities has declined over time.
As for liquidity risk, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find that differential loadings on the market
liquidity factor creates a cross-sectional difference in returns of 7.5% annually. Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) use a more comprehensive model for returns that also includes liquidity level
and a stock’s liquidity covariation with market liquidity and market return. They find that among
1Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2007) model “episodic illiquidity” as a breakdown of a cooperation equilib-
rium when for one of the (strategic) players the stakes are so high that predation (noncooperation) becomes the
dominant strategy.
2Liquidity level studies include Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), and
Hasbrouck (2009).
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the three risk factors, a stock’s liquidity covariation with market return is the dominant one in
explaining the aggregate liquidity risk premium in the cross-section of stocks. They further find
that the aggregate liquidity risk premium is smaller than the liquidity level premium. Hasbrouck
(2009) has recently reconfirmed these findings based on a longer dataset. The liquidity level in
and of itself has gradually improved (see, e.g., Amihud (2002) and Jones (2005)). Moreover, the
compensation per unit of illiquidity has declined (see Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl (2010)).
Has this level premium decline and the relatively small risk premium made liquidity unim-
portant for asset pricing? This chapter explores a new dimension of liquidity inspired by the
disaster risk literature (see, e.g., Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006)). Investors might care little about
liquidity in normal conditions, but high transaction cost might become a first order concern if
the stock hits a ‘disaster’ liquidity state such as, for example, a self-fulfilling non-participation
equilibrium. Such liquidity leak is particularly painful if the state is persistent so that waiting a
day will not restore liquidity. We refer to these events as liquidity leaks or liquileaks. The graph
below illustrates the key new feature as these stocks are similar in terms of level and risk, yet
only stock 2 is a liquileak stock.
illiquid
liquid
stock 1 stock 2
time in days
Ex ante, security-specific liquidity leak risk does not necessarily wash in the cross-section
of stocks and might in fact command a substantial additional return. One potential reason is
that stocks are not perfect substitutes if some investors’ endowment/labor risk factor correlates
with a security’s idiosyncratic return.3 Liquileaks make the cost of such transaction uncertain
and if investors cannot borrow against future income this negatively affects their immediate
consumption. Another potential reason is that inter-temporal risk-sharing among patient and
impatient investors breaks down in the presence of liquidity “blackout” periods (see Longstaff
(2009)).
To test whether liquidity leaks are priced requires a measure that recognizes (i) the frequency
of hitting an illiquid state and (ii) the duration of that state. Liquileaks are expected to hurt only
if both of these are substantial. That is, securities that hit illiquid states frequently only to revert
back in a day or securities that stay for a prolonged period in an illiquid state but almost never hit
this state do not necessarily hurt an investor. We operationalize this idea by estimating a Markov
3For example, if two investors switch jobs then they will want to also swap their positions in the two companies’
stock. See Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) for a mathematical formalization of such non-traded risk.
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regime-switching model where the transition probability matrix identifies these two dimensions.
A liquidity leak is then naturally defined as the (unconditional) probability that one finds the
security in the illiquid state and that it is stuck in that state for over a week, i.e., longer than
the average trading horizon of an institutional investor (see, e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1995)).
This probability is essentially the product of frequency and duration and therefore captures the
notion that both are necessary conditions for pain.4
A regime-switching model is estimated by stock-year for a sample of common stocks listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in the
period from 1963 to 2008. The daily Amihud ILLIQ measure (Amihud (2002)) is modeled as
drawn from either the liquid or the illiquid state distribution.5 To make cross-sectional compar-
isons meaningful, the mean of the illiquid state distribution is bounded from below to the 80%
quantile of all stock-day observations for the year of estimation. Estimates lead to the follow-
ing observations. Perhaps most important is that the data select the two-regime model over the
standard (single-regime) model in 97.10% of the stock-year samples. Estimates of this regime-
switching model reveal that the average probability of the illiquid state is 0.21 and its average
continuation probability is 0.45. The average liquileak (or disaster) probability is 0.06. Finally,
the nature of liquileaks seems to be primarily idiosyncratic as the first principal component of
an ex-post illiquid state estimate captures between 10% and 15% of its variation.6
The conjectured relationship between a stock’s liquileak probability and its required return is
tested in two conventional ways: portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions. The portfolio
sort analysis reveals that a trading strategy that is long in high liquileak stocks and short in
low liquileak stocks yields a significant average annual excess return of 3.36%. To explore
whether this positive return is only due to one of the two factors of the liquileak probability (i.e.,
frequency or duration) or just captures the (unconditional) average liquidity level, we double-
sort and find that, still, the return differential across low and high liquileak stocks remains
significantly positive. The Fama-MacBeth regressions enable us to also control for the standard
Fama-French factors and other stock characteristics. Liquileak probability remains significantly
positive. A one standard deviation increase in liquileak probability increases annual returns by
1.33%. These regressions are repeated for the two equal-length sub-periods (1964 through 1985
and 1986 through 2008) and the results indicate that the liquileak probability has become more
important for returns over time whereas, consistent with earlier literature, liquidity level has
4The focus here is on security-specific regime switches, not switches in the aggregate state of the market. The
latter was analyzed in Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) which lets securities’ liquidity-betas collectively switch
between low and high states.
5We have repeated all analysis based on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reversal measure (instead of ILLIQ)
and find very similar results. See “Appendix: Liquileaks”.
6This low commonality does not necessarily contradict the funding-constraint models if liquidity-supply is
not fully fungible across securities. In fact, Aragon and Strahan (2011) show that the 2008 Lehman bankruptcy
disproportionately affected liquidity supply in stocks which were held by Lehman-connected hedge funds.
16 CHAPTER 2: LIQUILEAKS
become less important.
As a robustness check, all analysis is repeated based on (model-free) nonparametric proxies
for frequency and duration that are calculated directly from the raw data. Frequency is measured
as the fraction of days that a stock is illiquid and duration is measured as the average number
of days that a stock is in the illiquid state. Redoing the required return analysis based on
these (noisy) proxies shows that our main finding that liquileak probability matters for required
returns is robust.
Finally, the current chapter relates to a microstructure literature that studies the “resiliency”
dimension of liquidity at the highest frequency. Demsetz (1968, p.41) first emphasized that
“waiting costs are relatively important for trading in organized exchanges, and would seem to
dominate the determination of spreads.” Following up on this idea, Black (1971) and Kyle
(1985) characterized as a liquid market one that has a high instant supply (low bid-ask spread
and high depth) which replenishes quickly when consumed (high resiliency). Foucault, Kadan,
and Kandel (2005) characterize the interaction of instant supply and resiliency in a dynamic
equilibrium model where traders arrive sequentially, observe the liquidity supply in the limit
order book, and decide to either post an order in the book (increase supply) or consume an order
from the book (reduce supply). Empirically, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) label incoming
limit orders on an ordinal scale from “large buy” (extreme consumption) to “new bid below”
(extreme supply). Large (2007) characterizes resiliency by estimating the conditional arrival
intensities for each of these order types.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the Markov
regime switching model to identify liquidity leaks. Section 2.3 describes the data and presents
descriptive statistics on the liquileak estimates. Section 2.4 tests the hypothesized relation be-
tween a stock’s liquileak probability and its return. Section 2.5 analyzes what stock and firm
characteristics might explain variation in liquileak probability. Section 2.6 contains a robustness
analysis. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Liquidity leak measurement
The nature of liquidity leaks is that a stock is in a normal liquidity state most of the days, but
occasionally hits an illiquid state. A natural econometric model to capture such characterization
is a Markov regime-switching model that potentially switches daily between these two states
(cf. Rietz (1988)). Within each state, liquidity draws are assumed to follow a first order autore-
gressive process with a state-specific mean and variance; the autoregressive nature allows for
some persistence in shocks which has been documented to exist by, for example, Acharya and
Pedersen (2005). The model we propose therefore is:
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illiqid =
{
µi0+φ
iilliqid−1+ ε
i
d, if s
i
d = 0
µi1+φ
iilliqid−1+ ε
i
d, if s
i
d = 1
(2.1)
where d indexes days, i indexes stocks, illiq is the illiquidity measure (e.g., the Amihud illiq
measure used in the main text or the Pastor-Stambaugh reversal measure used in the “Appendix:
Liquileaks”), s is the (unobserved) liquidity regime, and ε is an independent normally distributed
error term with mean zero and state-dependent variance σ2s .
The states are labeled such that the state zero (s = 0) is the normal liquidity state and state
one (s= 1) is the illiquid state. The state itself follows a first order Markov chain with transition
matrix {pijk} for stock i:
pijk = Pr(s
i
d = j|sid−1 = k) ∀ j,k ∈ {0,1} (2.2)
The probability of a liquileak event is defined as the unconditional probability to find a
stock in the illiquid state and, if so, to have it ‘trapped’ in that state for more than a week. The
Markovian nature of the model allows for straightforward calculation of such probability:
liquileak probB Pr(sd = 1)Pr(sd+1 = sd+2 = · · ·= sd+5 = 1|sd = 1) (2.3)
where d is some random day in the sample. The first factor on the right-hand side is the uncon-
ditional probability to find the stock in the illiquid state:
Pr(sd = 1) =
1− pi00
2− pi00− pi11
C pi1 (2.4)
and the second factor is the probability to find it in such state for five consecutive days, condi-
tional on starting off in the illiquid state:
Pr(sd+1 = sd+2 = · · ·= sd+5 = 1) = (pi11)5 =
(
Pr(sid = 1|sid−1 = 1)
)5
(2.5)
The liquileak probability is therefore:
liquileak prob = pi1(p
i
11)
5 =
(1− pi00)(pi11)5
2− pi00− pi11
(2.6)
The model is estimated by stock-year based on daily observations where all parameters are
stock-specific. To make meaningful comparisons across stocks, the illiquid state’s mean is con-
strained to be larger than the 80% quantile of all stock-day observations on illiq in the year of
estimation. The parameters are estimated with maximum likelihood where the likelihood func-
tion is calculated using the standard Hamilton filter (see Hamilton (1989)). The implementation
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details are included in the Appendix 2A.
2.3 Data, summary statistics, and liquileak estimates
Data. The data are standard and obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and Ken French’s website. The sample period is 1963 through 2008. The CRSP data
used are stock prices, returns, volume, shares outstanding, and dividend. Following standard
practice, the universe of stocks consists of only common stocks (CRSP share code 10 and 11)
listed on the NYSE or AMEX (CRSP exchange code 1 and 2). The data obtained from French’s
website are the risk-free rate and the three Fama-French factors.
The Amihud ILLIQ measure is used as the main liquidity measure (see Amihud (2002)).
Compared with potentially better measures, such as the price impact of order flow or the bid-
ask spread, the Amihud measure requires only daily data and thus enables us to study a much
longer time period. Among the various daily measures, Hasbrouck (2009, p.1456-1459) finds
that ILLIQ correlates highest with the price impact measure (which is to be preferred over
spread when orders execute in multiple trades).7 The ILLIQ measure is defined as:
illiqid =
|rid|
dvolid
(2.7)
where r is the transaction price return and dvol is dollar volume. Admittedly, the daily ILLIQ
measure is noisy but note that such noise is naturally captured by the ‘error’ terms εid in each of
the two liquidity states (see equation (2.1)).
The empirical analysis consists of essentially two stages. First, the liquileak regime-switching
model and the Fama-French betas are estimated by stock-year which yields a ‘panel’ of param-
eter estimates. Second, standard asset pricing analysis is done based on the cross-section of
monthly returns where previous year stock characteristics (e.g., liquileak prob and the Fama-
French betas) are used as explanatory variables.
The data filters used to prepare for liquileak model estimation are careful to not discard days
for which the ILLIQ measure cannot be calculated (due to zero volume) as such days might
indicate extreme illiquidity which is the focus of our study. The following filters have been
applied. First, zero volume days are treated as missing observation days rather than discarded
in order to avoid a downward bias in the duration measure.8 Second, for each stock ILLIQ
values are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% quantile. Third, the stock-year parameter estimate
7Robustness of results is verified by redoing all analysis based on the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) price
reversal measure. This set of tables is included in the “Appendix: Liquileaks”.
8Zero-volume days might also be evidence of extreme illiquidity. If instead of making them missing observa-
tions, one fills them with the highest observed illiquidity value, the chapter’s main result is largely unaffected, see
“Appendix: Liquileaks”.
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of liquileak prob, which is the focus explanatory variable of required returns, is only retained
when the stock-year has at least 150 illiq observations and the average stock price is between
$2 and $1000.9 The filter removes about 5% of all stock-years.
Summary statistics. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in the anal-
ysis. There are between 1123 and 2147 stocks for all years included in the (unbalanced) panel
dataset. This universe of stocks exhibits substantial variation in size and trade characteristics
both in the cross-section and through time. For example, the average market capitalization is
$2.41 billion with a cross-sectional (between) standard deviation of $7.46 billion and a time
(within) standard deviation of $8.58 billion. Daily volume is $10.53 million on average with a
between standard deviation of $28.88 million and a within standard deviation of $40.67 million.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for a variety of variables. The variable average by stock-year
makes up a panel dataset so that between and within variation can be calculated. The sample consists
of NYSE/AMEX stocks from December 31, 1962 through December 31, 2008. The included variables
are: daily stock return based on end-of-day transaction price (ret), daily end-of-day transaction price
(prc), daily dollar volume (dvol), market capitalization (mcap), Amihud’s ILLIQ measure (illiq), mean-
adjusted illiquidity level (illiqma), return over the last 100 days of the year (r100), return from the start
of the year until the day that is 100 days before the end of the year (r100yr), standard deviation of daily
return (sdret), dividend yield calculated as the sum of all dividends in the year divided by the end-of-year
price (divyld). Variable units are included in parentheses.
Mean St.Dev. St.Dev. St.Dev. Min Max Median
Betweena Withinb
ret (bps) 6.22 20.66 8.18 18.98 -594.85 666.67 6.25
prc ($) 29.16 24.53 17.93 16.75 2.03 899.36 24.40
dvol ($ mln) 10.53 49.88 28.88 40.67 0.00 2418.54 0.54
mcap ($ bln) 2.41 11.37 7.46 8.58 0.00 498.41 0.32
illiq (%/$mln) 0.41 1.06 0.74 0.76 0.00 31.88 0.06
illiqma 1.00 1.77 1.38 1.10 0.00 26.86 0.31
r100 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.26 -0.99 15.44 0.03
r100yr 0.12 0.39 0.14 0.36 -0.94 12.15 0.07
sdret (%) 2.43 1.20 0.82 0.87 0.00 42.63 2.19
divyld (%) 3.76 19.30 8.43 17.36 0.00 1920.00 2.69
#stocks 1639.28 261.65 112.13 236.40 1123.00 2147.00 1668.00
a: Based on stock-specific averages, i.e., x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on deviations from stock-specific averages, i.e., x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.
9The filter is less restrictive than Amihud (2002) in that the bar for inclusion is lowered from 200 observations
to 150 observations. The reason is that the focus is on extreme illiquidity events which are more likely to exist for
less actively traded stocks.
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The Amihud ILLIQ measure (illiq) exhibits considerable variation both in the cross-section
and through time. On average, its value is a 0.41% change per $1 million volume. The be-
tween and within standard deviation are 0.74 and 0.76, respectively, which indicates that there
is substantial variation both in the cross-section and, more importantly in view of liquileak risk,
through time. A particularly promising feature of illiq is that it has a positive skew since the
median (0.06) is substantially smaller than the mean (0.41); the dataset does appear to exhibit
days of extreme illiquidity (although this might still be entirely driven by the cross-sectional
dimension, not the time dimension).
Liquileak model estimates. Before presenting the liquileak model estimates by stock-year,
we first test whether the data actually support such regime-switching model. Table 2.2 presents
the results of a likelihood ratio test that tests the null of a single AR(1) process against the
liquileak model that switches between two AR(1) processes (see equation (2.1)). The results
show that for 97.10% of all stock-year samples (consisting of all days in that stock-year) the
null is rejected. This result seems representative of all years in the sample as for every year
more than 90% of the stock-year samples reject the null.
Table 2.3 presents various statistics on the ‘panel’ of liquileak model parameters that are
estimated by stock-year. Panel A presents the means and variances which lead to a couple of
observations. First, the average normal liquidity mean of illiq (µ0) is 0.25 which is less than
half the average illiquid state mean (µ1) which is 0.59. More importantly, this distance is almost
twice the liquid state standard deviations (σ0) which indicates that there is meaningful separa-
tion between the two liquidity states. The illiquid state standard deviation (σ1) is relatively high
which indicates either erratic liquidity supply or large measurement errors which one might ex-
pect to be present in a turbulent state. Second, there is evidence of persistence within a regime
as the AR(1) coefficient (ϕ) is 0.18 on average. Third, the transition probability estimates show
that the average duration is roughly 9 days (=1/(1-p00)) for the normal liquidity state but only 2
days for the illiquid state. This implies that, for an ‘average’ stock, liquileaks are rare events as
it requires a week spent in the illiquid state. Yet, there is considerable variation in the continu-
ation probability (p11), its standard deviation is 0.31, which implies that these events are more
likely for at least some stock-years. Finally, liquileaks are indeed rare events for the average
stock in the sample as the average probability is 0.06. But, as predicted, there is considerable
variation across stock-years as the standard deviation is 0.12.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the regime-switching model estimates by plotting both the daily obser-
vations on illiq and, for these days, an ‘ex-post’ estimate of the likelihood of the (unobserved)
illiquid state. This likelihood is the smoothed probability estimate, i.e., the best estimate condi-
tional on all past, current, and future observations on illiq. The top graph represents a high
liquileak stock; the bottom one presents a low liquileak stock. The period is 100 days in
1986, the median year in the sample. The high liquileak stock graph exhibits both features
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Table 2.2: Likelihood ratio test on one regime vs. two regimes
The table examines whether liquidity level (as proxied by Amihud ILLIQ) is subject to regime switches
or not. The null hypothesis of no-switching is an AR(1) model and the alternative is a two state Markov
regime switching model where each state is represented by an AR(1) model (mean and mean-reversion
parameters are state dependent, for details see Section 2.2, equations (2.1) and (2.2). A likelihood ratio
test is conducted where the test statistic is defined as LR = 2(lnL2AR− lnL1AR). The critical value is
based on the Davies (1987) p-value as suggested by Garcia and Perron (1996). The test is conducted
by stock-year and the table summarizes the findings by presenting the average likelihood, the fraction of
null rejections and its complement by year, by the two sub-periods, and for the full sample.
1963-1985 1986-2008
year likelihood % stocks % stocks year likelihood % stocks % stocks
ratio p-value < 0.01 p-value ≥ 0.01 ratio p-value < 0.01 p-value ≥ 0.01
1963 127.95 96.85 3.15 1986 190.66 97.08 2.92
1964 128.39 97.18 2.82 1987 207.96 97.48 2.52
1965 144.07 97.83 2.17 1988 188.17 96.58 3.42
1966 143.51 97.74 2.26 1989 189.67 95.99 4.01
1967 166.77 98.96 1.04 1990 191.41 96.05 3.95
1968 154.64 98.62 1.38 1991 191.69 96.24 3.76
1969 156.84 98.93 1.07 1992 176.04 95.30 4.70
1970 159.98 97.22 2.78 1993 179.16 95.95 4.05
1971 173.47 98.50 1.50 1994 173.60 96.31 3.69
1972 171.05 99.09 0.91 1995 179.46 96.22 3.78
1973 150.23 97.76 2.24 1996 177.27 95.47 4.53
1974 114.11 91.67 8.33 1997 181.62 96.11 3.89
1975 154.97 96.70 3.30 1998 194.60 96.59 3.41
1976 168.51 99.35 0.65 1999 164.84 95.86 4.14
1977 161.28 99.09 0.91 2000 160.95 94.85 5.15
1978 203.01 98.75 1.25 2001 170.74 95.22 4.78
1979 192.02 98.57 1.43 2002 175.75 95.63 4.37
1980 197.24 98.49 1.51 2003 190.86 95.30 4.70
1981 183.32 99.05 0.95 2004 172.60 94.21 5.79
1982 200.35 98.21 1.79 2005 168.29 94.33 5.67
1983 194.02 97.75 2.25 2006 180.68 95.00 5.00
1984 190.17 97.95 2.05 2007 195.97 94.98 5.02
1985 190.86 96.79 3.21 2008 262.03 94.28 5.72
1963-1985 167.67 98.01 1.99 1986-2008 184.30 95.83 4.17
1963-2008 174.62 97.10 2.90
#stocks*#years 1605*23 #stocks*#years 1672*23
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of liquileaks: trading seems to hit an illiquid state relatively often and, once it does, it seems to
be stuck in this state for multiple days. The low liquileak stock, on the other hand, does not hit
the illiquid state often and, if so, reverts back to the liquid state within a day. The graphs also
suggests that one needs to control for average illiq in the pricing analysis as it clearly is lower
in the bottom graph.
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents statistics on the cross-sectional and time covariation in the
panel of liquileak parameter estimates. This yields useful insights as to what drives variation
in liquileak prob before turning to its explanatory power for required returns in the next sec-
tion. The within and between correlations lead to the following observations. First, the two
factors that make up liquileak prob (=p1 p511, see equation (2.6)) are far from perfectly cor-
related. The cross-sectional and time correlation between (i) the unconditional probability of
hitting the illiquid state (p1) and (ii) staying a week in the illiquid state (p511) are 0.54 and 0.63,
respectively.10 The absence of (perfect) collinearity enables us to explore both these drivers
of liquileak prob as separate explanatory variables in our asset pricing regressions. Second,
the between and within correlation of liquileak prob with both these factors is of equal magni-
tude which indicates that variation in this focus explanatory variable is driven by both its factor
components Third, the liquileak prob correlation with any of the parameters that govern the au-
toregressive process within each state is relatively low. It is therefore unlikely that a significant
effect of liquileak prob in the asset pricing analysis is just a proxy for any of these characteris-
tics of the illiq process (although the unconditional liquidity level will be controlled for in the
Fama-MacBeth regressions).
Finally, liquileaks seem to be idiosyncratic in nature. Table 2.4 shows that the first principal
component of the ex-post illiquid state estimate captures between 10% and 15% of its variation.
This is true for both the filtered and the smoothed estimate as well as for both sub-periods
separately. The first five principal components capture less than 25% of the variation.
2.4 Are liquileaks priced in the cross-section of stocks?
This section does a standard asset pricing analysis to study whether the risk of disaster liquidity,
the probability of a liquileak, commands higher returns in the cross-section of stocks. The
first part does portfolio sorts, both single- and double-sorts, to explore any such relationship.
The second part does Fama-MacBeth regressions that allow for simultaneously bringing in a
multiple of standard control variables.
10The positive correlation is not surprising as p1 is a monotonically increasing function of p11 (see equa-
tion (2.4)). The focus here is on the size of this covariation.
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Table 2.3: Liquileak model estimates
This table presents the parameter estimates of the Markov regime switching model that aims to char-
acterize liquileak events, i.e., getting stuck in an illiquid disaster state for at least a week. The model
is estimated by stock-year and the table provides statistics on the ‘panel’ of parameter estimates. The
Markov regime switching model that is estimated for each stock-year (∼250 observations) is:
illiqit =
{
µi0+φ
iilliqid−1+ ε
i
t , if s
i
t = 0,
µi1+φ
iilliqid−1+ ε
i
t , if s
i
t = 1,
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, illiqit is the observed Amihud ILLIQ measure, s
i
t is the unobserved
liquidity state, and εit is an independent normally distributed error term with a state-dependent variance
σ2s . The state transition matrix is defined by the following transition probabilities:
Pr(sid = 0|sid−1 = 0) = pi00
Pr(sid = 1|sid−1 = 1) = pi11
Liquileak probability is therefore obtained as:
liquileak prob = pi1(p
i
11)
5 =
(1− pi00)(pi11)5
2− pi00− pi11
In the estimation the mean liquidity in the disaster liquidity state (µ1) is constrained to be larger than
the 80% quantile of illiq across all stock-days. This parameter is pooled across stocks to make cross-
sectional analysis meaningful. Implementation details are included in the Appendix 2A. Panel A presents
mean and variance statistics; Panel B presents within and between correlations.
Panel A: Mean and variance parameter estimates
Mean St.Dev. St.Dev. St.Dev. Min Max Median
Betweena Withinb
µ0 0.25 0.39 0.28 0.28 -3.63 4.92 0.10
µ1 0.59 0.41 0.21 0.36 0.07 1.68 0.52
σ0 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.00 1.87 0.07
σ1 1.41 2.36 1.65 1.69 0.00 20.29 0.47
φ 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.14 -0.93 1.00 0.12
p00 0.89 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.90
p11 0.45 0.31 0.13 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.42
p1 0.21 0.15 0.07 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.17
p511 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.01
liquileak prob 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00
#stocks 1639.28 261.65 112.13 236.40 1123.00 2147.00 1668.00
a: Based on the time means, i.e., x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.
- continued on next page -
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- continued from previous page -
Panel B: Between and within correlation parameter estimates
µ1 σ0 σ1 φ p00 p11 p1 p511 liquileak prob
µ0 ρ(between) 0.37* 0.99* 0.93* 0.19* -0.27* 0.19* 0.33* 0.04 0.10*
ρ(within) 0.39* 0.95* 0.79* -0.01* -0.01* -0.04* -0.05* -0.04* -0.06*
µ1 ρ(between) 0.36* 0.26* 0.13* -0.02 0.02 0.06* -0.02 0.02
ρ(within) 0.39* 0.29* 0.18* -0.04* 0.15* 0.16* 0.13* 0.14*
σ0 ρ(between) 0.94* 0.18* -0.29* 0.20* 0.34* 0.04 0.10*
ρ(within) 0.81* 0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02*
σ1 ρ(between) 0.12* -0.29* 0.17* 0.31* 0.01 0.07*
ρ(within) -0.05* -0.02* -0.04* -0.05* -0.07* -0.06*
φ ρ(between) 0.17* 0.77* 0.62* 0.79* 0.81*
ρ(within) 0.07* 0.66* 0.68* 0.72* 0.77*
p00 ρ(between) 0.10* -0.52* 0.33* 0.12*
ρ(within) 0.11* -0.44* 0.24* 0.05*
p11 ρ(between) 0.68* 0.86* 0.77*
ρ(within) 0.64* 0.81* 0.64*
p1 ρ(between) 0.54* 0.74*
ρ(within) 0.63* 0.82*
p511 ρ(between) 0.89*
ρ(within) 0.85*
#stocks*#years: 1639*46
a: Based on stock-specific averages, i.e., x¯i = 1Y ∑
Y
y=1 xi,y.
b: Based on deviations from stock-specific averages, i.e., x∗i,y = xi,y− x¯i.
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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Figure 2.1: ILLIQ and the probability of the illiquid state
This figure depicts daily observations on the Amihud ILLIQ measure and an ‘ex-post’ probability esti-
mate of the illiquid state for a high and a low liquileak stock (PERMNO 60695 and PERMNO 44740,
respectively). The data period is last 100 days of 1986, the median year in the sample. The probability
estimate is ‘ex-post’ in the sense that it is the smoothed probability estimate of the state given the regime-
switching model parameter estimates and all observations in the sample, i.e., it is based on a forward and
a backward recursion.
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Table 2.4: Commonality in the liquidity state across stocks
This table assesses commonality in the liquidity state across stocks. It does so through a principal com-
ponent analysis of the ‘ex-post’ probability of the illiquid state. In Panel A this probability is obtained as
the filtered estimate of the illiquid state based on the estimates of a regime-switching model. The filtered
estimate is obtained through a forward recursion and therefore is an estimate conditional on the stock’s
history of observations on ILLIQ. Panel B is obtained the same way except that it is also based on a
backward recursion and therefore takes the stock’s past, current, and future observations on ILLIQ into
account when calculating the probability estimate. The percentage of variance explained by the largest
five eigenvalues is presented for the full data sample, the first sub-period, and the second sub-period.
Panel A: Filtered probability of the illiquid state
All years 1963-1985 1986-2008
1 12.01 12.86 11.23
2 3.93 3.92 3.95
3 2.37 2.32 2.42
4 1.81 1.84 1.78
5 1.53 1.54 1.52
sum 21.66 22.48 20.90
Panel B: Smoothed probability of the illiquid state
All years 1963-1985 1986-2008
1 13.04 13.96 12.20
2 4.22 4.21 4.23
3 2.53 2.48 2.58
4 1.91 1.95 1.88
5 1.61 1.62 1.61
sum 23.32 24.23 22.50
#stocks*#years 1639*46 1605*23 1672*23
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Portfolio sorts. The comparative advantage of portfolio sorts over regressions is that they
produce easy-to-interpret returns on a straightforward and feasible investment strategy. The
idea is simple. If liquileak prob is priced, then a zero-investment portfolio that is long high
liquileak prob stocks and short low liquileak prob stocks should earn a positive return.
Table 2.5 shows that a single-sort portfolio strategy produces a monthly excess return of
0.28% which is 3.36% annually. Each month, stocks are sorted into five quintiles based on
their previous year liquileak prob. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and they are equal
weighted11. The table presents average monthly excess returns (relative to the risk-free rate)
for each portfolio. This return is 0.62% for the low liquileak portfolio and 0.91% for the high
liquileak portfolio. The return differential across these portfolios is 0.28% and significant as
tested using robust standard errors. The result seems to be particularly strong in the second
sub-period as the differential is larger (0.35%) and remains statistically significant. It is worth
noting that this return differential appears to be driven by the highest rather than the lowest
liquileak portfolio as intermediate portfolios have returns that are similar in magnitude to the
low liquileak return.
Table 2.5: Excess returns single-sorted portfolios
This table presents excess returns for portfolios of stocks that are sorted on their previous year liquileak
probability (liquileak prob). These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are equal weighted. The
excess return (ret− r f (%)) is the time-series mean of monthly portfolio returns. The t-stat are based on
Newey-West (1987) robust standard errors. The “5-1” row pertains to the return differential across the
lowest (1) and the highest (5) liquileak probability portfolio. The results are presented for the full data
sample, the first sub-period, and the second sub-period.
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.62 2.68** 0.68 1.93* 0.57 1.86*
2 0.61 2.49** 0.67 1.83* 0.56 1.69*
3 0.64 2.49** 0.69 1.77* 0.60 1.75*
4 0.70 2.46** 0.77 1.76* 0.63 1.73*
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.91 2.86** 0.90 1.90* 0.92 2.16**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.28 2.36** 0.21 1.33 0.35 1.98**
#stocks*#months 1639*540 1605*264 1672*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
Portfolio double-sorts enables one to control for one variable when analyzing excess returns.
The standard double-sort strategy first sorts stocks into five portfolios based on the control
variable and then, within each quintile, stocks are further sorted on liquileak prob. For each of
these five by five portfolios the average return is calculated and a liquileak prob quintile return
11If one uses value-weighting instead, the results are largely unchanged, see “Appendix: Liquileaks”.
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is now obtained as the average return for this liquileak prob quintile across the five control
variable portfolios.
Table 2.6 shows that it really is liquileak risk that drives excess returns beyond either one of
its component factors or average liquidity. This chapter’s basic premise is that it takes both a
non-negligible probability of hitting the illiquid state and a substantial probability of being stuck
in that state. A double-sort portfolio strategy is useful to verify its validity: liquileak probability
should continue to produce excess returns after controlling for each of these factors separately,
i.e., p1 and p511, respectively. Panel A shows that the monthly return differential across the
extreme liquileak portfolios is somewhat lower (not surprisingly), 0.13%, but continues to be
positive and significant after controlling for the illiquid state probability (p1). Panel B shows
a similar result when controlling for the likelihood of being stuck in the illiquid state for more
than a week when started off in such state (p511); in this case, the differential is 0.19% and
significant. Both these results, again, are particularly strong in the second sub-period. These
findings show that both the probability of hitting the illiquid state and being stuck there seem to
matter for required returns.
Panel C controls for the average (unconditional) liquidity level and continues to find a posi-
tive return differential associated with liquileak risk. The monthly return differential across the
low and the high liquileak portfolio is a significant 0.33%. This is the same order of magnitude
as the single-sort differential (0.31%). The result is particularly strong for the second sub-period
(0.81% and significant) but not present in the first sub-period (-0.12% and insignificant). This
contrast across these two sub-periods is stronger than what was found in the single-sort anal-
ysis. This is a first indication that perhaps the first sub-period’s increased return was driven
by liquidity level, whereas in the second sub-period it really is a liquileak risk effect. We will
revisit these time trends in the regression analysis. Overall, this double-sort analysis shows that
liquileaks do appear to matter over and above the average liquidity level.
Fama-MacBeth regressions. The portfolio analysis is complemented with standard Fama-
MacBeth regressions in order to control for multiple well-known determinants of expected re-
turns (see Fama and MacBeth (1973)). The approach consists of two steps. First, The Fama-
French factor loadings are estimated for each stock-year by running the regression:
ri,d,y = ai,y+βMKTi,y MKTd,y+β
SMB
i,y SMBd,y+β
HML
i,y HMLd,y+ εi,d,y (2.8)
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, y indexes years, MKT is the excess market return
(relative to the risk-free rate), SMB is the Fama-French size factor, and HML is the Fama-
French book-to-market factor.
Second, for each month we perform the following cross-sectional regression:
ri,m,y = γm+λ′mβi,y−1+δ
′
mZi,y−1+ εi,m,y (2.9)
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Table 2.6: Excess returns double-sorted portfolios
This table presents excess returns for portfolios of stocks that are sorted on their previous year liquileak
probability (liquileak prob) after first sorting on a control variable which is either the previous year un-
conditional probability of the illiquid regime (p1) in Panel A, the previous year continuation probability
of the disaster regime (p511) in Panel B, or the average illiquidity level in Panel C. Following standard
practice, stocks are first sorted on their control variable and then, within each quintile, stocks are sorted
on the variable of interest. Once these 5×5 portfolios are established, the return for each liquileak prob
quintile is calculated as the average return for this liquileak prob quintile across the five control vari-
able portfolios. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are equal weighted. The excess return
(ret− r f (%)) is the time-series mean of monthly portfolio returns. The t-stat are based on Newey-West
(1987) robust standard errors. The “5-1” row pertains to the return differential across the lowest (1) and
the highest (5) liquileak probability portfolio. The results are presented for the full data sample, the first
sub-period, and the second sub-period.
Panel A: Controlling for disaster state probability (p1)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.66 4.44** 0.68 3.46** 0.63 2.85**
2 0.46 2.89** 0.41 1.92* 0.51 2.17**
3 0.51 3.10** 0.40 1.79* 0.61 2.60**
4 0.61 3.53** 0.56 2.35** 0.66 2.64**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.79 4.22** 0.71 2.73** 0.87 3.24**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.13 1.70* 0.03 0.24 0.24 2.55**
Panel B: Controlling for disaster state continuation probability (p511)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.52 3.48** 0.47 2.37** 0.56 2.55**
2 0.55 3.60** 0.52 2.50** 0.58 2.59**
3 0.63 3.92** 0.58 2.62** 0.68 2.93**
4 0.62 3.57** 0.56 2.38** 0.68 2.67**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.70 3.63** 0.63 2.37** 0.77 2.76**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.19 2.35** 0.16 1.29 0.21 2.18**
Panel C: Controlling for average liquidity (illiq)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.48 3.28** 0.66 3.40** 0.29 1.31
2 0.53 3.31** 0.58 2.61** 0.48 2.07**
3 0.57 3.41** 0.53 2.36** 0.61 2.46**
4 0.66 3.81** 0.53 2.28** 0.79 3.09**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.81 4.48** 0.54 2.25** 1.10 4.02**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.33 3.06** -0.12 -0.78 0.81 5.37**
#stocks*#months 1639*540 1605*264 1672*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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where m indexes months, r is a stock’s excess return (relative to the risk-free rate), β is the
vector of factor loadings, λ is the vector of associated risk premiums, Z is a vector of further
stock-specific characteristics such as, for example, liquileak probability (liquileak prob). The
parameter estimates for δ and λ are obtained as (time) averages of the coefficients obtained in
each month’s cross-sectional regression.
Table 2.7 presents the Fama-MacBeth results which show that liquileaks do command a
significant premium. A one standard deviation change in the liquileak probability (0.12, see
Table 2.3) yields a significant additional annual return of 100%*12*0.12*0.00746=1.07%. To
put it in perspective, a one standard deviation change in the average liquidity level (1.77, see Ta-
ble 2.1) commands a premium of 3.40%. It further appears that both factors of liquileak prob,
the unconditional probability of hitting the illiquid regime (p1) and its duration (p511), matter as
they are significantly positive when included individually (models (2) and (3)) and remain so
(although p511 significance is marginal) when included jointly. To find significance at all when
both are included (given their strong correlation, 0.54, see Table 2.3) is surprising and support
the liquileak logic that both matter for required returns.
Splitting the sample in two sub-periods and repeating the Fama-MacBeth regressions shows
that the liquileak premium has increased. In the first subsample, 1964 through 1985, liquileak prob
and its two separate factors (p1 and p511) carry the right sign but are not significant. The second
sub-period, 1986 through 2008, appears to carry the overall result as the signs are correct, the
coefficients are larger, and, most importantly, this time they are all significant (even when the
two factors are included jointly in model (4)). Moreover, the three formal tests on equality of
coefficients on liquileak prob, p1, and p511 across the two sub-periods all reject the null hy-
pothesis. Not only has the premium per unit of liquileak probability increased, the premium
differentials across stock-years have increased as well. A one first-period standard deviation
(0.13) increase commands an additional (first-period) annual return of 0.46%; a one second-
period standard deviation (0.12) increase commands an additional return of 1.69%.
The subsample analysis further reveals that the liquidity level premium has decreased. The
average liquidity level significantly explains returns in both sub-periods. The second-period
coefficient is significantly lower than the first-period coefficient (the null of equal coefficients
is rejected, see Table 2.7). This confirms the diminishing per-unit liquidity premium first doc-
umented in Ben-Rephael, Kadan, and Wohl (2010). The liquidity premium differentials across
stock-years have also grown as a first-period standard deviation (1.23) increase in illiquidity
commands an additional annual return of 3.39% whereas a second-period standard deviation
(2.15) increase commands an additional return of 2.43%. It seems that, over time, the liquileak
premium has grown to become similar in magnitude as the liquidity level premium; a one
second-period standard deviation increase implies an annual premium of 1.69% and 2.43%,
respectively.
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Table 2.8 redoes the Fama-MacBeth regressions with an extended set of stock-specific con-
trol variables suggested by Amihud (2002). These additional variables do not weaken the results
of the standard model as presented in Table 2.7. If anything, they make them stronger. Liquileak
probability now commands an annual return of 100%*12*0.12*0.00925=1.33% which is higher
than the 1.07% obtained for the standard Fama-MacBeth regressions. And, liquileak prob now
also turns significant for the first sub-period, which seems to be driven by the duration part as
it is p511 that turns significant, not p1. The coefficients in the second sub-period are generally
larger than what was found for the standard regressions.
The table further shows that some additional variables appear to matter for required returns.
There is a momentum effect as the previous year return (either over the last 100 days of the
year (r100) or from the start of the year until its end (r100yr)) carries a significantly positive
coefficient in the first sub-period. There is a size effect as market capitalization (lnsize) carries
a significantly negative sign throughout the sample. The stock’s volatility matters as more
volatility implies a lower future return. These findings are all consistent with what has been
documented in Amihud (2002).12 The only variable that does not appear to matter is dividend
yield (divyld).
Overall, the portfolio sorting analysis and the Fama-MacBeth regressions show consistent
evidence that the liquidity leak probability commands a premium in the cross-section of returns.
This premium is economically and statistically significant. Both factors that make up the liq-
uidity leak probability, p511 and p1, seem to contribute to the premium. Moreover, the liquidity
leak probability becomes more relevant in explaining cross-sectional returns over time whereas
the importance of liquidity level declines.
2.5 Which are the high-liquileak stocks?
Table 2.9 regresses liquileak probability on various standard trade and accounting variables in
order to characterize stocks that are prone to liquileaks. These regressions are based on a panel
dataset of variables that are calculated by stock-year. The overall OLS panel regression reveals
that high liquileak stocks seem to be highly volatile, small-cap stocks that exhibit high daily
volume variability. If only cross-sectional variability is used (based on the time averages of
all variables), these explanatory variables remain significant, but also two accounting variables
turn significant: return-on-assets and growth-rate-of-assets, i.e., highly profitable fast-growing
companies are more prone to liquileaks. If only time variability is used (based on a variable’s
deviation from its time average), volume variability is no longer significant, but asset growth
12A recent explanation for the somewhat puzzling volatility effect is in Fu (2008) which finds that it is driven
by non-synchronicity (lagged volatility, future return) and the time-varying (GARCH) nature of volatility. If this
is properly controlled for, the relation turns positive; conditional idiosyncratic volatility positively correlates with
expected returns.
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and leverage do become significant, i.e., in years that a company exhibits fast growth and high
leverage, liquileaks are more likely.
Table 2.9: Which are the high-liquileak firms?
This table regresses stock-year liquileak probability (liquileak prob) estimates on firm characteristics.
The panel dataset regressions include a:
(i) full-sample variation regression (i.e., a simple OLS regression),
(ii) a between-regression that based only on cross-sectional variation (i.e., the variables are averaged
across years and the result enters an OLS regression across stocks),
(iii) and a within-regression on only the time series variation (i.e., all variables are demeaned by sub-
tracting off the stock-specific mean and the result enters an OLS regression).
Some explanatory variables are pure trade variables: end-of-day transaction price (prc), volume in shares
(svol), standard deviation of daily share volume (sdsvol), standard deviation of daily return (sdret), mar-
ket capitalization (mcap). Some explanatory variables are pure book values: book to market value (btm),
return on assets (roa), growth rate of assets (growth asset). And, finally, one is calculated based on both
trade and book values: financial leverage calculated by the ratio of long-term debt to stockholder’s equity
(leverage).
OLS between-OLS within-OLS
prc 0.01 0.08 -0.07
(0.37) (1.43) (-1.60)
svol -4.17 -7.65 -1.91
(-0.87) (-0.57) (-0.39)
sdsvol 17.11** 40.63** 10.30
(3.01) (2.34) (1.59)
sdret 40.81** 33.45** 55.14**
(46.36) (18.25) (36.14)
mcap -1.17** -1.76** -1.90**
(-4.95) (-3.62) (-4.48)
btm 0.02 -2.28** 0.40
(0.06) (-5.65) (1.64)
roa 0.60 31.77** 4.13
(0.07) (2.56) (0.34)
growth asset 0.06 0.11 0.52**
(0.94) (0.60) (3.72)
leverage 0.03 -0.06 0.06**
(1.08) (-1.25) (2.03)
intercept -38.68** -24.89**
#stocks*#years 1639*46
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
2.6 Robustness checks
This section contains four robustness checks on the pricing of liquidity leaks. First, the liquileak
probability is replaced by a (model-free) proxy that is calculated directly from the raw data.
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Second, the financial crisis period, 2007-2008, was removed from the second sub-period to
verify whether the increased liquileak premium was due to the crisis. Third, the full sample
Fama-MacBeth regressions are re-done where liquileaks are defined as the security being stuck
in the illiquid state for three, ten, and fifteen days. Fourth, all analysis is redone without the
month of January as there is evidence that the pricing of liquidity is entirely a ‘January effect’.
Model-free raw data proxies for liquileak prob. All results thus far are based on param-
eter estimates from a Markov regime switching model. These results therefore require one to
believe that the model is a reasonable approximation to the data-generating process. Ideally,
one wants to see the results hold up in a nonparametric approach so as to avoid the criticism
that all is driven by the modeling choice. This is the aim of the first robustness analysis.
The liquileak probability, liquileak prob, is the product of two factors which both have a
natural analogue measure in the raw data. This probability is essentially the product of the
unconditional probability of hitting the illiquid state (p1) and the probability of being stuck in
it for five consecutive days (p511) (see equation (2.3)). We propose the following two raw data
proxies for these factors. The probability to find a stock in the illiquid state is proxied for by the
frequency with which a stock exhibits an Amihud ILLIQ value that is above the 80% quantile
across all stock-day observations on ILLIQ for that year ( freq illiq). The duration factor is
proxied for by the average time a stock spends in this state (duration illiq). The product of
these two factors is then taken as the raw data proxy for liquileak probability ( freq illiq×
duration illiq).
Table 2.10 presents summary statistics on the raw data proxies. Panel A finds that the
frequency of the illiquid regime ( freq illiq) is 0.22 on average.13 The measure’s cross-sectional
variation is substantial, 0.20, and of the magnitude as its variation through time, 0.23. The
duration of the illiquid state is 2.37 days on average with a cross-sectional variation of 3.43 and
an even larger time variation of 6.69. These statistics show that a threshold of five days might
make liquileaks a ‘negligible’ event for the average stock, but certainly not for some stocks in
some years. Not surprisingly, the liquileak proxy, being the product of these two proxies, also
shows substantial variation in the cross-section as well as through time. This is promising for a
variable that is tested as a ‘right-hand side’ variable.
Panel B presents the correlations (i) among the raw data proxies and (ii) between these
proxies and the model-based parameter estimates. It leads to the following observations. First,
the raw data proxies for the two factors of liquileak probability ( freq illiq and duration illiq)
are highly correlated both in the cross-section (ρ(between)=0.93) and in the time dimension
(ρ(within)=0.82). These proxies therefore cannot discriminate well between the two character-
istics that make a liquileak event. Second, both proxies are significantly positively correlated
with the model-based parameters that they proxy for. They correlate better in cross-section (0.20
13It is not exactly 0.20 because the average frequency is the average of frequencies that are themselves calculated
by stock-year. The 80% percentile is based on all stock-day values for the year.
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and 0.10) than they do through time (0.03 and 0.02) although all are significant. Not surpris-
ingly, the same pattern exists for freq illiq× duration illiq which proxies for liquileak prob
(ρ(between)=0.11 and ρ(within)=0.02). The higher between-correlation is encouraging as the
Fama-MacBeth approach identifies return premiums off of the cross-section. Third, the corre-
lations between the proxies and the average liquidity level (illiq) are similar in magnitude as
those for model-based parameter estimates. This alleviates the concern that the raw data proxies
might not capture as much of the disaster event nature of liquileaks but might just be another
(noisy) proxy for the average liquidity level.
Table 2.11 redoes the standard Fama-MacBeth analysis of Table 2.7 based on the raw data
proxy for liquileak prob and continues to find that liquileaks are priced. The coefficient of
this proxy ( freq illiq× duration illiq) is significantly positive and a one standard deviation
change in this proxy commands an annual premium of 100%*12*7.41*0.00040=3.56%. The
component factors are both significantly positive when included individually in the regression,
but only duration remains weakly significant when entered jointly. This is not surprising given
that both factors are highly collinear in the cross-section. The two sub samples both show that
the liquileak proxy is significantly positive in both sub-periods with alternating significance on
both of its component factors.
Table 2.12 uses the extended set of control variables in the Fama-MacBeth regressions (cf.
Table 2.8) and also finds that liquileaks continue to be priced when using the raw data proxy,
both in the full sample and in the two sub samples. Its two component factors both carry a pos-
itive coefficient when included individually or jointly, but they are not consistently significant.
The findings are very similar to those discussed for the standard Fama-MacBeth regressions
based on the raw data proxies (i.e., the results presented in Table 2.11).
2007-2008 financial crisis. Table 2.14 in the “Appendix: Liquileaks” redoes the Fama-
McBeth analysis of Table 2.7 and 2.8 after removing the financial crisis years 2007-2008 from
the second subperiod (1986-2008). The coefficient on liquileak prob is slightly higher, 12.07
vs. 11.77 (and 14.63 vs. 13.52 with extended controls), and we therefore conclude that the
increase in the second subperiod relative to the first subperiod was not due to the financial
crisis.
Duration liquileaks. Liquileaks are defined as the security being stuck in the illiquid state
for more than five days (see equation (2.3)). Tables 2.15 through 2.17 redo the full sample Fama-
MacBeth regressions but now define liquileaks based on three, ten, and fifteen days respectively.
The results show that liquileaks continue to be priced for all durations. The per-unit premium
increases monotonically with duration.
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January effect. A fourth robustness analysis removes the months of January to show that
liquileak pricing is not just a ‘January effect’. Keim (1983) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum
(1993) find that the bid-ask spread does no longer increase the expected return in the cross-
section once the month of January is excluded. A straightforward robustness check is therefore
to remove the January months and redo both the model-based and the raw data proxy analysis
using the extended set of control variables.
Panel A of Table 2.13 shows that liquileak prob continues to carry a significantly positive
sign in the cross-section of returns. There is some evidence of a January effect as its coefficient,
0.00676, is lower than the coefficient of the full sample analysis, 0.00925 (see Table 2.8). The
two component factors of liquileak prob (p1 and p511) continue to be significant when included
individually, but are now also significant when included jointly.
The raw data proxy analysis presented in Panel B also finds that liquileaks continue to be
priced. Its proxy freq illiq× duration illiq carries a significantly positive sign and its coef-
ficient, 0.43, is of the same magnitude as the coefficient in the full sample analysis, 0.42 (cf.
Table 2.12). The two factors that make up this proxy are significantly positive when included
individually, but not when included jointly (due to high collinearity).
2.7 Conclusion
This study proposes a new liquidity measure that formalizes the risk of finding the security in a
market from which all liquidity has leaked for a considerable amount of time. Whereas normal
market liquidity might not be a concern to investors, such liquileak event might be painful. The
probability of such event was estimated using a Markov regime-switching model where the se-
curity’s trading state alternates between a liquid and an (extremely) illiquid state. Standard asset
pricing analysis based on both portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions on all AMEX and
NYSE common stocks from 1963 to 2008 shows that liquileaks do command additional returns.
The regression results show that a one standard deviation increase in the liquileak probability
commands an additional annual return of 1.33%. A nonparametric robustness analysis confirms
that liquileak events are priced.
To find that liquileak risk matters in equity markets that generally have wide participation
implies that this might be an even more important issue for non-equities. Also, post-crisis
regulatory efforts might consider liquileak risk in capital adequacy requirements. The recent
financial crisis has shown that normal market liquidity might not be there when it is needed
most.
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Table 2.13: Fama-MacBeth regressions, excluding January effects
This table presents the results of a Fama-MacBeth regression analysis on whether the probability of
liquileaks (liquileaks prob) is priced in the cross-section of returns. It replicates Table 2.8 and 2.12
with the only difference that the month of January is excluded from the sample. First, the Fama-French
factor loadings are estimated for each stock-year by running the following regression: ri,d,y = ai,y +
βMKTi,y MKTd,y + βSMBi,y SMBd,y + βHMLi,y HMLd,y + εi,d,y where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, y indexes
years, MKT is the excess market return (relative to the risk-free rate), SMB is the Fama-French size
factor, and HML is the Fama-French book-to-market factor. Second, for each month the following cross-
sectional regression is performed: ri,m,y = γm +λ′mβi,y−1 + δ′mZi,y−1 + εi,m,y where m indexes months, r
is a stock’s excess return (relative to the risk-free rate), β is the vector of factor loadings, λ is the vector
of associated risk premiums, Z is a vector of further stock-specific characteristics which includes the
model-based liquileak probability (liquileak prob), the model-based (unconditional) probability that a
stock hits the illiquid regime (p1), the model-based probability that it is stuck in this regime for five
consecutive days (p511), the frequency with which a stock is more illiquid than the 80% quantile of
all stocks’ Amihud’s ILLIQ measure in that year ( freq illiq), the average duration that a stock of this
event (duration illiq), the product of these two variables ( freq illiq×duration illiq), the mean-adjusted
illiquidity level (illiqma), the return during the last 100 days of each year (r100), the return from the
start of the year until 100 days before its end (r100yr), the standard deviation of daily returns (sdret), the
logarithm of the market capitalization (lnsize), and the dividend yield (divyld). The parameter estimates
for δ and λ are obtained as (time) averages of the coefficients obtained in each month’s cross-sectional
regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. All coefficients have been multiplied by 1000.
Panel A: liquileak prob
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 6.76**
(3.29)
p1 5.49** 3.22**
(4.13) (2.04)
p511 3.31** 2.36**
(4.01) (2.42)
illiqma 0.95** 0.93** 0.96** 0.95**
(5.71) (5.59) (5.73) (5.66)
r100 7.93** 7.83** 7.98** 7.85**
(4.73) (4.66) (4.76) (4.66)
r100yr 2.07* 1.93* 2.01* 1.92
(1.77) (1.65) (1.72) (1.64)
lnsize -1.85** -1.75** -1.89** -1.82**
(-6.68) (-6.31) (-6.80) (-6.59)
sdret -4.56** -4.49** -4.62** -4.61**
(-7.73) (-7.56) (-7.82) (-7.83)
divyld -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.03) (0.04) (-0.02) (-0.02)
βMKT 7.16** 7.26** 7.14** 7.20**
(3.79) (3.84) (3.78) (3.81)
βSMB -3.25** -3.32** -3.22** -3.28**
(-2.75) (-2.81) (-2.73) (-2.78)
βHML -2.93** -2.93** -2.94** -2.95**
(-2.56) (-2.56) (-2.56) (-2.57)
intercept 18.67** 17.15** 18.87** 18.00**
(7.69) (7.08) (7.79) (7.59)
- continued on next page -
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- continued from previous page -
Panel B: raw data proxy for liquileak probability: f req illiq×duration illiq
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f req illiq×duration illiq 0.43**
(3.98)
f req illiq 2.50** 1.32
(3.71) (1.19)
duration illiq 0.29** 0.20
(3.14) (1.34)
illiqma 1.46** 1.51** 1.56** 1.50**
(5.39) (5.76) (5.84) (5.56)
r100 7.80** 7.72** 7.73** 7.70**
(5.08) (5.04) (5.04) (5.02)
r100yr 1.60 1.59 1.55 1.58
(1.59) (1.58) (1.54) (1.57)
lnsize -1.91** -1.82** -1.86** -1.80**
(-7.67) (-7.36) (-7.53) (-7.32)
sdret -5.35** -5.32** -5.35** -5.32**
(-9.72) (-9.69) (-9.71) (-9.67)
divyld 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
(1.35) (1.40) (1.34) (1.38)
βMKT 7.18** 7.21** 7.21** 7.21**
(3.83) (3.85) (3.84) (3.85)
βSMB -2.86** -2.85** -2.86** -2.85**
(-2.42) (-2.41) (-2.42) (-2.41)
βHML -3.05** -3.05** -3.05** -3.04**
(-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.67)
intercept 19.65** 18.93** 19.22** 18.82**
(8.37) (8.09) (8.24) (8.05)
#stocks*#months 1639*495
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Appendix 2A: Implementation details on likelihood optimiza-
tion using the Hamilton filter
A number of empirical research suggests that the time series behavior of economic and financial
variables may exhibit different patterns over time. Therefore, instead of using one model for
the conditional mean of a variable, it is natural to employ several models to capture different
patterns. The idea of liquidity leaks is that a stock is in a normal liquidity state most of time, but
occasionally hits an illiquid state. These features can be readily accommodated by a Markov
regime-switching model.
A Markov regime-switching model is constructed by combining two or more dynamic mod-
els via a Markovian switching mechanism. It involves multiple structures that can characterize
different time series behaviors in different states. By permitting switching between these states,
this model is able to represent more complex dynamic patterns. A novel feature of the Markov
switching model is that the switching mechanism is controlled by an unobservable state variable
that follows a first-order Markov chain process. In particular, the probability of a change in state
depends on the past only through the value of the most recent state. As such, a structure may
prevail for a random period of time, and it will be replaced by another structure when a switch-
ing takes place. This is in sharp contrast with the random switching model of Quandt (1972)
in which the events of switching are independent over time. The Markov switching model is
therefore suitable for describing correlated data that exhibit distinct dynamic patterns during
different time periods.
The estimation of a Markov regime-switching model with no autoregressive coefficient dates
back to the analysis of Baum, Petrie, Soules, and Weiss (1970). Later, Poritz (1982), Juang
and Rabiner (1985), and Rabiner (1989) incorporate autoregressive elements and describe such
processes as “hidden Markov models”. The estimation procedure described below follows the
approach of Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton (1994).
Let yt be the observation series that is drawn from the regime switching model described
in Section 2.2. Let Ωt = {yt ,yt−1, · · · ,y0} denote the set of observations up to time t and let
θ= (p,q,µ0,µ1,ρ,σ0,σ1)′ be the parameter vector. The transition probabilities p00 and p11 are
constrained to be between 0 and 1 and are therefore parameterized as:
p00 =
exp(p)
1+ exp(p)
(2.10)
p11 =
exp(q)
1+ exp(q)
(2.11)
The autocorrelation parameter φ is constrained to be between -1 and 1 (to ensure stationarity)
and is therefore parameterized as:
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φ=
exp(ρ)−1
exp(ρ)+1
(2.12)
The parameter estimates are obtained through maximum likelihood where the likelihood is
calculated with the Hamilton filter as described in the remainder of the appendix. First, the
likelihood is written as a product of conditional probabilities which are evaluated iteratively,
i.e., the likelihood is:
log f (y0,y1, · · · ,yT |y0;θ) =
T
∑
t=0
log f (yt |Ωt−1;θ) (2.13)
In the iteration, given the probability of state st , the conditional density of yt+1 is calculated
as well as the probability of st+1 (where the probability for the initial state s0 is set to the
unconditional probability (cf. equation (2.3)). So, let Pr(st = 0|Ωt) = pi0 and Pr(st = 1|Ωt) =
pi1. The transition probabilities are:
Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 0|Ωt) = Pr(st+1 = 0|st = 0;Ωt) ·Pr(st = 0|Ωt) = p00pi0 (2.14)
Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 0|Ωt) = Pr(st+1 = 1|st = 0;Ωt) ·Pr(st = 0|Ωt) = p01pi0 (2.15)
Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 1|Ωt) = Pr(st+1 = 0|st = 1;Ωt) ·Pr(st = 1|Ωt) = p10pi1 (2.16)
Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 1|Ωt) = Pr(st+1 = 1|st = 1;Ωt) ·Pr(st = 1|Ωt) = p11pi1 (2.17)
For each of these transitions the distribution of yt+1 is:
f (yt+1|st+1 = 0;st = 0;Ωt ;θ) = 1√2piσ0
exp
(
− [(yt+1−µ0)−φ(yt−µ0)]2
2σ20
)
(2.18)
f (yt+1|st+1 = 1;st = 0;Ωt ;θ) = 1√2piσ1
exp
(
− [(yt+1−µ1)−φ(yt−µ0)]2
2σ21
)
(2.19)
f (yt+1|st+1 = 0;st = 1;Ωt ;θ) = 1√2piσ0
exp
(
− [(yt+1−µ0)−φ(yt−µ1)]2
2σ20
)
(2.20)
f (yt+1|st+1 = 1;st = 1;Ωt ;θ) = 1√2piσ1
exp
(
− [(yt+1−µ1)−φ(yt−µ1)]2
2σ21
)
(2.21)
The density therefore is:
f (yt+1|Ωt ;θ) =
1
∑
j=0
1
∑
i=0
f (yt+1,st+1 = j,st = i|Ωt ;θ) (2.22)
=
1
∑
j=0
1
∑
i=0
f (yt+1|st+1 = j;st = i;Ωt ;θ) ·Pr(st+1 = j,st = i|Ωt ;θ) (2.23)
= (2.18)× (2.14)+ (2.19)× (2.15)+ (2.20)× (2.16)+ (2.21)× (2.17)(2.24)
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If observation yt+1 is then added to the conditioning set, the state probabilities are updated with
Bayes’ rule:
Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 0|Ωt+1) = Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 0|yt+1;Ωt) (2.25)
=
f (yt+1,st+1 = 0,st = 0|Ωt ;θ)
f (yt+1|Ωt ;θ) (2.26)
=
f (yt+1|st+1 = 0;st = 0;Ωt ;θ) ·Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 0|Ωt ;θ)
f (yt+1|Ωt ;θ) (2.27)
= ((2.18)× (2.14))/ (2.24) (2.28)
Similarly,
Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 0|Ωt+1) = ((2.19)× (2.15))/((2.24)) (2.29)
Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 1|Ωt+1) = ((2.20)× (2.16))/((2.24)) (2.30)
Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 1|Ωt+1) = ((2.21)× (2.17))/((2.24)) (2.31)
Finally, the state probability for the next period is obtained as:
Pr(st+1 = 0|Ωt+1) = Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 0|Ωt+1)+Pr(st+1 = 0,st = 1|Ωt+1) (2.32)
= (2.28)+ (2.30) (2.33)
Pr(st+1 = 1|Ωt+1) = Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 0|Ωt+1)+Pr(st+1 = 1,st = 1|Ωt+1) (2.34)
= (2.29)+ (2.31) (2.35)

Chapter 3
Downside Liquidity
This chapter is based on Wang (2011).
3.1 Introduction
In the market microstructure literature, we usually refer liquidity as the ability to buy or sell an
asset, at low cost, without affecting the asset’s price. Whether investors demand higher returns
for less liquid stocks has been a focus for a substantial body of research. Meanwhile, a series
of market crisis, for example, the crash of 1987, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the dot-com
bubble of 2000, and more recently the credit crisis of 2008, has drawn much attention of market
participants and regulators on liquidity in the downside market. In this chapter, we investigate
liquidity level and risk explicitly conditioning on the market return and examine whether the
downside illiquidity level and beta are priced differently in the cross section of stock returns.
There are a number of theoretical and empirical papers that examine the pricing of liquidity.
One line of literature focuses on the relationship between liquidity level and stock returns. For
example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) propose a single-period model with non-stochastic liq-
uidity and suggest that assets with low liquidity level will command a positive return premium.
Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) also investigate how fixed transaction costs affect asset prices
and trading volume. In their continuous-time equilibrium model, they show that in the presence
of fixed transaction costs, agents choose to trade only infrequently. This reduces agents’ asset
demand and in equilibrium leads to a significant illiquidity discount in asset prices. Empirically,
Amihud (2002) first proposes to use the ratio of absolute returns to trading volume (ILLIQ mea-
sure) as a measure of illiquidity and finds that the positive return-illiquidity relationship exists
both across stocks and over time. The other line of literature studies the systematic component
of liquidity as a source of priced risk. For example, Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2000)
demonstrate that liquidity has a common systematic factor. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) regard
market liquidity as a state variable and propose a liquidity beta as return sensitivity to market
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liquidity. They find a substantial annual return difference of 7.5% across low and high liquid-
ity beta stocks. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing
model. In addition to the level of liquidity and the ‘Pastor- Stambaugh’ return sensitivity to
market liquidity, they show that commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity and liquidity
sensitivity to market returns should also matter for required returns. Empirically they find that
the aggregate liquidity risk premium is approximately 1.1% annually.
While liquidity level and risk are important to investors in general, they can be particu-
larly important during a crisis period. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) provide a model that
links an asset’s liquidity with traders’ funding liquidity. They show that there can be multi-
ple equilibria in the market. In one equilibrium, market is liquid and margin requirements are
favorable for speculators, so speculators are in general liquidity suppliers in the market. In an-
other equilibrium, market is illiquid with higher margin requirement, then speculators turn to
be liquidity demanders instead of suppliers. A large market shock can lead to losses for spec-
ulators. When their capital is reduced to a certain level, the market will eventually switch to a
low-liquidity/high-margin equilibrium. Vayanos (2004) presents a dynamic equilibrium model
of a multi-asset market with stochastic volatility and transaction costs. His key assumption is
that investors are fund managers, subject to withdrawals when fund performance falls below
a threshold. This model reveals a link between asset liquidity premium and the extent of un-
certainty (represented by the volatility of asset payoffs). During volatile times, the probability
that performance falls below an exogenous threshold increases, and withdrawals become more
likely. This reduces the managers’ willingness to hold illiquid assets, and raises the liquidity
premium. Empirically, Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2007) provide evidence that market
condition affects the time variation in liquidity. They find that negative market returns reduce
liquidity more than positive market returns. Moreover, the impact of negative market returns on
liquidity is stronger when financial intermediaries are more likely to face funding constraints.
Next, they find the commonality in spreads increases during market declines. They also docu-
ment the industry spill-over effect in liquidity and show that the cost of providing liquidity is
highest in the declining market.
Economists have recognized that investors regard downside losses differently from upside
gains. It is well accepted that investors are not only risk averse but also loss averse, and they
place more weight on losses relative to gains in their utility function. In a declining market,
investors are especially unwilling to hold assets that co-move with the market since these assets
tend to have very low payoffs when the wealth of investors is low. Therefore, investors who are
averse to downside losses require higher expected returns for holding stocks with high down-
side risk. Recent market microstructure literature suggests that market conditions also have
effects on investors trading behavior. In a declining market, liquidity often dries up suddenly
either because financial intermediaries withdraw from providing liquidity or market participants
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engage in panic selling. In a normal market state, market makers provide liquidity by absorb-
ing temporary liquidity shocks. When stock market is declining, the value of their portfolio is
shrinking. Then it is very likely that market makers hit their capital constraints and are forced
to liquidate. The usual liquidity suppliers then turn to become liquidity demanders. Moreover,
when investors are in need of capital, they are more willing to hold liquid assets in a down mar-
ket so that they can easily sell those assets and meet the capital requirement. Therefore, market
decline could reduce the aggregate collateral of the market making sector which may lead to
higher commonality in liquidity.
In this chapter, we differentiate market downside and upside explicitly. We set the average
market return as a cutoff level and define a market is in a downside (upside) if its return is lower
(higher) than this cutoff level. Amihud ILLIQ measure is used as our daily illiquidity measure.
The downside (upside) illiquidity level is defined as the average of daily ILLIQ measure in a
downside (upside) market. The downside and upside liquidity beta is the comovement of stock’s
illiquidity level with the market illiquidity level conditioning on the market return. The mean
value of the downside illiquidity level is 0.33, which is about 3% higher than the mean of the
upside illiquidity level. There are considerable variations in the downside and upside illiquidity
level, both in the cross-section and over time. Although the summary statistics of the downside
and upside liquidity beta are similar, their between correlation is 0.59 implying that these two
variables are far from perfectly correlated.
We use two approaches to investigate the relation between the downside liquidity and stock
returns in the cross-section. One is the portfolio sorting approach, which produces easy-to-
interpret returns on a feasible investment strategy. We sort individual stocks into five quintiles
based on the their downside (and upside) illiquidity level and downside (and upside) liquidity
beta, and find that stocks with high downside illiquidity level and beta have higher returns than
stocks with low downside illiquidity level and beta. For example, a trading strategy that is long
in stocks with high downside illiquidity level and short in stocks with low downside illiquidity
level yield an average monthly excess return of approximately 0.94%. The return difference
between the two extreme downside liquidity beta quintiles is 0.74% per month. To differentiate
the effects of downside and upside illiquidity level and beta, we further conduct a double-sorting
analysis. After control for the upside illiquidity level we still find that the return spread of
portfolios sorted by the downside illiquidity level is significantly positive. Also, the increasing
pattern of return from the low downside liquidity beta to high downside liquidity beta remains
after first sort on the upside liquidity beta. The other approach applied is the Fama-MacBeth
regression, which allows us to regress cross-sectional excess returns directly on the downside
illiquidity level and beta and enable us to control for other well-known return determinants.
The regression is conducted on the firm level. We find evidence that the downside illiquidity
level and beta have a significantly positive effect on stock returns in the cross-section. For
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example, an increase of one standard deviation in the downside illiquidity level would increase
monthly returns by 0.15%. It is approximately 1.8% on an annual basis, which also indicates
economical significance. The downside liquidity beta also has a significantly positive effect
on stock returns. However, when the downside illiquidity level, the upside illiquidity level,
the downside and upside liquidity beta are included jointly in the cross-sectional regression,
only the downside illiquidity level still has a significantly positive coefficient on returns. In the
robustness check, we find that the results are robust to the January effect.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and
presents the descriptive statistics of the downside illiquidity level and beta. In section 3.3, we
examine the cross-sectional relation between the downside illiquidity level and beta and stock
returns. Section 3.4 presents the robustness check, where we repeat the analysis but control for
the January effect. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and the downside liquidity level and beta
Data. The data consists of two parts. First, daily and monthly data of stock prices, returns,
volume, shares outstanding, and dividend are obtained from CRSP, with a sample period from
December 31, 1962, through December 31, 2008. Following Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam
(2000) and Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we utilize only common stocks (CRSP share code
10 and 11) listed on NYSE/AMEX (CRSP exchange code 1 and 2). Second, we obtain the daily
and monthly risk-free rate and the daily Fama and French three factors from Kenneth French at
Dartmouth College.
Summary statistics. Table 3.1 presents overall, between, and within summary statistics for
NYSE/AMEX firms over the sample period from 1963 through 2008. In addition to return
(ret), price (prc), dollar volume (dvol), and market capitalization (mcap), there are several
additional variables used in the analysis: r100 is the return during the last 100 days of each
year; r100yr is the return between the beginning of the year and the 100 days before its end;
sdret is the standard deviation of the daily return; divyld is the dividend yield calculated as
the sum of the dividends during one year divided by the end-of-year price. There are between
1123 and 2147 stocks in our sample. The average daily stock return is 6.90 basis point. It
has a minimum value of -594.47 basis point indicating that there are considerable downturns
in the stock market. The daily closing price has a range from $2.02 to $906.50 and a mean
value of $29.08. There is substantial variation in volume and size both in the cross-section and
through time. For example, daily volume is 7.50 million on average with a between standard
deviation of 14.29 million and a within standard deviation of 19.98 million. The average market
capitalization is 1.69 billion with a cross-sectional (between) standard deviation of 3.47 billion
and a time (within) standard deviation of 3.60 billion.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of general variables
This table presents overall, between, and within summary statistics for NYSE/AMEX firms over the
sample period from December 31, 1962 through December 31, 2008. The included variables are: daily
stock returns (ret), daily closing price (prc), daily dollar volume (dvol), market capitalization (mcap),
the return during the last 100 days of each year (r100), the return between the beginning of the year and
the 100 days before its end (r100yr), the standard deviation of the daily return (sdret), the dividend yield
calculated as the sum of the dividends during one year divided by the end-of-year price (divyld). #stocks
denotes the number of stocks. Variable units are included in parentheses.
Mean St.Dev. St.Dev. St.Dev. Min Max Median
Betweena Withinb
ret (bps) 6.90 22.42 8.69 20.67 -594.47 859.66 6.58
prc ($) 29.08 24.20 17.66 16.55 2.02 906.50 24.43
dvol ($ mln) 7.50 24.57 14.29 19.98 0.01 1193.43 0.56
mcap ($ bln) 1.69 5.00 3.47 3.60 0.00 131.03 0.32
r100 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.26 -0.99 15.44 0.03
r100yr 0.12 0.39 0.14 0.36 -0.94 12.15 0.07
sdret (%) 2.42 1.18 0.81 0.86 0.00 42.63 2.18
divyld 2.67 6.51 2.53 6.00 0.00 296.56 1.76
#stocks 1638.76 262.59 113.62 236.74 1123.00 2147.00 1650.00
a: Based on the time means i.e. x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.
Illiquidity and downside illiquidity. We use the Amihud (2002) measure as our daily illiq-
uidity measure. Compared with other measures of illiquidity, such as the bid-ask spread or the
price impact, the Amihud measure only requires daily data and thus enable us study a much
long time period. Moreover, Hasbrouck (2006) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) have shown
that the Amihud measure is highly correlated with many other measures of illiquidity, suggest-
ing that it is a reliable measure of illiquidity. Specifically, for each stock i and day d, the Amihud
illiquidity measure is defined as:
illiqid =
|rid|
dvolid
where rid is the daily return of stock i on day d. dvol
i
d is the daily dollar volume of stock i on day
d. We follow the filtering procedure of Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2000), and Kamara,
Lou, and Sadka (2008). In specific, first, illiqid is defined only for positive values of dvol
i
d , and
non-missing non-zero values of rid . Second, for a daily observation to be included in the sample,
the stock’s price at the end of the previous trading day has to be at least $2. Third, firm-days
outliers with illiqid in the lowest and highest 1% percentiles of the sample are discarded after
applying the first two filters. Finally, a stock is retained in a given year only if it has at least 200
valid observations
The downside illiquidity level (illiq−) and upside illiquidity level (illiq+) are defined as
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follows:
illiq− =
1
N
N
∑
d=1
(illiq|rm < µm)
illiq+ =
1
N
N
∑
d=1
(illiq|rm > µm)
where rm is the market’s excess return, and µm is the average market excess return. In addition,
the downside liquidity beta (β−cc) and upside liquidity beta (β+cc) are defined as follows:
β−cc =
cov(ci,cm|rm < µm)
var(cm|rm < µm)
β+cc =
cov(ci,cm|rm > µm)
var(cm|rm > µm)
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents overall, between, and within summary statistics for the yearly
estimates of illiquidity level, downside illiquidity level and beta. The mean value of downside
illiquidity level is 0.33, which is about 3% higher than the mean value of the upside illiquidity
level. It implies that on average the downside market is more illiquid than the upside market.
Moreover, there are considerable variations in downside and upside illiquidity level, both in the
cross-section and over time. There is no difference in the mean value of the downside liquidity
beta and upside liquidity beta. The average value of Amihud’s ILLIQ measure (illiq) is a 0.34%
change per $1 million volume. The between and within standard deviation are 0.69 and 0.50,
respectively, which indicates that there is substantial variation both in the cross- section and
through time.
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the between, and within correlation of the estimated downside
and upside illiquidity level and beta. The between and within correlation between illiq− and
illiq+ are 0.99 and 0.96 respectively, both significant at 95% level. Although the summary
statistics of β−cc and β+cc are similar, their between correlation is 0.59, significant at a 95% level
implying that these two variables are not same. As expected, illiq−, illiq+, β−cc and β+cc all have
significantly positive correlation with the Amihud ILLIQ measure.
3.3 The pricing of the downside illiquidity level and beta
In this section we investigate whether the downside illiquidity level and beta are priced in the
cross-section. We first implement portfolio sorting approach to examine the relationship be-
tween the downside liquidity and stock average returns. Then we move on to Fama-MacBeth
regressions which enable us regress cross-sectional returns directly on the downside liquidity
and meanwhile control for other firm characteristics and risk factors.
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Table 3.2: Downside and upside illiquidity level and beta
This table presents summary statistics for the yearly estimates of the downside and upside illiquidity level
and beta conditioning on movements of the market excess return. The daily ILLIQ measure is defined as
illiqid =
|rid |
dvolid
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, r is the transaction price return and dvol is dollar volume. The
downside illiquidity level (illiq−) and upside illiquidity level (illiq+) are defined as follows:
illiq− =
1
N
N
∑
d=1
(illiq|rm < µm)
illiq+ =
1
N
N
∑
d=1
(illiq|rm > µm)
where rm is the market’s excess return, and µm is the average market excess return. In addition, the
downside liquidity beta (β−cc) and upside liquidity beta (β+cc) are defined as follows:
β−cc =
cov(ci,cm|rm < µm)
var(cm|rm < µm)
β+cc =
cov(ci,cm|rm > µm)
var(cm|rm > µm)
Panel A presents mean and variance statistics; Panel B presents within and between correlation.
Panel A: Mean and variance
Mean St.Dev. St.Dev. St.Dev. Min Max Median
Betweena Withinb
illiq−(%/mln) 0.33 0.65 0.51 0.41 0.00 5.93 0.06
illiq+(%/mln) 0.32 0.63 0.49 0.40 0.00 6.43 0.06
β+cc 0.39 1.56 0.99 1.21 -41.89 75.32 0.03
β−cc 0.39 1.59 1.00 1.23 -32.17 78.39 0.03
illiq (%/mln) 0.34 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.00 5.08 0.06
Panel B: Between and within correlation
illiq+ β−cc β+cc illiq
illiq− ρ(between) 0.99* 0.58* 0.60* 0.99*
ρ(within) 0.96* 0.30* 0.33* 0.96*
illiq+ ρ(between) 0.60* 0.60* 0.99*
ρ(within) 0.32* 0.31* 0.96*
β−cc ρ(between) 0.80* 0.59*
ρ(within) 0.59* 0.30*
β+cc ρ(between) 0.60*
ρ(within) 0.31*
a: Based on the time means i.e. x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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Portfolio sorting analysis Compared to the regression approach, portfolio sorting is
interesting since it produces easy-to-interpret returns on a feasible investment strategy. For
example, if individual stocks with high downside illiquidity level have higher returns than stocks
with low downside illiquidity level, then a zero-investment portfolio that is long in high illiq−
stocks and short in low illiq− stocks should earn a positive return.
First, the single-sorting portfolio analysis is conducted. Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the
excess returns of portfolios that are sorted based on previous year downside illiquidity level
illiq−. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are equal weighted. For each portfolio, the
average monthly excess returns (relative to the risk-free rate) and robust Newey-West (1987) t-
statistics are presented, and the analysis is done for the full data sample, the first sub-period and
the second sub-period respectively. The returns are generally higher for portfolios with higher
values of the downside illiquidity level illiq−. The average monthly excess return is 1.35%
for the portfolio with highest illiq−, whereas the portfolio with lowest illiq− has 0.41% return.
The average monthly excess return for a zero-investment portfolio is 0.94% (about 11.28% per
year), which is both economically and statistically significant. For both sub-periods, the return
difference across illiq− quintiles is significantly positive. However, for the first 264 months
(from year 1964 to 1985) the return spread is 1.37% per month, which is more than twice as
big as that of the second sub-period. In Panel B stocks are sorted by the pervious year upside
illiquidity level illiq+. We find that over the full data sample, the return difference across the
two extreme illiq+ portfolios is 0.93%, which is 0.01% lower than the return difference of
the illiq− portfolios. The trend is similar that a higher return difference is found in the first
sub-period.
Panel C and Panel D of Table 3.3 present the excess return of portfolios that are sorted based
on previous year downside liquidity beta β−cc and upside liquidity beta β+cc respectively. The
excess return increases monotonically within the β−cc quintiles. The difference in excess returns
between the two extreme β−cc quintiles is 0.74% per month (approximately 8.88% per year). The
same analysis is also conducted for two sub-periods. For the period from year 1964 to 1985, the
return difference across β−cc quintiles is 1.06%, statistically and economically significant. The
second sub-period still shows significantly positive return difference, but the magnitude of the
return difference is much smaller than that in the first sub-period. Moreover, the monthly return
of the zero-investment strategy in β−cc portfolios is approximately 0.2% smaller than that of
illiq− portfolios. Last, stocks are sorted by β+cc in Panel D. The two extreme β+cc portfolios have
the smallest monthly return of 0.64% for the full sample period, although it is still statistically
significant. Similarly, the positive return spreads are mainly resulted from the first sub-period.
In the next step, we apply the double-sorting portfolio analysis which allows us to check the
robustness of the illiq− and β−cc effects controlling for illiq+ and β+cc respectively. As we have
shown in Table 3.3, both the downside and upside illiquidity level have a positive premium
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Table 3.3: Excess returns single-sorted portfolios
This table presents the excess returns of single-sorted portfolios. In each month stocks are sorted into
five quintiles based on their previous year downside illiquidity level illiq− in Panel A, upside illiquidity
level illiq+ in Panel B, downside liquidity beta β−cc in Panel C, and upside liquidity beta β+cc in Panel D.
These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are equally weighted. The column labeled “ret− r f (%)” is
the time-series means of the monthly portfolio returns in percentage. The column labeled “t-stat” is the
robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics. “1” (“5”) represents the low (high) value. The row “5-1” refers to
the difference in monthly returns between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. The results are presented for the
full data sample, the first sub-period, and the second sub-period.
Panel A: stocks sorted by illiq−
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.41 1.84 0.31 0.95 0.51 1.66
2 0.54 2.14* 0.52 1.37 0.55 1.67
3 0.63 2.32* 0.70 1.70 0.56 1.58
4 0.80 2.79* 0.99 2.28* 0.61 1.64
5 (High) 1.35 4.56* 1.68 3.54* 1.04 2.90*
5−1 0.94 5.60* 1.37 5.25* 0.52 2.58*
Panel B: stocks sorted by illiq+
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.42 1.85 0.30 0.92 0.53 1.70
2 0.53 2.12* 0.51 1.34 0.55 1.68
3 0.62 2.28* 0.72 1.74 0.53 1.48
4 0.81 2.87* 0.99 2.30* 0.65 1.74
5 (High) 1.34 4.54* 1.69 3.56* 1.01 2.85*
5−1 0.93 5.54* 1.39 5.29* 0.49 2.43*
Panel C: stocks sorted by β−cc
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.50 2.26* 0.45 1.39 0.55 1.81
2 0.51 2.16* 0.47 1.31 0.55 1.76
3 0.64 2.38* 0.72 1.78 0.55 1.58
4 0.79 2.75* 0.97 2.20* 0.62 1.67
5 (High) 1.24 3.99* 1.51 3.03* 0.99 2.62*
5−1 0.74 4.82* 1.06 4.04* 0.43 2.74*
Panel D: stocks sorted by β+cc
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.55 2.46* 0.50 1.55 0.60 1.94
2 0.53 2.27* 0.51 1.46 0.55 1.77
3 0.64 2.41* 0.70 1.72 0.58 1.70
4 0.76 2.64* 0.91 2.04* 0.62 1.68
5 (High) 1.19 3.80* 1.50 3.00* 0.90 2.36*
5−1 0.64 4.32* 1.00 3.93* 0.30 1.99*
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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Table 3.4: Excess returns double-sorted portfolios
This table presents the excess returns of double-sorted portfolios. In Panel A, stocks are sorted into five
quintiles based on their upside illiquidity level illiq+ in the previous year. Then within each quintile,
stocks are sorted again based on their downside illiquidity level illiq− in the previous year. In Panel
B, stocks are sorted into five quintiles based on their upside liquidity beta β+cc in the previous year.
Then within each quintile, stocks are sorted again based on their downside liquidity beta β−cc in the
previous year. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are equally weighted. The column labeled
“ret−r f (%)” is the time-series means of the monthly portfolio returns in percentage. The column labeled
“t-stat” is the robust Newey-West (1987) t-statistics. “1” (“5”) represents the low (high) value. The row
“5-1” refers to the difference in monthly returns between portfolio 5 and portfolio 1. The results are
presented for the full data sample, the first sub-period, and the second sub-period.
Panel A: illiq− sorts controlling for illiq+
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.43 2.86* 0.32 1.43 0.53 2.67*
2 0.53 3.14* 0.54 2.12* 0.52 2.33*
3 0.60 3.40* 0.71 2.58* 0.50 2.21*
4 0.70 3.75* 0.94 3.26* 0.47 1.96*
5 (High) 1.05 5.31* 1.42 4.28* 0.69 3.16*
5−1 0.62 4.84* 1.10 5.29* 0.16 1.07
Panel B: β−cc sorts controlling for β+cc
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (Low) 0.45 3.10* 0.43 1.97* 0.47 2.42*
2 0.52 3.33* 0.51 2.12* 0.54 2.63*
3 0.62 3.51* 0.72 2.65* 0.53 2.30*
4 0.74 3.89* 0.96 3.21* 0.53 2.23*
5 (High) 0.97 4.64* 1.32 3.80* 0.63 2.68*
5−1 0.51 4.22* 0.89 4.21* 0.16 1.26
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
CHAPTER 3: DOWNSIDE LIQUIDITY 59
when they are sorted separately with stock returns. The same is found for the downside and
upside liquidity betas. The single-sorting portfolio analysis above do not shed light on the
differential effects of the downside and upside illiquidity level or the differential effects of the
downside and upside liquidity betas. To explore this, we then follow the approach suggested
by Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006). In Panel A of Table 3.4, we first sort stocks into five quintiles
based on their illiq+ in the previous year. Then, within each quintile, we sort stocks into five
quintiles based on their previous year illiq−. These portfolios are rebalanced monthly and are
equal weighted. After forming the 5× 5 illiq+ and illiq− portfolios, we average the return of
each illiq− quintile over the five illiq+ portfolios. In this way these illiq− quintiles control for
differences in illiq+. Over the entire sample period, controlling for illiq+ reduces the magnitude
of the return difference from 0.94% in Table 3.3 to 0.62% per month. However, we still observe
the increasing pattern of returns from the low illiq− portfolio to the high illiq+ portfolio and
the 5−1 difference in average returns is significantly positive for the full data sample. Unlike
the results of the single sorting analysis, the return difference in the second sub-period is no
longer significant. Panel B of Table 3.4 present the excess return of double-sorted portfolios of
the downside liquidity beta β−cc controlled for β+cc. The excess return increases monotonically
within the β−cc quintiles. The difference in excess returns between the two extreme β−cc quintiles
is positive and significant at 95% level for all months, and for the first sub-period. The return
spread for the full sample is 0.51% per month, 0.23% smaller than that of the single sorting
analysis.
Fama-MacBeth regressions The portfolio-sorting analysis suggests that both downside
illiquidity level and beta have a positive relation with average stock returns. However, it does
not account for other well-known determinants of expected returns and therefore could possibly
introduce biases in the inference. To address this issue, we next examine the relation between
the downside illiquidity level and beta and stock returns by cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth re-
gressions. The asset-pricing model is of the form:
E(ri) = γ+λ′βi+δ′Zi (3.1)
where E(ri) denotes the expected return of stock i. βi is a vector of factor loadings of stock
i relative to several different risk factors. λ is a vector of risk premiums. Zi is a set of firm
characteristics of stock i and δ is a vector of characteristic premiums. The coefficients of Equa-
tion (3.1) are estimated for each month, m = 1,2, . . . ,M, in the cross-sectional regression:
ri,m,y = γm+λ′mβi,y−1+δ
′
mZi,y−1+ εi,m,y (3.2)
where ri,m,y denotes the monthly excess return (relative to the risk-free rate) of stock i in month
m of year y. βi,y−1 is a vector of K factor loadings of stock i in year y− 1. λm is a vector of
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risk premiums in month m. δm is a vector of premiums of firm characteristics. Zi,y−1 is a vector
of L firm characteristics of stock i in year y−1. Among them, the variables of interest are the
downside illiquidity level (illiq−), the upside illiquidity level (illiq+), the downside liquidity
beta (β−cc), and the upside liquidity beta (β+cc).
Since factor loadings are unobservable, they are pre-estimated through a time-series regres-
sion:
ri,d,y = ai,y+βMKTi,y MKTd,y+β
SMB
i,y SMBd,y+β
HML
i,y HMLd,y+ εi,d,y (3.3)
This is the commonly used Fama-French three-factor model, where ri,d,y is the daily return of
stock i on day d in year y. MKTd,y is the daily excess market return in year y. SMBd,y and
HMLd,y are the daily excess return of small caps over big caps and of value stocks over growth
stocks in year y.
The final estimate, δˆ and its variance are given by:
δˆ =
1
M
M
∑
m=1
δˆm (3.4)
Var(δˆ) =
1
M(M−1)
M
∑
m=1
(δˆm− δˆ)2 (3.5)
where M is the total number of months in the sample. Similarly, λˆ and its variance are given by:
λˆ =
1
M
M
∑
m=1
λˆm (3.6)
Var(λˆ) =
1
M(M−1)
M
∑
m=1
(λˆm− λˆ)2 (3.7)
Table 3.5 presents the results of Fama-MacBeth two-step regressions. In the first step, factor
loadings are estimated for each stock each year via OLS regression (3.3). Then in the second
step, we apply the cross-sectional regression (3.2) in each month via OLS. All models are es-
timated over the entire sample period. Thus, we calculate the average of the 540 estimated
coefficients, and also present t-statistics against the null hypothesis that the average is zero.
Model (1) examines the pricing of the downside illiquidity level after control for the Fama-
French three risk factors. The coefficient of illiq− is 2.31, significant at a 95% level. It implies
that an increase of one standard deviation in illiq− (0.65; see Table 3.2) would increase monthly
returns by 2.31× 10−3× 0.65 = 0.15%. It is approximately 1.8% on an annual basis. As we
can see, the downside illiquidity level is priced both statistically and economically significant.
Model (2) includes the upside illiquidity level illiq+ instead of illiq− in the regression. The
coefficient of illiq+ is also significantly positive, implying that the upside illiquidity level has
a positive effect on cross-sectional returns. An increase of one standard deviation in illiq+
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Table 3.5: Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on downside and upside illiquidity level
and beta with standard control variables
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions on downside and upside illiquidity level and
beta over the full data sample. First, the Fama-French factor loadings are estimated for each stock-year
by running the following regression: ri,d,y = ai,y +βMKTi,y MKTd,y +βSMBi,y SMBd,y +βHMLi,y HMLd,y + εi,d,y
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, y indexes year, MKT is the excess market return (relative to the
risk-free rate), SMB is the Fama-French size factor and HML is the Fama-French book-to-market factor.
Second, for each month the following cross-sectional regression is performed: ri,m,y = γm + λ′mβi,y +
δ′mZi,y−1 + εi,m,y, where m indexes months, r is a stock’s excess return (relative to the risk-free rate),
β is the vector of factor loadings, λ is the vector of associated risk premiums, Z is a vector of further
stock-specific characteristics which includes the downside illiquidity level (illiq−), the upside illiquidity
level (illiq+), the downside liquidity beta(β−cc), the upside liquidity beta(β+cc). The parameter estimates
for δ and λ are obtained as (time) averages of the coefficients obtained in each month’s cross-sectional
regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. All coefficients have been multiplied by 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
illiq− 2.31* 2.44* 2.86*
(8.09) (3.00) (2.89)
illiq+ 2.23* -0.12 -0.48
(7.95) (-0.17) (-0.56)
β−cc 0.73* 0.51* -0.08
(6.66) (5.31) (-0.82)
β+cc 0.68* 0.33* -0.17
(6.56) (3.83) (-1.80)
βMKT 6.02* 6.00* 6.02* 5.09* 5.07* 5.18* 6.13*
(3.43) (3.42) (3.43) (2.95) (2.94) (2.99) (3.48)
βSMB -0.64 -0.62 -0.65 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 -0.63
(-0.53) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.05) (-0.01) (-0.11) (-0.53)
βHML -0.80 -0.79 -0.80 -0.61 -0.60 -0.63 -0.82
(-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.68) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.69)
intercept 0.66 0.71 0.65 1.97* 2.00* 1.84 0.50
(0.67) (0.72) (0.66) (2.02) (2.06) (1.89) (0.50)
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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(2.23; see Table 3.2) would increase monthly returns by 2.23×10−3×0.63 = 0.14%, implying
a smaller economic effect than the downside illiquidity level. In Model (3) both of the downside
and upside illiquidity level are included. The coefficient of the downside illiquidity level illiq−
is slightly bigger than that in Model (1) and remains statistically significant. On the contrary,
the upside illiquidity level illiq+ turns out to be insignificant. It implies that when both illiq−
and illiq+ are included in the regression, it is illiq− that takes the major effect on the stock
returns. Next, we investigate the pricing of the commonality in liquidity that is conditioning
on the market return. Model (4) includes the downside liquidity beta β−cc. It has a significantly
positive coefficient with value 0.73, indicating that one standard deviation increase in β−cc would
yield a monthly return of 0.12%. Although the effect of β−cc on stock returns is statistically sig-
nificant, its economic significance is smaller than that of the downside illiquidity level. Model
(5) investigates the pricing of the upside liquidity beta separately. β+cc is positively associated
with stock returns. However the magnitude of its economic influence on stock returns is the
smallest compared to other three variables. When the downside and upside liquidity beta are
included together in Model (6), both variables have significantly positive coefficients, indicat-
ing independent explanatory power for β−cc and β+cc in the cross-sectional returns. Moreover, the
coefficients of both the downside and upside liquidity beta when included jointly are smaller
than when included separately. Model (7) tests the effects of all four variables on stock returns
jointly. As we can see, the downside illiquidity level is the only one that remains significantly
positive. This evidence implies that eventually it is the downside illiquidity level that has the
most important explanatory power for stock returns among others.
In Table 3.6 we add other well-known firm characteristics in the cross-sectional regressions.
r100 and r100yr are two variables that measure past stock returns. lnsize is the logarithm
of market capitalization, which measures the size of a firm. sdret reflects the total risk of a
stock. And divyld is the dividend yield. The results of these control variables are consistent
with theories and previous studies. Small firms have a higher premium. Stocks with higher
volatility have lower require returns, which is consistent with the tax trading option theory of
Constantinides and Scholes (1980). Dividend yield has a significantly positive coefficient. The
variables of interest, illiq−, illiq+, β−cc, and β+cc have similar results as the previous table. When
include separately in Model (1), (2), (4), and (5), each variable is positively associated with
the cross-sectional returns. When illiq− and illiq+ are both included in the cross-sectional
regression, the coefficient of illiq− remains highly significant and its magnitude even becomes
bigger. On the other hand, the statistical significant of illiq+ disappears in the presence of
illiq−. The downside and upside liquidity beta both have significantly positive effect on stock
returns when included jointly. In the presence of illiq−, the other three variables, the upside
illiquidity level, the downside and upside liquidity beta all turn to be insignificant, indicating
the overruled explanatory power of the downside illiquidity level.
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Table 3.6: Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on downside and upside illiquidity level
and beta with extended set of control variables
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions on downside and upside illiquidity level and
beta over the full data sample. First, the Fama-French factor loadings are estimated for each stock-year
by running the following regression: ri,d,y = ai,y +βMKTi,y MKTd,y +βSMBi,y SMBd,y +βHMLi,y HMLd,y + εi,d,y
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, y indexes years, MKT is the excess market return (relative to the
risk-free rate), SMB is the Fama-French size factor, and HML is the Fama-French book-to-market factor.
Second, for each month the following cross-sectional regression is performed: ri,m,y = γm +λ′mβi,y−1 +
δ′mZi,y−1 + εi,m,y where m indexes months, r is a stock’s excess return (relative to the risk-free rate), β
is the vector of factor loadings, λ is the vector of associated risk premiums, Z is a vector of further
stock-specific characteristics which includes the downside illiquidity level (illiq−), the upside illiquidity
level (illiq+), the downside liquidity beta(β−cc), the upside liquidity beta(β+cc, the return during the last
100 days of each year (r100), the return from the start of the year until 100 days before its end (r100yr),
the standard deviation of daily returns (sdret), the logarithm of the market capitalization (lnsize), and
the dividend yield (divyld). The parameter estimates for δ and λ are obtained as (time) averages of
the coefficients obtained in each month’s cross-sectional regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. All
coefficients have been multiplied by 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
illiq− 2.08* 2.30* 2.63*
(8.35) (2.82) (2.65)
illiq+ 2.01* -0.19 -0.43
(8.30) (-0.26) (-0.48)
β−cc 0.72* 0.46* -0.05
(8.28) (5.11) (-0.45)
β+cc 0.69* 0.37* -0.02
(8.18) (4.35) (-0.22)
r100 1.51 1.58 1.54 1.71 1.66 1.71 1.72
(0.94) (0.98) (0.96) (1.07) (1.03) (1.07) (1.07)
r100yr 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.16
(0.13) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17)
lnsize -2.19* -2.22* -2.18* -2.80* -2.82* -2.75* -2.15*
(-9.30) (-9.40) (-9.21) (-11.56) (-11.51) (-11.38) (-9.05)
sdret -4.46* -4.43* -4.45* -3.93* -3.93* -4.03* -4.44*
(-9.96) (-9.89) (-9.92) (-8.89) (-8.87) (-9.06) (-9.83)
divyld 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* 0.15* 0.16* 0.16*
(2.90) (2.92) (2.92) (2.93) (2.82) (2.93) (2.94)
βMKT 10.52* 10.51* 10.52* 10.07* 10.08* 10.16* 10.54*
(5.94) (5.94) (5.94) (5.70) (5.71) (5.74) (5.94)
βSMB -1.57 -1.59 -1.57 -1.98 -2.00 -1.95 -1.54
(-1.40) (-1.42) (-1.39) (-1.78) (-1.79) (-1.76) (-1.38)
βHML -2.57* -2.57* -2.58* -2.48* -2.48* -2.52* -2.60*
(-2.36) (-2.35) (-2.36) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-2.30) (-2.37)
intercept 2.03 2.00 2.03 1.64 1.67 1.76 1.98
(1.68) (1.65) (1.68) (1.35) (1.38) (1.45) (1.63)
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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Overall, the portfolio sorting analysis and Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions show
consistent evidence that the downside liquidity is positively priced in the cross-section. The
premium of the downside illiquidity level and beta is economically and statistically significant
after control for the upside illiquidity level and beta. However, when the downside illiquidity
level and beta are included jointly in the cross-sectional regression, only the downside illiquidity
level has significantly positive return premium.
3.4 Robustness check
This section explores the robustness test that investigates whether the well-known January effect
has any impact on our findings. Previous studies show that excluding January makes the effects
of size and big-ask spread insignificant (for example, Keim (1983); Eleswarapu and Reinganum
(1993)). To explore whether the return premium we found is related to the January effect, we
conduct the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions over the entire sample period excluding
January.
Table 3.7 presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions after control for the January
effect. Excluding January, there are in total a number of 495 monthly estimates in the second
step of the Fama-MacBeth regression. As before, in univariate regressions the coefficient on
illiq−, illiq+, β−cc, and β+cc are significantly positive after control for the Fama-French three
factors and other firm characteristics. The joint test implies that the downside illiquidity level
has the most important explanatory power for cross-sectional returns.
3.5 Conclusion
There are a number of theoretical and empirical papers that study the relationship between
liquidity level and stuck returns (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Amihud (2002)), and also
liquidity risk and stock returns (e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen
(2005)). In this chapter, we argue that investors behave differently in a declining market and
a rising market. In general, investors are not only risk averse but also loss averse, meaning
that they care more about downside losses than upside gains. Market return endogenously
affects both liquidity level and liquidity risk, and liquidity level and risk should be particularly
important in the downside market. Therefore, we differentiate the downside and upside liquidity
explicitly and examine the relation between the downside liquidity and stock returns.
Using NYSE/AMEX common stock data between 1963 to 2008, we measure the downside
illiquidity level as the average of Amihud’s ILLIQ measure when market return is below its
average. The downside liquidity beta is defined as the comovement of stock’s illiquidity with
market illiquidity conditioning on the market return. We investigate the pricing of the down-
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Table 3.7: Fama-MacBeth regressions, excluding January effects
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions on downside and upside illiquidity level and
beta over the full data sample. It replicates Table 3.6 with the only difference that the month of January
is excluded from the sample. First, the Fama-French factor loadings are estimated for each stock-year
by running the following regression: ri,d,y = ai,y +βMKTi,y MKTd,y +βSMBi,y SMBd,y +βHMLi,y HMLd,y + εi,d,y
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, y indexes years, MKT is the excess market return (relative to the
risk-free rate), SMB is the Fama-French size factor, and HML is the Fama-French book-to-market factor.
Second, for each month the following cross-sectional regression is performed: ri,m,y = γm +λ′mβi,y−1 +
δ′mZi,y−1 + εi,m,y where m indexes months, r is a stock’s excess return (relative to the risk-free rate), β
is the vector of factor loadings, λ is the vector of associated risk premiums, Z is a vector of further
stock-specific characteristics which includes the downside illiquidity level (illiq−), the upside illiquidity
level (illiq+), the downside liquidity beta(β−cc), the upside liquidity beta(β+cc, the return during the last
100 days of each year (r100), the return from the start of the year until 100 days before its end (r100yr),
the standard deviation of daily returns (sdret), the logarithm of the market capitalization (lnsize), and
the dividend yield (divyld). The parameter estimates for δ and λ are obtained as (time) averages of
the coefficients obtained in each month’s cross-sectional regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. All
coefficients have been multiplied by 1000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
illiq− 1.70* 2.01* 2.27*
(6.73) (2.33) (2.15)
illiq+ 1.63* -0.28 -0.41
(6.69) (-0.35) (-0.44)
β−cc 0.54* 0.35* -0.04
(6.57) (3.76) (-0.38)
β+cc 0.55* 0.30* -0.02
(6.90) (3.48) (-0.16)
r100 6.69* 6.76* 6.75* 6.88* 6.80* 6.86* 6.87*
(5.00) (5.05) (5.04) (5.11) (5.04) (5.09) (5.09)
r100yr 1.01 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.03 1.04
(1.13) (1.08) (1.09) (1.09) (1.10) (1.15) (1.15)
lnsize -1.79* -1.81* -1.77* -2.29* -2.29* -2.24* -1.75*
(-7.61) (-7.70) (-7.52) (-9.70) (-9.64) (-9.54) (-7.38)
sdret -4.74* -4.71* -4.73* -4.27* -4.30* -4.37* -4.71*
(-10.67) (-10.62) (-10.61) (-9.70) (-9.70) (-9.84) (-10.48)
divyld 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.12* 0.11* 0.12* 0.12*
(2.06) (2.08) (2.07) (2.09) (2.00) (2.08) (2.08)
βMKT 8.89* 8.88* 8.88* 8.52* 8.53* 8.59* 8.89*
(4.88) (4.87) (4.87) (4.67) (4.68) (4.71) (4.87)
βSMB -2.55* -2.57* -2.55* -2.89* -2.90* -2.87* -2.52*
(-2.22) (-2.24) (-2.22) (-2.55) (-2.55) (-2.52) (-2.20)
βHML -3.30* -3.29* -3.30* -3.22* -3.23* -3.25* -3.32*
(-2.97) (-2.97) (-2.97) (-2.90) (-2.91) (-2.93) (-2.99)
intercept 3.68* 3.66* 3.67* 3.33* 3.38* 3.45* 3.63*
(2.99) (2.97) (2.98) (2.70) (2.74) (2.79) (2.94)
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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side liquidity using portfolio sorting analysis and Fama-MacBeth regressions. We find reliable
evidence that the downside illiquidity level has a positive effect on cross-sectional returns. The
premium of the downside illiquidity level is both statistically and economically significant. The
downside liquidity beta is also positively associated with stock returns when it is included sep-
arately in the cross-sectional regressions. However, in the joint regression only the downside
illiquidity level has significantly positive return premiums, implying that the downside illiquid-
ity level has the most important explanatory power for stock returns among others. Our results
are also robust to the January effect.
Chapter 4
How Do Designated Market Makers
Create Value for Small-Caps?
This chapter is based on Menkveld and Wang (2009).
4.1 Introduction
The May 6, 2010 flash crash has re-ignited the debate on affirmative obligations for market
makers to effectively create a minimum liquidity guarantee. On this day, liquidity dried up
quickly when a single investor aggressively demanded liquidity to sell the E-Mini S&P 500
futures contract. As a result, all major U.S. equity indices dropped by 5-6% in a matter of
minutes (see SEC (2010)). A key contributing factor was that some high-frequency traders
— the new market makers — quickly withdrew from the market. Triggered by the crash, a
committee of academics and industry professionals recommended that the SEC reconsiders
market maker obligations (see Born, Brennan, Engle, Ketchum, O’Hara, Philips, Ruder, and
Stiglitz (2011, recommendation 9)). The value of such obligations is the subject of this chapter.
A liquidity guarantee is potentially most valuable to small-cap stocks. Cross-sectionally,
small-caps exhibit lowest liquidity levels and highest liquidity risk, which both raise their cost
of capital substantially. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) link liquidity levels to asset prices and
estimate that stocks with the highest bid-ask spread could gain 50% in value if, all else equal,
spread is reduced to the level of the lowest spread stocks. In addition, Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) find that these low liquidity stocks also suffer high liquidity risk.1 Both studies show that
these illiquid stocks typically belong to small-cap firms. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) study
1On page 391, they state “In other words, a stock which is illiquid in absolute terms, also tends to have a lot
of commonality in liquidity with the market, a lot of return sensitivity to market liquidity, and a lot of liquidity
sensitivity to market returns. This result is interesting on its own since it is consistent with the notion of flight to
liquidity.”
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size directly and confirm that liquidity risk is highest for small-caps and is compensated for
through an additional required return of 3.7% annually.
Some exchanges have responded by facilitating a contract whereby small-cap firms hire
designated market makers (DMMs) to guarantee a minimum supply of liquidity in their stock.
A firm typically pays a broker a lump-sum fee for a commitment to always provide a bid and
ask quote with (i) a price differential (weakly) smaller than the contracted maximum spread and
(ii) a depth (weakly) larger than the contracted minimum depth.2 Recent empirical studies find
that this type of DMM raises a stock’s liquidity level (see Nimalendran and Petrella (2003)) and
produces abnormal returns of roughly five percent around the introduction (see Venkataraman
and Waisburd (2007) and Anand, Tanggaard, and Weaver (2009)).
We conduct an event study and, contrary to previous work, focus on liquidity risk as the
minimum liquidity supply insures liquidity demanders against extreme illiquidity events. In
essence, a broker is paid to be a ‘supplier of last resort’ to insure current shareholders against
the idiosyncratic risk of having to trade when liquidity is low. It also mechanically reduces
covariation with market return and market liquidity and therefore reduces systematic liquidity
risk (see Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). The value is realized if, at times of low endogenous
liquidity, the supply constraint binds and shareholders realize a gain from trade that otherwise
might have met too high transaction cost (in the absence of the minimum supply guarantee).
This effect should show up in the data by more volume and higher DMM participation in these
extreme market conditions.
We study the exogenous event of a Euronext roll-out of their Paris limit order market system
to Amsterdam on October 29, 2001. Arguably the most significant change was the possibility
for small-caps to hire a DMM as, otherwise, the system replaced an already well-functioning
limit order system. We find that 74 out of 101 eligible firms enter DMM contracts. An impor-
tant advantage of this exogenous all-stock migration is that the analysis does not suffer from
an endogenous timing bias that haunts any study based on sequential introductions (e.g., the
existing DMM studies based on French and Swedish stocks). If at some point brokers privately
learn that future liquidity supply will be less costly for a particular firm they will aggressively
pitch to be a DMM. This is consistent with the observed pattern of an abnormal return around
the introduction as well as an ex-post liquidity improvement. Admittedly, there is still a poten-
tial endogenous selection bias across DMM and nonDMM stocks for which we control with a
standard Heckman procedure. We find no empirical support for such bias as the inverse Mills
ratio is not significant in our cross-sectional regressions.3
2An alternative model is to require that a designated market maker maintain price continuity as has been the
case for the NYSE specialist. Weill (2007) illustrates why such requirement does not lead to a Pareto efficient
outcome.
3Furthermore, the institutional setting is such that most brokers are members of financial conglomerates that
pitch a DMM sponsorship to cross-sell other financial products. ABN-AMRO, for example, announced that all
their existing corporate finance clients receive DMM sponsorship for free. This is consistent with the lack of
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The novel DMM contracts fit into a large literature on designated market makers with af-
firmative obligations. Most studies focus on the NYSE specialist who was subject to the Price
Continuity Rule—an obligation to participate in order to smooth price discovery. Panayides
(2007) shows that this rule is costly to her at times when the constraint binds. In return, she
enjoyed trading privileges such as a last-mover advantage when supplying liquidity as she could
condition on the incoming market order (see, e.g., Rock (1990)). These arrangements prompted
studies on whether a specialist system can compete with a pure limit order book (see, e.g., Par-
lour and Seppi (2003) and Glosten (1994)). Back and Baruch (2007) show that if technology
(e.g., algorithms) allows informed traders to split their orders at low cost and pool them with
small uninformed orders, the last-mover advantage loses its value. Further examples of trading
privileges are: reduced trading fees, private access to the content of the limit order book, or a
pro rata share of the order flow (see Saar (2009) for a review). It seems that any such privi-
lege effectively taxes other market participants and therefore might distort agents’ incentives.
The advantage of the Euronext DMM system is that the issuer pays for liquidity support and
therefore internalizes this cost in her overall financing strategy.4
Our empirical strategy consists of essentially two analyses. First, liquidity level, liquidity
risk, and cumulate abnormal returns (CARs) are studied surrounding DMM introductions. Sec-
ond, a proprietary dataset on DMM own-account trading enables us to verify whether a DMM
loses money on a binding supply constraint.
Liquidity level, liquidity risk, and CARs are studied in three steps. First, we document how
liquidity level and liquidity risk change with the introduction of a DMM where liquidity risk
measures are taken from Acharya and Pedersen (2005). A difference-in-difference approach
(i.e., post- minus pre-event and DMM minus non-DMM stocks) measures a ‘DMM treatment’
effect. Second, a valuation effect is studied through cumulative abnormal returns around the an-
nouncement and the effective date. Finally, cross-sectional regressions relate CARs to liquidity
level and liquidity risk changes: Are abnormal returns higher for stocks that exhibit stronger
level improvement, larger risk reduction, or both? We essentially find that both are significant
explanatory variables for the cross-sectional dispersion in positive abnormal returns associated
with DMM stocks. These returns are economically significant as they are 3.5% on average and,
if multiplied by market capitalization, amount to an aggregate value creation of approximately
1 billion euro.
support for endogenous selection in the Heckman procedure.
4A more extreme example of unnatural taxation is cross-subsidization where a specialist is forced to quote loss-
making inactive securities and is compensated through valuable trading privileges in actively traded securities (see
Cao, Choe, and Hatheway (1997)). Recently, the NYSE has relabeled specialists as ‘designated market makers’
and removed their informational advantage. They continue to require them to ‘maintain an orderly market’ for
which they are compensated by the exchange through rebates on executed limit orders, see NYSE-Euronext press
release, October 24, 2008 and Traders Magazine, “2008 Review: NYSE Fights Back with Designated Market
Makers,” December 2008.
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The second set of empirical analyses aims at identifying the conjectured channel for value
creation, i.e., investors benefit from a DMM as ‘supplier of last resort’. A proprietary transaction
dataset identifies for each side of a trade (buy or sell) whether there was a DMM or not. We
do three analyses after all post-event trading days are sorted according to whether the minimum
supply constraint was likely bind or not. First, the DMM participation rate in trades is compared
across these two types of days to verify whether they participate more on binding-constraint
days. Second, the same comparison is done for DMM gross trading revenues to verify whether
the conjectured increased participation is costly to them. Finally, we verify whether their service
was ‘consumed’ in that it generated more volume. This is done by comparing binding-constraint
post-event days with similar pre-event days. We find empirical support in all three analyses.
The contribution to existing literature is three-fold: (i) an analysis of liquidity risk changes
associated with DMM introductions, (ii) an analysis on how their arrival relates to the two
basic components of price changes, i.e., (efficient) price innovations and pricing errors, and (iii)
empirical identification of the channel that DMMs are ‘liquidity suppliers of last resort’. Anand,
Tanggaard, and Weaver (2009) is most related to our study. They find that DMM introduction
in Sweden increases the liquidity level, produces a positive CAR, increases volume, and leads
DMMs to trade more in the stocks that they contract for. Our findings are consistent with theirs.
We contribute by exploring the ‘liquidity risk channel’ which is closer to the spirit of a DMM
contract, i.e., it guarantees a minimum for liquidity supply that is stochastic in nature. Liquidity
risk changes around DMM introductions are analyzed and the liquidity insurance channel is
explicitly tested for by comparing DMM participation, DMM trading profit, and overall volume
across days where the constraint binds and days where it does not.
In analyzing how DMMs create social value, Bessembinder, Hao, and Lemmon (2007) pro-
pose an alternative channel by which DMMs could create value.5 This explanation relies on
improved price discovery as the liquidity guarantee creates incentives for investors to become
informed. Such improved price discovery, in turn, generates superior information for manage-
ment decisions (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999)).
We consider this explanation less likely in our sample as (i) the adverse selection component is
substantially smaller than the realized spread component, (ii) spread does not increase signifi-
cantly with the addition of a DMM, and (iii) the size of price innovations is reduced for DMM
stocks6. We do find that DMMs reduce pricing errors which is some evidence of improved price
discovery.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the institutional
5They also discuss a non-informational channel that is not as explicit as our conjecture of ‘supplier of last
resort’ but also relies on the externality associated with investors participating in a market.
6This in contrast to Perotti and Rindi (2009) who find that the introduction of a designated market maker in
the Italian stock market is associated with improved price discovery. In their case, however, DMMs are obliged to
write at least two ‘analyst reports’ per year and organize roadshows where the company meets investors. No such
obligations exist for Euronext DMMs.
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background of DMM introduction in the Dutch market. Section 4.3 discusses how DMMs
could create value as liquidity suppliers of last resort. Section 4.4 presents the data, discusses
the methodology, and reviews the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional background
In 2000, the exchanges in Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels merged and the new exchange, Eu-
ronext, decided to structure all markets according to the Paris Bourse trading model: an elec-
tronic limit order book market. Orders are transmitted from 10:00 a.m. through 5:00 p.m. to a
transparent limit order book that is observable to all market participants. Market orders (or mar-
ketable limit orders) are executed automatically against the book according to strict price-time
priority. Trading takes place continuously for the more actively traded securities. Less active
stocks trade only twice a day via call auctions at 10:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. with no trading in
between the auctions.7 We refer to Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) for a detailed description of
the Euronext trading model.
In 1992, the Paris Bourse introduced designated market makers—officially termed “liquidity
providers”—to address poor liquidity supply by public limit orders for inactively traded stocks.
The exchange, however, did not mandate stocks to trade with a DMM, nor was it involved in
the process of selecting a broker who provides a DMM service. Both decisions were taken by
the listed firm. The exchange only facilitated the process by providing firms with a list of DMM
brokers. It did require a DMM to sign its standard contract and guarantee a minimum liquidity
supply set by the exchange (“General Terms”). That is, the DMM commits to always have a
bid and ask quote in the market with a price differential (weakly) smaller than the exchange-
mandated maximum spread and a depth (weakly) larger than the exchange-mandated minimum
depth. The issuer, however, was free to negotiate tighter liquidity supply with the DMM. Once
the contract was in place, the exchange monitored the DMMs and could terminate the service if
a DMM did not meet her commitment.
In this model the DMM is compensated for the cost of the minimum supply constraint in
essentially three ways. First, the issuer pays the DMM an annual lump sum amount specified
in a private contract between the issuer and the brokerage firm (and therefore unknown to us).
Second, a designated market maker relationship gives the broker a foot in the door to cross-sell
other financial services to the firm, such as a seasoned offering, banking services, insurance,
etc.8 This might be seen as a ‘soft’ payment by the firm as these brokers now might not need
7Call auctions are used to trade less active stocks in several world markets, including Euronext, Athens, Madrid,
Milan, Vienna, etc. In addition, the call auction is commonly used by many exchanges to open and close trading
in securities.
8This compensation is particularly important for the Dutch market as brokers who offer a DMM service are
members of financial conglomerates. Examples of cross-selling are: ING is DMM for Unit4Agresso and has
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to give aggressive price discounts when pitching their products to management. Third, the
exchange supports DMM activity by waiving all fees on quotes and trades by DMMs. It also
markets the DMM as primary facilitator for upstairs transactions. We emphasize that, unlike the
NYSE specialist, a DMM does not have any ex-post quote privilege in the sense that she cannot
condition her quotes on the arriving order flow and cherry-pick (uninformed) market orders.
Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) studies the early years (1992-1998) of designated mar-
ket makers in the Paris Bourse system for a sample of stocks that trade twice a day in a call
auction. They identify 75 firms that at some time in their sample hire a DMM and use the 206
firms that do not hire a DMM as a control group. They document that stocks that add a DMM
trade more frequently and exhibit lower order book imbalances ex-post. They further find that
younger firms, smaller firms, and firms with less volatile stock returns are more likely to hire a
DMM. Finally, they report an average cumulative abnormal return of nearly five percent around
the introduction day.
On Monday, October 29, 2001, Euronext introduced the Paris Bourse system with its DMM
option for small-caps in the Dutch equity market in order to harmonize trading systems within
the Euronext group. The new system replaced a similar well-functioning electronic limit order
book. The new DMM feature had raised a lot of local regulatory interest ahead of the intro-
duction. The Dutch regulator did not approve early proposals as they did not offer sufficient
guarantees against illegal insider trading.9 Euronext eventually addressed these concerns by
agreeing to report all DMM transactions to the local regulator.10 Another feature unique to the
Amsterdam market is that Euronext introduced the DMM option only for a subset of small-cap
stocks. It excluded all Euronext 100 index stocks and stocks that generated less than 2,500
transactions per annum. It further set the minimum liquidity supply in the “General Terms” of
the contract to a maximum spread of 4% and a minimum depth of e10,000 for the majority of
stocks.11 Excerpts from a sample contract regarding a DMM’s obligation and her remuneration
are included in the Appendix 4A.
In addition to the DMM option as its most salient change, the new system brought two other
changes worthy of discussion. First, the old system did have a designated market maker (the
‘hoekman’) for all stocks who, by all practical means, did not have any material duty nor any
organized a stock option scheme for management; ABN-AMRO is DMM for Fugro and Imtech and has organized
a share buy-back for them; SNS is DMM for DBA and has created a prospectus for them ahead of their merger with
Flex; SNS and FORTIS are DMM for Stern Group and have organized three recent seasoned equity offerings for
them. The brokers admit that they might have had this business without acting as DMM, but a DMM relationship
allows them to make a bid when the firm shows interest in these products.
9See interview with Chief Operating Officer Euronext, G. Mo¨ller, in Financieel Dagblad, “Euronext: ‘Werk in
Uitvoering’,” October 6, 2001.
10See manuscript of Chief Operating Officer Euronext, G. Mo¨ller, published in Financieel Dagblad, “Euronext
kiest Wel voor Transparantie Handel Eigen Aandelen’,” October 12, 2001.
11These were the conditions for the most important small-cap index (Next150) to which most of our stocks
belong. For other small-cap stocks, the maximum spread is 5% and the minimum depth is e5000.
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trading privileges. She was effectively hired by the exchange and paid a fixed commission (and
did not pay any fees on orders or trades) for ensuring that the market keeps a continuous bid-
ask quote (no minimum supply constraint). In our event study, any change in liquidity level
is therefore unlikely to be caused by a waiver on DMM fees as the old system also featured a
DMM who did not pay any fee. Second, stocks with less than 5,000 trades per year had to move
from the old continuous market to a twice a day electronic auction. The only way to stay in the
continuous market for these firms was to hire a DMM. If ignored, this effect might lead to a
selection bias if characteristics of these firms correlate with the error term in the difference-in-
difference regression analysis. We control for such potential bias in a Heckman procedure where
we find only weak support for such concern as the auction-threat dummy carries a positive but
insignificant sign in the DMM-or-not Probit regression (see Table 4.6).
On the Monday in the week ahead of the introduction day, Euronext published the list of
the 74 firms that signed up with brokers for a DMM service.12 Interestingly, Dutch small-caps
contracted with more than one DMM—3.13 on average out of a dozen brokerage firms that
offer the service13—whereas the majority of French firms hired only one. We see two reasons
for the apparently aggressive pitch by Dutch brokers. First, an important institutional feature of
the Dutch brokerage market is that most brokers are part of large financial conglomerates, so
that a DMM relationship created many opportunities for cross-selling other products. Second,
the average Dutch DMM stock was potentially more interesting than its French counterpart as
it belonged to a 12 times larger firm (in terms of market cap) and generated 63 times more
volume.14
4.3 The value of a supplier of last resort: a discussion
A maximum spread commitment of 4% with an associated minimum depth ofe10,000
seems to be meaningless, but for these small-cap stocks, it does hurt sometimes. As
designated market maker you lose money for sure when the market is very volatile.
—Willem Meijer, SNS Securities15
To motivate our empirical strategy, this section discusses how a DMM might create value for
small-cap firms in her role as supplier of last resort. The quote of Willem Meijer, who heads
one of the most active local DMM brokers, illustrates how it is natural to consider two liquidity
12For a report on the Euronext DMM announcement on Monday October 22, 2001, see, “Animateur en Fonds
Bekend Amsterdam,” Het Financieele Dagblad, October 23, 2001.
13The active brokers are ABN-AMRO, AEK, AOT, Brom, Dexia, Deutsche Bank, Fortis (previously known as
MeesPierson), ING, Kempen &Co, Rabobank, SNS Securities, Van Lanschot, Van der Wielen. From Financieel
Dagblad, “Animateurs betalen Leergeld,” September 17, 2002
14Based on comparing our Table 4.1 with Table 1 in Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007).
15See Financieel Dagblad, “Animateurs Betalen veel Leergeld,” September 17, 2002.
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regimes: a normal regime where the minimum supply constraint does not bind and an adverse
liquidity regime where it does bind. It is at these times of a binding constraint that the DMM
effectively becomes the ‘last man standing’ and she suffers a net trading loss if her supply is
consumed.
DMMs and the cost of capital. The cap on transaction cost produced by the DMM contract
is valuable for liquidity demanders as it mechanically improves the average liquidity level and
it reduces liquidity risk. This is best illustrated by the liquidity-CAPM model proposed by
Acharya and Pedersen (2005). It is essentially an application of the CAPM model to returns net
of transaction cost. Formally, it yields:
E(rit− cit) = E(r ft )+λβneti , (4.1)
where
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We rewrite the model and find for required gross returns:
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It is now immediate that if we cap the transaction cost cit it mechanically reduces the expected
transaction cost and its covariation with market transaction cost and market return (βcci and β
cr
i ,
respectively). As they both feed into a stock’s required return, the cap thus reduces the cost of
capital along both the level and risk dimension.
Cost of capital reduction vs. cash outflow. Ultimately, DMMs only create value if the
cash outflow from the firm to compensate for a DMM’s trading loss offsets the reduction in its
cost of capital. Clearly, in a rational world a DMM arrangement must create nonnegative value
given that both sides to the DMM contract enter voluntarily. Ex-ante, however, it is not obvious
that the arrangement produces positive shareholder value particularly if the bargaining power
resides with the brokerage firms. We nevertheless believe that this is unlikely in our case as
multiple brokers offer a DMM service which is good for the bargaining power on the side of the
firm.
But, at a more fundamental level, how can a DMM contract create social value if it means
that a DMM is effectively pushed into suboptimal trading positions at times of a binding liq-
uidity constraint? One potential source of value creation is that a DMM contract serves as a
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coordination device to overcome the externality associated with trading (cf. Pagano (1989)).
That is, the liquidity guarantee attracts more investors to a stock where each new arrival reduces
the trading cost of existing investors (as they are more likely to find a counter-party to a trade
when they demand liquidity). Another source of value creation arises when markets are in-
complete with respect to hedging investors’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The DMM contract
then becomes an insurance policy for current shareholders as the DMM fee insures against high
transaction costs at the time that the trading need arises. For both sources of value creation
we should see that volume increases at times when the liquidity constraint binds relative to the
benchmark of no DMM.16 For the second source of value creation, the reason for a volume
increase is that shareholders might not realize a gain from trade if it is less than the transac-
tion cost, whereas they might if DMMs cap such transaction cost. We will test this volume
prediction in the data.
4.4 Empirical results
This section presents our empirical results. We first describe our dataset and present some sum-
mary statistics. We then conduct the first set of empirical analyses that aim (i) to identify the
liquidity level and liquidity risk change associated with a DMM introduction, (ii) to measure
abnormal returns in the event period which contains the announcement date and the effective
date, and (iii) to cross-sectionally relate the abnormal return to the liquidity level and the liquid-
ity risk change in order to establish a direct link between value creation and liquidity effects. In
a second set of analyses we search for evidence in support of a DMM as a supplier of last resort.
We study whether (i) DMMs participate in more trades and (ii) generate less trading revenue on
days that their contract is likely to bind. We further test whether (iii) their minimum supply on
these days is indeed consumed as evidenced by increased volume on these days.
4.4.1 Data and summary statistics
Data
We use four datasets for our empirical analysis. First, we have an intraday dataset for 11 months
before and after the introduction day which contains (i) the best bid and ask quote and (ii) the
price and size of all transactions along with a label that indicates whether or not a DMM was
involved in the transaction (only their own-account trades are considered) and, if so, on which
side of the trade. Second, we have daily data for the same period that includes market capi-
talization for each stock. Third, we have a file that for all DMM stocks contains the initiation
16We will operationalize this in our empirical analysis by comparing volume on days in the post-event period
when the constraint is likely to bind with similar days in the pre-event period.
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and termination date of a DMM service. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the con-
tracts themselves and we therefore do not know whether the issuer and broker have contracted
on a tighter minimum supply than the Euronext mandated 4% maximum spread and e10,000
minimum depth. Finally, we use the Compustat Global database for Tobin’s q calculations.
EffectiveAnnouncement
10/22/2001 10/29/2001
DayDay
0−5
10/15/2001 11/2/2001
+4−10
9/30/2001 9/30/200212/01/2000 11/30/2001
(2 months) (10 months)
EventPre−event Post−event
Panel B: Event window (15 days)
Panel A: Sample period (22 months)
(10 months)
Figure 4.1: Time line event study
This figure depicts the time line of our event study. Panel A depicts the sample period which consists of
22 months: a 10 month pre-event period, a two month event period, and a 10 month post-event period.
Panel B depicts the three week event window used for the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) analysis. It
includes the announcement day at the start of week two and the effective day at the start of week three.
All our analysis is essentially an event study on 74 small-caps that sign up for DMMs at the
introduction day and 27 small-caps that do not and thus serve as benchmark firms. Figure 4.1
depicts the time line: a ten month pre-event period, a two month event period, and a ten month
post-event period. The effective date was Monday, October 29, 2001, and Euronext published
the list of the 74 stocks on the Monday in the week before. As nonDMM benchmark stocks,
we select all stocks that are eligible for DMM service but that do not sign up a broker on the
introduction day or any time in the post-event period. We reiterate that not all listed firms are
eligible as, for example, all Euronext 100 index stocks are not allowed to hire a DMM. We add
the complete list of all DMM and nonDMM stocks in the Appendix 4B.
Before presenting any summary statistics, let us review the definitions of the three standard
liquidity measures that we use in our study. We propose the effective spread and Amihud’s
ILLIQ measure as ex-post measures of liquidity and quoted spread as an ex-ante measure of
liquidity. An important advantage of the ex-post measures is that they account for actual con-
sumption of liquidity and therefore are a better measure for the transaction cost as it was really
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paid by the ‘representative’ investor.
Effective spread. We define the daily effective spread as the share-weighted average of
espreadit = 2qit(pit−mit)/mit , (4.4)
where i indexes stocks, t indexes transactions, qit is an indicator variable that equals +1 for
market buy orders and -1 for market sell orders, pit is the transaction price, and mit is the
midquote prevailing at the time of the transaction. Trades are trivially signed in electronic
limit order markets as transaction prices at or above (below) the prevailing ask (bid) quotes
indicate market buys (sells). We also decompose the effective spread into two components using
standard techniques. The adverse selection component captures the average loss of liquidity
suppliers due to informationally-motivated market orders (suppliers are on the wrong side of the
trade in these transactions). The realized spread component is the remaining part and therefore
captures the gross profit to liquidity suppliers. These two components are identified through an
estimate of the average information in a (signed) market order, which is revealed through post-
trade midquotes. That is, if we wait long enough we find how much permanent price impact the
market order had. In the implementation we use 15 minutes to allow the market to settle on the
permanent price impact of the order. Formally, the two components are defined as:
rspreadit = 2qit(pit−mit+15min)/mit and (4.5)
adv selectionit = 2qit(mit+15min−mit)/mit . (4.6)
Amihud’s ILLIQ measure. We also calculate the illiquidity measure as proposed by
Amihud (2002), which is based on daily data:
ILLIQit =
|rit |
volumeit
(4.7)
where rit is the midquote return from day t−1 to day t and volumeit is the volume (in euro) on
day t.
Quoted spread. We define the quoted spread as a time-weighted daily average of
qspreadit = (askit−bidit)/mit , (4.8)
where t indexes time in the trading day.
We then winsorize all variables in the sample by setting values larger the 99% quantile to
the 99% quantile and values smaller than the 1% quantile to the 1% quantile.
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics based on our panel dataset which consists of 22 trading
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics panel dataset
This table presents overall, between, and within summary statistics based on 74*22 stock-month ob-
servations for stocks that hire a designated market maker (DMM) (Panel A) and 27*22 stock-month
observations for stocks that do not (Panel B). The sample period runs from 12/01/00 through 9/30/02.
The dataset includes monthly averages of: share-weighted effective spread (espread), time-weighted
quoted spread (qspread), share-weighted realized spread based on the average 15 minute price impact
of a trade (rspread), share-weighted adverse selection component of the spread - again based on the
15 minute price impact (adv selection), Amihud’s ILLIQ measure (ILLIQ), standard deviation of daily
midquote return (volatility), daily volume in shares (volume), daily closing price (price), daily number
of trades (nr trades), first order autocorrelation of the daily midquote return (ret autocorr), market cap-
italization (mktcap) and the number of registered designated market makers (nr DMMs). We winsorize
all data using the 1% and 99% quantile. We include the units of each variable in parentheses.
Mean Pre-Mean St.Dev. St.Dev. St.Dev. Min Max Median
Betweena Withinb
Panel A: 74 DMM stocks
espread(%) 1.17 1.24 0.81 0.69 0.42 0.12 5.87 0.95
qspread(%) 1.40 1.63 1.14 0.94 0.64 0.14 7.71 1.02
rspread(%) 0.89 1.00 0.83 0.68 0.48 0.06 7.04 0.61
adv selection(%) 0.28 0.24 0.44 0.24 0.38 -3.18 4.53 0.26
ILLIQ (%/mln) 2.50 2.33 9.80 4.68 8.61 0.00 181.33 0.14
volatility(%) 1.99 2.13 1.23 0.90 0.83 0.11 8.43 1.70
volume(1000 shares) 37.79 35.52 66.50 59.65 29.40 0.52 780.12 13.44
price(e ) 19.56 21.48 13.45 12.47 5.06 0.38 72.83 16.42
nr trades 74.20 88.06 111.33 100.50 47.90 1.95 1017.34 31.67
ret autocorr -0.04 -0.05 0.23 0.08 0.22 -0.74 0.65 -0.04
mktcap(e bln) 0.49 0.49 0.70 0.70 0.00 0.02 5.25 0.34
nr DMMs 3.13 0.00 1.44 1.33 0.56 1.00 8.00 3.00
Panel B: 27 nonDMM stocks
espread(%) 2.41 1.76 2.26 1.64 1.55 0.18 17.00 1.92
qspread(%) 2.95 2.55 2.59 1.93 1.73 0.22 19.16 2.43
rspread(%) 1.79 1.21 1.91 1.13 1.54 0.06 15.47 1.16
adv selection(%) 0.62 0.55 1.49 0.97 1.14 -6.10 13.80 0.46
ILLIQ (%/mln) 7.89 5.04 38.49 14.84 35.51 0.00 478.93 0.52
volatility(%) 3.46 3.50 2.67 1.82 1.96 0.17 18.44 3.00
volume(1000 shares) 52.95 50.30 76.04 63.28 42.15 0.00 670.32 17.52
price(e ) 13.94 17.23 25.79 23.01 11.64 0.06 194.34 3.21
nr trades 76.94 97.64 124.96 110.12 59.06 0.05 983.43 25.91
ret autocorr -0.12 -0.10 0.25 0.10 0.23 -0.83 0.55 -0.13
mktcap(e bln) 2.14 2.14 7.30 7.30 0.00 0.00 38.64 0.07
nr DMMs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a: Based on the time means i.e. x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.
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months for 74 DMM stocks (Panel A) and 27 nonDMM stocks (Panel B).17 The statistics lead to
a couple of observations. First, we find that DMM stocks in spite of belonging to small-cap firms
are still sizable stocks in terms of trade activity and firm size. The average firm has a market
capitalization of e490 million and its stock has an average of 74.20 trades per day. Second,
the average quoted spread is 1.40% and exhibits a monthly within18 variation of 0.94% which
is an early indication that liquidity risk might indeed be important. These statistics suggest
that spreads are well within the Euronext mandated 4% spread most of the time, but we know
from interactions with brokers and from plotting quoted spread histograms stock by stock that
many firms appear to contract on tighter spreads.19 Third, the average effective spread is 1.17%
and is therefore smaller than the quoted spread which is undoubtedly the result of the typical
intraday trading pattern where the bulk of trading happens at the start and the end of the day.20
The spread decomposition shows that more than three quarters of the effective spread is gross
profit to liquidity suppliers with the remaining part compensating for losses against informed
market orders. Fourth, the average number of DMMs a firm hires is 3.13 with considerable
cross-sectional dispersion as the between (see footnote 18) standard deviation is 1.44. Fifth, if
we compare trade statistics across Panel A and B we find that the pre-event mean is the same
order of magnitude for DMM and nonDMM stocks. For example, we find that the average
effective spread is 1.24% vs. 1.76% for DMM and nonDMM stocks, respectively, the average
daily volume is 35,520 vs. 50,300 shares per day, and market capitalization is e490,000 vs.
e2,140,000.
Table 4.2 presents overall, between, and within correlations for our liquidity proxies along
with volume and volatility for both DMM stocks and nonDMM stocks. We find that the three
proxies are significantly correlated both across stocks and in the time dimension which is not
surprising given that they are proxies for the same object. We also find significant evidence that
liquidity is negatively correlated with volatility and positively correlated with volume in both
the cross-section and the time dimension which is reassuring.
17We use the monthly frequency as our point of departure as some series are only naturally defined at a monthly
frequency, e.g., ILLIQ or volatility of daily midquote returns.
18The within variation is defined in panel data analysis as the sample variation after all time series are demeaned
using an individual-specific mean. The between variation, on the other hand, is the variation in individual-specific
means (see Table 4.2 for the mathematical definitions).
19If we consider contractual spread maximums to be on a grid with a 0.5% step size, we find ,e.g., 26 firms with
a 4% cutoff, 15 firms with a 1.5% cutoff, 11 firms with a 3% cutoff, and 11 firms with a 2% cutoff. We do not want
to hang our hats on these numbers as, admittedly, we only observe realizations and the probability of the event
that a spread is lower than x% throughout the sample is likely to be positive even if the true maximum spread is
y% > x%. We therefore treat these numbers only as indicative evidence.
20The trading externality makes that this concentration of trading within the day reduces the effective spread
which is not reflected in the time-weighted quoted spread.
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Table 4.2: Overall, between, and within correlation liquidity proxies
This table presents the overall, between, and within correlation for share-weighted effective spread,
time-weighted quoted spread, Amihud’s ILLIQ measure, volatility of midquote return, and daily volume
in shares. The correlations are based on our monthly panel dataset and span the full sample period
(12/01/00-9/30/02). Panel A presents the correlations for the 74 DMM stocks and Panel B presents them
for the 27 nonDMM stocks.
Panel A: 74 DMM stocks
qspread ILLIQ volatility volume
espread ρ(overall) 0.87** 0.44** 0.42** -0.29**
ρ(between)a 0.95** 0.80** 0.45** -0.36**
ρ(within)b 0.68** 0.26** 0.41** -0.05**
qspread ρ(overall) 0.46** 0.44** -0.31**
ρ(between) 0.85** 0.42** -0.40**
ρ(within) 0.26** 0.47** -0.05**
ILLIQ ρ(overall) 0.13** -0.13**
ρ(between) 0.31** -0.29**
ρ(within) 0.04 -0.01
volatility ρ(overall) 0.31**
ρ(between) 0.37**
ρ(within) 0.24**
Panel B: 27 nonDMM stocks
qspread ILLIQ volatility volume
espread ρ(overall) 0.92** 0.24** 0.46** -0.26**
ρ(between) 0.97** 0.37* 0.77** -0.44**
ρ(within) 0.85** 0.14** 0.17** -0.01
qspread ρ(overall) 0.28** 0.48** -0.31**
ρ(between) 0.48** 0.71** -0.49**
ρ(within) 0.15** 0.26** -0.02
ILLIQ ρ(overall) 0.08* -0.12**
ρ(between) 0.27 -0.34*
ρ(within) -0.04 -0.02
volatility ρ(overall) 0.04
ρ(between) -0.14
ρ(within) 0.30**
a: Based on the time means i.e. x¯i = 1T ∑
T
t=1 xi,t .
b: Based on the deviations from time means i.e. x∗i,t = xi,t − x¯i.∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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4.4.2 Liquidity level change, liquidity risk change, and cumulative abnor-
mal return
Liquidity level change. We study whether the DMM contract causes a stock’s liquidity level
to improve in what is essentially a difference-in-difference approach. We use our 20*101 stock-
month panel dataset to estimate various perturbations of the following model (with slight abuse
of notation to minimize notational burden):
yit = αi+β1 postt ∗DMMi+β2 postt +β′3control varsit + γt + εit (4.9)
where i indexes stocks and t indexes months, yit is the liquidity proxy of interest, αi is a
fixed effect, postt is a dummy for the post-event period, DMMi is a dummy for DMM stocks,
control varsit is a vector of control variables including price, volume, and volatility, γt is a time
effect, and εit is the error term. Standard errors are calculated following Thompson (2011) to
account for any (remaining) correlation in residuals. In this specification, the β1 coefficient
captures the difference-in-difference effect. That is, it estimates how the average yit changes
for DMM stocks in the post-event period relative to how it changes for nonDMM stocks. It is
therefore this coefficient and its associated t-value that tests, for example, whether the DMM
stock effective spread change more than the nonDMM stock effective spread.
Table 4.3 finds that the average liquidity level improves for DMM stocks in the post-event
period relative to nonDMM stocks, but only finds significance for quoted and effective spread,
not for the ILLIQ measure. In model (1) that does not yet add the control variables we find
that the difference-in-difference for effective spread is a significant -1.50%. This means that the
effective spread declines by 1.50% for DMM stocks relative to the change in effective spread
for nonDMM stocks. DMM stocks’ effective spread declines by 0.13% (i.e., 1.37%-1.50%)
comparing the pre- and post-event period. This substantially smaller difference effect relative
to the difference-in-difference effect is caused by a substantial increase in effective spread in
nonDMM benchmark stocks. Such increase most likely reflects a general decline in (small-cap)
liquidity in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, which should be controlled for (this is
the strength of the difference-in-difference approach). These effective spread results are robust
to adding price, volume, and volatility as control variables (model (2)). The effective spread
decomposition into realized spread and adverse selection shows that the spread decrease appears
to be due to a reduction in gross profits to liquidity suppliers and not a reduction in adverse
selection. That is, in model (2) the realized spread for DMM stocks declines significantly
relative to nonDMM stocks by 1.53% and the adverse selection component does not change
significantly. The quoted spread results are similar. The ILLIQ measure analysis also shows
qualitatively similar results, but here we do not find any statistical significance. We believe
that it is primarily due to its noisy character as for low volume days the ratio explodes and
82 CHAPTER 4: THE VALUE OF DMM FOR SMALL-CAPS
Ta
bl
e
4.
3:
D
es
ig
na
te
d
m
ar
ke
tm
ak
er
s
an
d
po
st
-e
ve
nt
ch
an
ge
in
liq
ui
di
ty
le
ve
la
nd
no
nl
iq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
gr
es
se
s
liq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s
on
a
se
to
fd
um
m
ie
s
an
d
st
an
da
rd
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
.T
he
du
m
m
ie
s
al
lo
w
fo
ra
di
ff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
te
st
(p
os
t-
ev
en
tm
in
us
pr
e-
ev
en
t,
D
M
M
m
in
us
no
nD
M
M
)t
o
ve
ri
fy
w
he
th
er
a
D
M
M
in
tr
od
uc
tio
n
ch
an
ge
s
th
e
liq
ui
di
ty
le
ve
l.
W
e
us
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
liq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
th
e
te
st
:
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
sp
re
ad
,q
uo
te
d
sp
re
ad
,A
m
ih
ud
’s
IL
LI
Q
m
ea
su
re
,r
ea
liz
ed
sp
re
ad
,a
nd
th
e
ad
ve
rs
e
se
le
ct
io
n
co
m
po
ne
nt
of
th
e
sp
re
ad
(w
he
re
th
e
la
tte
rt
w
o
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
th
e
av
er
ag
e
15
-m
in
ut
e
pr
ic
e
im
pa
ct
of
a
tr
ad
e)
.
W
e
al
so
pe
rf
or
m
a
di
ff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
te
st
fo
r
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
no
nl
iq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s:
vo
lu
m
e,
vo
la
til
ity
,
an
d
da
ily
re
tu
rn
au
to
co
rr
el
at
io
n.
W
e
us
e
ou
r1
01
*2
0
st
oc
k-
m
on
th
pa
ne
ld
at
as
et
to
es
tim
at
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
m
od
el
:
y i
t
=
α i
+
β 1
po
st
t
∗D
M
M
i+
β 2
po
st
t
+
β′ 3
co
nt
ro
l
va
rs
it
+
γ t
+
ε it
w
he
re
ii
nd
ex
es
st
oc
ks
an
d
t
in
de
xe
s
m
on
th
s,
α i
is
a
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
,p
os
t t
is
a
du
m
m
y
fo
rt
he
po
st
-e
ve
nt
pe
ri
od
,D
M
M
i
is
a
du
m
m
y
fo
rD
M
M
st
oc
ks
,c
on
tr
ol
va
rs
it
is
a
ve
ct
or
of
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
in
cl
ud
in
g
pr
ic
e,
vo
lu
m
e,
an
d
vo
la
til
ity
,γ
t
is
a
tim
e
ef
fe
ct
,a
nd
ε it
is
th
e
er
ro
rt
er
m
.T
he
liq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ar
e
do
ne
w
ith
an
d
w
ith
ou
tt
he
st
an
da
rd
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
(m
od
el
1
an
d
m
od
el
2,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y)
.
W
e
do
no
tu
se
an
y
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
fo
r
th
e
no
nl
iq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s.
W
e
ad
d
t-
va
lu
es
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
w
he
re
th
e
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
co
rr
ec
te
d
fo
rb
ot
h
fir
m
an
d
tim
e
cl
us
te
ri
ng
.
L
iq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s
N
on
liq
ui
di
ty
va
ri
ab
le
s
es
pr
ea
d
qs
pr
ea
d
IL
LI
Q
rs
pr
ea
d
ad
v
se
le
ct
io
n
vo
lu
m
e
vo
la
ti
lit
y
re
t
au
to
co
rr
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(1
)
(1
)
po
st
∗D
M
M
-1
.5
0*
*
-1
.4
8*
*
-1
.2
8*
*
-1
.2
3*
*
-4
.8
8
-5
.1
0
-1
.5
1*
*
-1
.5
3*
*
0.
01
0.
05
5.
64
0.
02
0.
07
**
(-
3.
50
)
(-
3.
69
)
(-
2.
91
)
(-
3.
09
)
(-
0.
84
)
(-
0.
83
)
(-
3.
63
)
(-
3.
71
)
(0
.0
2)
(0
.1
7)
(0
.9
4)
(0
.1
1)
(3
.4
2)
po
st
1.
37
**
1.
37
**
0.
81
**
0.
80
**
5.
18
5.
21
1.
28
**
1.
33
**
0.
09
0.
04
-0
.7
7
-0
.3
2
-0
.0
5*
*
(3
.3
5)
(3
.7
0)
(1
.9
9)
(2
.2
1)
(0
.9
6)
(0
.9
0)
(3
.1
8)
(3
.3
3)
(0
.3
2)
(0
.1
6)
(-
0.
15
)
(-
1.
64
)
(-
3.
31
)
pr
ic
e
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
1*
0.
01
0.
01
-0
.0
2*
*
(-
1.
17
)
(-
1.
87
)
(0
.2
1)
(0
.9
5)
(-
3.
81
)
vo
lu
m
e
-0
.0
0*
*
-0
.0
0*
*
0.
01
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0*
*
(-
2.
62
)
(-
3.
51
)
(1
.0
0)
(-
0.
27
)
(-
2.
38
)
vo
la
ti
lit
y
0.
15
**
0.
24
**
-0
.6
7
0.
03
0.
12
**
(8
.9
9)
(5
.2
9)
(-
1.
51
)
(0
.9
5)
(6
.0
8)
Ti
m
e
D
um
m
y
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Fi
xe
d
E
ff
ec
t
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
#O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
2,
00
5
2,
00
5
2,
02
0
2,
02
0
1,
89
7
1,
89
7
2,
00
5
2,
00
5
2,
00
5
2,
00
5
2,
02
0
2,
02
0
2,
02
0
∗∗
:S
ig
ni
fic
an
ta
ta
95
%
le
ve
l.
∗
:S
ig
ni
fic
an
ta
ta
90
%
le
ve
l.
CHAPTER 4: THE VALUE OF DMM FOR SMALL-CAPS 83
these observations start to dominate the regressions.21 We exclude the ILLIQ measure from any
remaining analysis given its poor statistical performance.22
Table 4.3 further finds that volume and volatility appear unaffected by the introduction of
a DMM, yet the quality of price discovery seems to improve. That is, we do not find any
significant effect for volume and volatility in the model (1) estimates. We do find, however,
that the return autocorrelation becomes significantly less negative for DMM stocks relative
to nonDMM stocks. The difference-in-difference estimate is +0.07 for DMM stocks, which
compares to a pre-event mean of -0.05 (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.4 further studies price discovery through the estimation of a state space model
(cf. Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas (2007)). Such approach decomposes price changes into
‘efficient’ price innovations and pricing errors.23 The standard deviation of each component
is then related to DMM introduction. In the post-event period, pricing errors are a signifi-
cant 100%*1.60/(0.96+1.15)=76% lower for DMM stocks relative to the untreated benchmark
stocks. This indicates that price discovery has improved. More surprising is the finding that the
size of efficient price innovations has shrunk by a significant 100%*0.69/(2.94-0.17)=25% for
DMM stocks relative to the benchmark stocks. One possible explanation is that incentives to
collect and trade on information are reduced for these stocks if one agent, the DMM, is naturally
incentivized to collect all information she can — the marginal benefit of additional information
collection is then reduced.24
Liquidity risk change. We measure liquidity risk through the Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) liquidity risk betas as summarized in equation (4.1). To enable direct econometric tests
21Table 4.1 shows that even after a 1% winsorization on both sides, the maximum value of ILLIQ is 181.33
relative to an average value of 2.50.
22We added a more-than-one-DMM dummy to capture a potential additional effect from multiple DMMs; we
generally find that this variable is not significant (for further discussion we refer to Section 4.4.4).
23Note that the decomposition assumes that both components are uncorrelated. This assumption is not innocuous
as it is at odds with a canonical microstructure model that has both components be positively correlated (see
discussion Menkveld, Koopman, and Lucas (2007, section 4.3)). Empirical identification requires (intraday) trade
data which is not accessible to us for the full sample. We believe the zero-correlation assumption is still useful for
exploratory analysis.
24The argument is in the spirit of Pasquariello and Vega (2007, p.1984) who observe that, in the presence of
a public signal (the DMM quotes in our case), the “belief update about v stemming from Sp makes speculators’
private information less valuable.” In their model v is the unobserved fundamental value and Sp is the public signal.
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Table 4.4: Designated market makers and post-event change in price discovery
This table presents the change in price discovery after the introduction of DMMs. We use three measures
of price discovery in the test which are estimated from the following state space model:
pi,t = mi,t + si,t
mi,t = mi,t−1+wi,t
si,t = φisi,t−1+ εi,t
where pi,t is the observed price of stock i on day t and it is modeled as the sum of two unobservable com-
ponents. The first component mi,t is the ‘fundamental’ or ‘efficient’ price , which follows a martingale
process. The second component si,t is a transitory deviation from the efficient price, the ‘pricing error’.
The state-space model is estimated stock by stock and for pre- and post-event periods separately with
maximum likelihood using Kalman filter. We use the daily midquote, adjusted for splits, new issues and
dividends, as the observed price pi,t . The estimation is implemented in Ox using standard optimization
techniques. Three measures for price discovery are σ(w), σ(ε) and σ(ε)√
1−φ2 . To examine how DMMs
affect price discovery, we apply the following cross-sectional regression:
yi = α+β1 posti ∗DMMi+β2 posti+ εi
where i indexes stocks, post is a dummy for the post-event period, and DMM is a dummy for DMM
stocks. We add t-values in parentheses.
σ(w) σ(ε) σ(ε)√
1−φ2
post ∗DMM -0.69* -1.31** -1.60**
(-1.72) (-5.20) (-4.99)
post -0.17 0.96** 1.15**
(-0.44) (3.97) (3.73)
intercept 2.94** 0.75** 0.96**
(16.72) (6.75) (6.74)
#Observations 202 202 202
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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on beta changes, we estimate the following panel data model based on daily data:
rit = ∑
k∈{pre,post}
αrrik + β˜
rr
ik kt ∗ rmt + εrrit (4.10)
rit = ∑
k∈{pre,post}
αrcik − β˜rcik kt ∗ cmt + εrcit (4.11)
cit = ∑
k∈{pre,post}
αcrik − β˜crik kt ∗ rmt + εcrit (4.12)
cit = ∑
k∈{pre,post}
αccik + β˜
cc
ik kt ∗ cmt + εccit (4.13)
where i indexes stocks, t indexes days, k indexes pre- and post-event periods, kt is a dummy
that equals one if day t falls into the k period, zero otherwise, rit is the daily midquote return
that is adjusted for stock-splits and includes dividends, cit is the (effective or quoted) half-
spread divided by 20 trading days (to be consistent with Acharya and Pedersen (2005)), rmt
is the Amsterdam AEX index return, cmt is the market-cap weighted (effective or quoted) half
spread of the AEX index stocks. Finally, we use tildes to emphasize that these are regression
betas rather than the covariance expressions of the basic Acharya and Pedersen (AP) model
(see equation (4.1)). In reporting our results, we scale the regression betas with the appropriate
covariance ratio to arrive at the AP betas.25 Note that we add a minus sign in front of βrc and
βcr to make the signs of these betas consistent with the AP model (see equation (4.2)).
Table 4.5 finds strong support that βcc liquidity risk is reduced for DMM stocks relative
to nonDMM stocks and weak support for a reduction in βrc and βcr liquidity risk. The table
reports the results for both the effective and the quoted spread measure. It leads to a couple of
observations. First, we find, consistent with Acharya and Pedersen (2005), that the market beta
(βrr) is an order of magnitude larger than the liquidity betas (βcc,βrc,βcr). In their basic liquidity-
CAPM model, the risk premia are assumed to be constant across all sources of risk as evident
from a single risk premium λ in equation (4.3)). In this case, liquidity risks would be dominated
by market risk. If, however, the risk premiums associated with the liquidity risks are higher than
the market risk premium (as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find in their calibration) then liquidity
risks start to matter for required returns as well. Second, again consistent with Acharya and
Pedersen (2005), we find that all betas represent risk as almost all their estimates are positive.
Third and most important, we find for DMM stocks relative to nonDMM stocks (last set of
columns) that all three liquidity betas (βcc, βcc, and βrc) decrease in the post-event period. These
are all changes that reduce the liquidity risk and are therefore potential channels for liquidity
to generate value. However, we only find statistical significance for a reduction in the βcc
liquidity risk for both the quoted and the effective spread measure, i.e., a security’s transaction
25Stock by stock we multiply the regression beta with (var(rit)/var(rmt − cmt )) for equation (4.10) and (4.11)
and (var(cit)/var(rmt − cmt )) for equation (4.12) and (4.13).
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cost covaries less with market transaction cost after hiring a designated market maker. This
reduction naturally arises with an upper bound on the spread as covariation with market liquidity
is ‘hampered’. The βrc liquidity measure is only significantly reduced for the effective spread
measure and the βcr is significantly reduced for the quoted spread measure and only significantly
reduced for the effective spread measured at the 90% confidence level.
Cumulative abnormal returns. Figure 4.2 shows that DMM stocks on average generate a
significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the three week window around the announce-
ment and effective day (see also the timeline of Figure 4.1). We estimate CARs based on daily
midquote returns and post-event market beta estimates.26 Panel A shows that DMM stocks gen-
erate a significant CAR over this period of 3.5%. Most of this CAR is a strong run-up in prices
in the week after Euronext publishes (t=-5) the list with all DMM stocks. We also find a 1.0%
CAR in the week before the announcement which suggests that some of the information might
have leaked to the market in the days before the announcement. We find another 0.5% on the
effective day (t=0) and no significant changes afterwards. Panel B plots the CAR for nonDMM
stocks which is insignificant throughout the entire period. Overall, the evidence suggests that
the act of hiring a DMM appears to create value for the firm’s shareholders.
Cross-sectional regression of CARs on liquidity level and liquidity risk changes. If the
liquidity changes that come with a DMM introduction are the cause of the DMM CARs, one
expects the CARs to be largest for those stocks that show the largest improvement in liquidity
level or the strongest reduction in liquidity risk. In the remainder of this subsection, we run
a cross-sectional regression to verify whether one can indeed relate value creation to liquidity
improvement. In the process, we worry about alternative explanations for the DMM stocks to
generate CARs based on endogenous selection. We use an Heckman approach to control for
such explanation in the cross-sectional regression.
We propose two alternative explanations for the abnormal returns based on endogenous
selection of DMM stocks. First, the significant positive abnormal return for DMM stocks is
really the result of a signaling game, where the good type firms take on the cost of hiring a
DMM to signal their type to investors. For bad type firms this cost is prohibitively high. We
consider this explanation unlikely as, in addition to a positive abnormal return for DMM stocks,
it predicts a negative abnormal return for nonDMM stocks, which we do not find in the data.
Second, a more plausible explanation that also captures the liquidity improvement is that DMM
brokerage firms have private knowledge on future liquidity conditions of the small-cap firms
26 We estimate the market model using post-event data to avoid an ex-post selection bias (cf. Amihud, Mendel-
son, and Lauterbach (1997, p.373)). If brokers select stocks with an exceptionally good pre-event performance
relative to the market, then the pre-event beta estimator (and thus the CAR estimator around the event) correlates
with DMM selection and thus biases the DMM CAR analysis. It is for this reason that we prefer a post-event
beta estimator, where the post-event period (starting 11/30/01) is far removed from the event window we use to
calculate CARs (ending 11/2/01) (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative abnormal returns in the event period
This figure depicts the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) with a 90% confidence interval over
the three week event window that includes the announcement day as day -5 and the effective day as day
0 (see Figure 1 for the time line). We estimate CARs based on daily midquote returns. We use post-
event beta estimates to avoid a potential ex-post selection bias (cf. Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach
(1997, p.373). Panel A reports the CAR for DMM stocks; Panel B for nonDMM stocks. The confi-
dence intervals are based on robust standard errors which account for stock-specific autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity.
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and only pitch aggressively to those firms with good liquidity prospects.27 This explains both
the post-event liquidity changes and their association with abnormal returns.
We recognize a potential endogenous selection in the cross-sectional regression through a
Heckman procedure (see Heckman (1979)). That is, we first use a Probit model to estimate
which observable factors drive the decision for a firm to hire a DMM. We then use a transfor-
mation of the likelihood of the (observed) firm’s decision to hire a DMM given its observable
characteristics, i.e., the inverse Mills ratio. A high ratio for stock i indicates that hiring a DMM
was very unlikely given its characteristics. A selection bias now occurs if the unobservables that
drive the hiring decision (i.e., the draw of the residual in the Probit selection equation) correlate
with the regressors and with the error term in the cross-sectional regression of abnormal returns.
In the Heckman procedure we control for such bias through the inclusion of the inverse Mills
ratio in the cross-sectional regression. If, for example, consistent with the second alternative
explanation, our results are only driven by private information on the side of brokerage firms on
future liquidity conditions, the inverse Mills ratio is collinear with the liquidity change and this
should make both variables insignificant in the cross-sectional regression.
We propose the following Probit model for a firm’s decision on whether or not to hire a
DMM (where all explanatory variables are based on the pre-event period):
Pr[DMMi = 1] = Φ(α1+α2volatilityi+α3volumei+α4 pricei+ (4.18)
α5nr shares outstandingi+α6auction threati+
α7tobins qi+α8 forecasted spreadi),
where i indexes stocks, DMMi is a dummy that equals one if firm i hires designated market mak-
ers and zero otherwise, volatilityi is the average daily midquote return volatility, volumei is the
average daily trading volume in shares, pricei is the average daily closing price, nr shares outstandingi
is the number of shares outstanding, auction threat is a dummy that switches to one if the
stock’s trading frequency in the pre-event period is less than 5,000 transactions per year, tobins q
is Tobin’s q measure, and forecasted spread is a forecast of the post-event spread based on an
AR(p) model fitted to pre-event observations (p is determined on a stock by stock basis using
the AIC criterion). All these variables might affect the likelihood of DMM introduction and
therefore need to enter the Heckman first stage Probit. In particular, the reason for the auction
threat variable is that, in the new system, a stock with such low trading frequency has to move
to a twice-a-day auction, unless the firm decides to hire a DMM.
Table 4.6 finds that DMM introduction is less likely for large firms and for firms for which
the spread is forecasted to be high. The size result is consistent with Venkataraman and Wais-
burd (2007). We do not find any significance for volatility, volume, stock price, the auction
27For instance, they might know that (new) management will improve communication which allows liquidity
suppliers to save on monitoring cost.
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Table 4.6: Probit analysis of DMM-or-nonDMM in the cross-section of small-cap stocks
The table presents the estimates of a cross-sectional Probit model where the DMM-or-nonDMM depen-
dent variable is explained by several pre-event firm and trade characteristics. The model specification
is:
Pr[DMMi = 1] = Φ(α1+α2volatilityi+α3volumei+α4 pricei+α5nr shares outstandingi
+α6auction threati+α7tobins qi+α8 forecasted spreadi)
where i indexes stocks, DMMi is a dummy that equals one if firm i hires designated market makers and
zero otherwise, volatilityi is the average daily midquote return volatility, volumei is the average daily
trading volume in shares, pricei is the average daily closing price, nr shares outstandingi is the number
of shares outstanding, auction threat is a dummy that switches to one if the stock’s trading frequency
in the pre-event period is less than 5,000 transactions per year, tobins q is the ratio of the market value
to the book value of the firm’s assets (tobins q is not available for 3 nonDMM stocks in our database),
and forecasted spread is the forecasted spread calculated as follows: first, a time series AR(p) model is
estimated for each stock based on all observations of the quoted spread in the pre-event period, where the
order p is determined individually based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (the average value
of p equals to 1.3); next, the prediction of the spread in the post-event period is calculated based on the
estimated AR coefficients; forecasted spread is the average value of the predicted spread. The Probit
regression is based on 98 stocks (74 DMM stocks and 24 nonDMM stocks). We use maximum likelihood
to estimate the model parameters.
Coefficient t-stat
volatility -0.27 -1.40
volume -0.00 -0.83
price -0.02 -1.46
nr shares outstanding -12.17 -3.62**
auction threat 0.72 1.37
tobins q 0.02 0.43
forecasted spread -0.57 -2.44**
intercept 3.38 4.82**
#Observations 98
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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threat dummy, or Tobin’s q.
Table 4.7 finds that both the liquidity level change and the liquidity risk change explain
the abnormal return in the cross-section and it also shows that these findings are robust to a
potential selection bias. For the ex-post liquidity measure, the effective spread, we find that
its largest component, the realized spread, has strongest explanatory power in the univariate
cross-sectional regressions.28 Stocks with larger realized spread reductions experience higher
abnormal returns. We also find that changes in liquidity risk significantly explain abnormal
returns in the cross-section, i.e., stocks with larger risk reductions experience higher abnormal
returns. The regression only includes βcc liquidity risk as it was most significantly affected by
DMM introduction — “Appendix: How Do Designated Market Makers Create Value for Small-
Caps?” has all three liquidity betas as explanatory variables and finds no additional explanatory
power for the other two. Model (3) includes both realized spread change and liquidity risk
change in a multivariate regression and shows that both are important in explaining the cross-
section of CARs.29 We find these results to be robust as they do not change when we include the
inverse Mills ratio to control for a potential selection bias. For the ex-ante liquidity measure, the
quoted spread, we also find a significance for liquidity level change, but this time no significance
for liquidity risk change.
4.4.3 Binding vs. nonbinding liquidity regimes
In this second set of empirical analyses, we search for evidence in support of value creation
through DMMs as liquidity suppliers of last resort whose services are consumed at times of
low ‘endogenous’ liquidity. First, we show that on days where the liquidity constraint is likely
to bind, we find that DMMs participate in more trades and do so involuntarily as their trading
revenue turns to a loss. Second, we show that their supply is appreciated by liquidity demanders
as volume is higher on these days relative to comparable days in the pre-event period.
DMM liquidity supply on days where constraints are likely to bind. We do not observe
the minimum liquidity supply that the issuer and the broker contract on and we therefore cannot
identify times when broker’s constraint binds. Instead, we propose the following. We take all
post-event trading days for DMM stocks and sort them stock by stock based on quoted spread
(which is what we know the contracts are based on). For each stock, we calculate the q and the
28We do not find the adverse selection component of the spread to be significant in the univariate regressions,
which is not surprising as it does not change significantly with the addition of a DMM (see Table 4.3). This also
makes alternative explanations for abnormal returns based on information asymmetry changes less likely (see, e.g.,
Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008))
29We are aware that we potentially suffer from an ex-post selection bias as brokers select firms with exceptionally
strong ex-ante performance as discussed in footnote 26. In this case, however, the analysis requires estimation
of pre-event liquidity betas to establish the change in betas. We are, however, somewhat less concerned about a
conditioning on exceptional performance relative to nonstandard liquidity factors as opposed to the salient standard
CAPM market factor.
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Table 4.7: Determinants of cross-sectional dispersion in cumulative abnormal returns
This table regresses the three week cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the DMM introduction
date (see Figure 2) on changes in liquidity level, changes in liquidity risk, and the inverse Mills ratio
(IMR) where the IMR is a Heckman control for a potential endogenous selection bias. The liquidity
level and liquidity risk changes are simply the post- minus pre-event value of proxies for these variables
(see also Table 4.3 and 4.5) where we follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to calculate liquidity risk.
Although their model proposes various liquidity risk factors, we only include the covariation of a stock’s
liquidity with market liquidity (βcc) in this regression as it was most significantly affected by the intro-
duction of DMMs. The IMR is based on the Probit model estimate of Table 4.6. Panel A is based on
the effective spread as liquidity measure; Panel B is based on the quoted spread. We include t-values in
parentheses.
Panel A: Effective spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆rspreada -2.80 ** -2.12 ** -2.30 **
(-3.43) (-2.38) (-2.27)
∆adv selectiona 0.62 1.18 1.10
(0.55) (1.00) (0.91)
∆βcc(×104) -74.71** -53.61* -53.58*
(-2.77) (-1.85) (-1.84)
IMR 3.02
(0.37)
intercept 2.76 ** 1.65 2.10 * 0.97
(2.60) (1.50) (1.88) (0.30)
R2 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.15
#Observations 101 101 101 98
Panel B: Quoted spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆qspread -2.02 ** -2.46 ** -2.32 **
(-2.40) (-2.61) (-2.31)
∆βcc(×104) -2.13 57.12 54.47
(-0.04) (1.09) (1.03)
IMR -3.24
(-0.42)
intercept 2.06 * 2.32 ** 2.25 ** 3.51
(1.91) (2.04) (2.04) (1.10)
R2 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.07
#Observations 101 101 101 98
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
a : We prefer to use the two components of effec-
tive spread rather effective spread itself in order
to trace down which component drives CARs. If,
however, we include effective spread instead, we
find its coefficient to be significantly negative in
all models.
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(1-q) quantile and label days with a spread larger than the (1-q) quantile as ‘high spread days’
where the constraint is likely to bind and days with a spread lower than the q quantile as ‘low
spread days’ where it almost surely does not bind. In the implementation we use q equal to 0.10,
0.33, and 0.50. We prefer this approach to a more subjective armchair econometrics approach
that studies quoted spread histograms and takes a guess at a cutoff level to label trading days.
We nevertheless also followed this alternative approach and find that results are unchanged.
We interpret high quoted spread days as days when the ‘endogenous’ liquidity supply is low
and these days therefore benefit from a DMM liquidity guarantee. In an intermediate empirical
analysis that is available upon request, we characterize these days by comparing trade statistics
across low and high spread days. We find that high spread days exhibit higher volatility, weakly
lower volume, less trades, and contemporaneous and lagged negative stock and market returns.
We indeed associate all these characteristics with low endogenous liquidity supply.
We calculate DMM participation rate, DMM gross trading revenue per share, and realized
spread as a proxy for aggregate gross trading revenue per share for both the high and the low
spread days. We then use a panel data model to test for differences across the two types of
days. We use the following definitions. DMM participation rate is the ratio of the number of
transactions with a DMM on one side of the trade and the total number of transactions. Inspired
by Sofianos (1995), we calculate DMM gross trading revenue per share (GT R) by aggregating
revenue across all DMM buys and sells in the day and marking-to-market her start of day and
end of day inventory:
GT Rit = (Sit−Bit + pitIit− pi,t−1Ii,t−1)/nr shares transactedit , (4.19)
where i indexes stocks and t indexes days, pit is the end of day midquote, Iit is the end of day
DMM inventory in shares, Sit (Bit) is the total euro value of all sells (buys), and nr shares transactedit
is the sum of trade size in shares of all transactions where a DMM is on one side of the trade.
We do not observe DMM inventory directly and we therefore proxy for it with the sum over
signed DMM volume in shares.30
We realize that high quoted spread days might, in addition to being costly to DMMs if their
constraint binds, also enable DMMs (and others) to earn off of a wide bid-ask spread through
round-trip trades. To analyze these two sources of daily DMM gross trading revenues (GT Rs),
we decompose them into a round-trip-trading-revenue component (RT R) and an inventory-
repricing component (IT R) (see also Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Seasholes, and Moul-
30We implicitly assume that the inventory level is zero at the start of the sample. We are not too worried about
this assumption as we ultimately test for differences in GT R levels across the two types of trading days, not for the
levels themselves. We check robustness by starting with different inventory levels and find that our main results
are not affected.
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ton (2010)). The first inventory-neutral component is defined as:
RT Rit = min(sit ,bit)(psit− pbit), (4.20)
where i indexes stocks and t indexes days, sit (bit) is the number of shares the DMM sells (buys),
and psit (p
s
it) is the average price at which the DMM sells (buys) that day. The IT R component
captures gross profits associated with DMM inventory and is defined as:
IT Rit = (pit− pbit)(bit− sit)++(psit− pit)(sit−bit)++ Ii,t−1(pit− pi,t−1), (4.21)
where (x)+ equals x if x is positive, zero otherwise. This term essentially captures the revenue
associated with repricing inventory positions. The first two terms pick up the revenue for the
inventory that was built in the course of the trading day (and turns negative if DMMs have to
‘lean against the wind’). The last term picks up the result based on the start of day inventory
position. By construction, we have:
GT Rit = RT Rit + IT Rit (4.22)
for each day in the sample.
We estimate the following panel data model:
yit = αi+βlowlow qspreadit +βhighhigh qspreadit + εit , (4.23)
where i indexes stocks and t indexes days, yit is DMM participation rate, DMM gross trading
revenue and its decomposition, or realized spread, low qspreadit is a dummy that is one for the
days that are labeled ‘low spread days’, zero otherwise, high qspreadit is defined analogously.
Table 4.8 compares high to low quoted spread days and finds that DMMs participate in
more trades, they build up larger excess inventory positions, and their gross trading revenue
per share turns to a loss on high spread days, which indicates that they operate under a binding
constraint. Not surprisingly, we find the strongest results when we zoom in on the tails, i.e.,
when we use q=0.10 (Panel A). For this quantile, we find that DMM trade participation in the
high spread regime is 0.32, which is a significant 0.13 higher than their participation in the low
spread regime. Excess inventory — the absolute deviation from average inventory — grows
significantly during high spread days whereas there is no such effect for low spread days. They
earn -e1.10 per share (GT R) in the high spread regime which is significantly lower than the
e0.95 per share in the low spread regime. We decompose the (GT R) into its two components
and find that the losses are due to adverse price movements on inventory as IT R is -e1.12 in
in the high spread regime, which is significantly lower than e0.94 in the low spread regime. It
seems that the DMM contract forces them to ‘lean against the wind’, i.e., they are long when the
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price falls and short when the price rises.31 Panels B and C show that these results are generally
robust to changing the quantile from 0.10 to 0.33 or 0.50, respectively.
Table 4.8 further shows that DMM round-trip trade revenues are higher on high quoted
spread days, which is evidence of higher speculative profits on these days. It seems that DMMs
do earn the larger spread (net of adverse selection) on their round-trip trades. For the 0.10
quantile reported in Panel A, we find that RT R is e0.02 per share on high quoted spread days,
which is a significant e0.01 higher than the RT R on low quoted spread days. The realized
spread, which represents the aggregate gross profits across all liquidity suppliers, also increases
significantly from 0.32% on low spread days to 0.56% on high spread days. It seems that both
the DMM round-trip trade revenue and the aggregate liquidity supplier revenue roughly double
on high quoted spread days. These results illustrate that the only cause for DMM losses on high
quoted spread days is that they suffer adverse price movements on their inventory positions.
They are forced to lean against the wind as suppliers of last resort.
Volume change for binding constraint days. Finally, we study whether the forced liq-
uidity supply on high spread days actually leads to more consumption by liquidity demanders.
That is, does it actually allow current shareholders to realize a gain from trade that would other-
wise be dominated by too high transaction cost or, does it attract new shareholders to the stock?
Either way, we should see a volume increase if the DMM liquidity guarantee leads to increased
consumption. We propose the following test. We use the previously used post-event high spread
quantile q to label trading days in the pre-event period. We then compare volume differentials
across pre- and post-event ‘high spread days’ in what is a difference-in-difference panel data
approach similar to what we did in the tests on liquidity level change (see equation (4.9)).
Table 4.9 finds significant volume increases on high quoted spread days for DMM stocks
relative to volume decreases for nonDMM stocks for two of the three quantile levels. The
difference-in-difference estimates are also economically significant as for the q = 0.10 quantile
analysis, for example, we find a volume increase of 14,670 shares per day, which compares to
a pre-event DMM stock mean of 35,520 shares.32
4.4.4 Additional analysis
This section summarizes the results of some additional analysis which is available in the
“Appendix: How Do Designated Market Makers Create Value for Small-Caps?”.
31In the “Appendix: How Do Designated Market Makers Create Value for Small-Caps?” we show that DMM
passive buys exceed their passive sales on days with price downturns and vice versa for days with price upturns.
This indicates that DMMs trade against price swings (and supply liquidity) as their standing quotes in the book get
consumed.
32We also find an overall volume increase in the difference-in-difference analysis of Table 4.3. It amounts to
5640 shares per day which is a substantial increase given the pre-event DMM stock mean of 35,520 shares per day
(see Table 4.1). We do not find it to be statistically significant probably due to the less precise nature of the search,
i.e., it also includes days where the DMMs are most likely not on a binding constraint.
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Table 4.8: Post-event DMM activity and gross trade revenue in high and low quoted spread
regimes
This table presents an analysis on whether DMMs are suppliers of last resort in the sense that they are
forced to supply the minimum liquidity that they committed to at times of low “endogenous” supply.
Empirically, we should find that they participate in more trades, suffer lower trading revenues, and have
larger excess inventory positions on days that their constraint is likely to bind. For each stock, we cal-
culate the q and the (1-q) quantile of the daily (time-weighted) quoted spread in the post-event period.
We then label days with a spread larger than the (1-q) quantile as “high spread days” where the con-
straint is likely to bind and days with a spread lower than q as “low spread days” where it almost surely
does not bind. We compare the DMM trade participation rate, DMM gross trading revenue (GT R), and
DMM excess inventory changes across the two types of days. We define DMM participation rate as
the ratio of the number of transactions with a DMM on one side of the trade and the total number of
transactions. We calculate GT R by summing over all trade revenues in the day and marking-to-market
DMM inventory any time the midquote changes (cf. Sofianos (1995)). We also decompose GT R into
its two components: inventory-related trading revenue (IT R) and round-trip trading revenue (RT R) (cf.
Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Seasholes, and Moulton (2008)). We further calculate aggregate
gross trading revenue across all liquidity suppliers using realized spread based on the average 15-minute
price impact of a trade. We scale GT R, IT R, and RT R by the number of shares traded to make them
comparable to the realized spread. The DMM excess inventory changes, ∆(|DMM excess inv|), is cal-
culated as changes in the absolute value of the deviation from the stock average inventory position. We
use the following panel data regression to test for differences across liquidity regimes:
yit = αi+βlowlow qspreadit +βhighhigh qspreadit + εit
where low spreadit is a dummy for the low spread days and high spreadit is a dummy for the high
spread days. We add t-values in parentheses, where the standard errors are corrected for both firm and
time clustering.
Low quoted High quoted Difference #Observations
spread regime spread regime
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Panel A: q=0.10 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM particip rate 0.19 0.32 0.13 ** 3,479
(23.18) (33.30) (7.69)
DMM GT R pershare 0.95 -1.10 -2.04 ** 2,628
(1.90) (-2.27) (-2.17)
DMM IT R pershare 0.94 -1.12 -2.05 ** 2,628
(1.88) (-2.31) (-2.18)
DMM RT R pershare 0.01 0.02 0.01 ** 2,638
(6.16) (23.84) (5.87)
rspread 0.32 0.56 0.24 ** 2,324
(20.35) (28.41) (6.90)
∆(|DMM excess inv|) -0.17 0.38 0.55 ** 3,515
(-1.45) (2.80) (2.21)
- continued on next page -
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Low quoted High quoted Difference #Observations
spread regime spread regime
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Panel B: q=0.33 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM particip rate 0.21 0.31 0.10 ** 11,193
(32.09) (45.02) (7.66)
DMM GT R pershare 0.27 -1.15 -1.42 ** 8,855
(0.87) (-3.81) (-2.60)
DMM IT R pershare 0.26 -1.17 -1.43 ** 8,855
(0.83) (-3.88) (-2.61)
DMM RT R pershare 0.01 0.02 0.01 ** 8,900
(16.62) (29.91) (6.14)
rspread 0.34 0.49 0.15 ** 7,557
(30.37) (37.47) (6.55)
∆(|DMM excess inv|) 0.01 0.13 0.13 11,279
(0.10) (2.04) (1.08)
Panel C: q=0.50 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM particip rate 0.22 0.30 0.08 ** 16,712
(46.21) (59.13) (8.23)
DMM GT R pershare -0.15 -1.32 -1.17 ** 13,360
(-0.63) (-5.45) (-3.02)
DMM IT R pershare -0.17 -1.34 -1.18 ** 13,360
(-0.69) (-5.53) (-3.03)
DMM RT R pershare 0.01 0.02 0.01 ** 13,444
(26.19) (37.61) (5.51)
rspread 0.35 0.46 0.11 ** 11,364
(39.00) (43.35) (6.31)
∆(|DMM excess inv|) -0.04 0.05 0.09 16,809
(-0.74) (0.92) (0.82)
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 4.9: Pre- and post-event volume in high quoted spread regime
This table studies whether DMM additions raise liquidity consumption in high quoted spread regimes. It
uses a difference-in-difference (post- minus pre-event, DMM minus nonDMM) approach to volume on
high quoted spread days. We use the post-event quantiles (consistent with Table 4.8) for the daily (time-
weighted) quoted spread to label both the pre- and post-event trading days. We estimate the following
panel data model:
yit = αi+βpost DMM post DMMit +βpost nonDMM post nonDMMit +βDMMDMMi+ εit
where post DMMit is a dummy that equals one if stock i is a DMM stock and day t is in post-event
period and zero otherwise. post nonDMMit is defined analogously. DMMi is a dummy that equals one
if stock i is a DMM in the post-event period, zero otherwise. We add t-values in parentheses, where the
standard errors are corrected for both firm and time clustering.
Pre-event Post-event
high quoted high quoted Difference
spread regimea spread regimeb
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Panel A: q=0.10 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 43.81** 48.70** 4.89
(7.20) (8.07) (1.31)
NonDMM stocks 42.10** 32.32** -9.78*
(16.44) (3.91) (-1.67)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks 1.71 16.38 14.67**
(0.20) (1.19) (2.28)
#Observations 7,728
Panel B: q=0.33 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 41.87** 46.96** 5.09*
(5.54) (6.32) (1.94)
NonDMM stocks 41.83** 33.81** -8.02
(13.89) (3.26) (-1.08)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks 0.03 13.14 13.11
(0.00) (0.74) (1.72)*
#Observations 17,556
Panel C: q=0.50 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 42.54** 48.39** 5.85**
(8.33) (9.69) (2.23)
NonDMM stocks 43.03** 34.96** -8.06
(21.48) (4.95) (-1.58)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks -0.48 13.43 13.91**
(-0.07) (1.13) (2.52)
#Observations 23,837
a: The pre-event volume of DMM stocks is calculated as
1
74 ∑
74
i=1αi+βDMM . For nonDMM stocks, it is
1
27 ∑
101
i=75αi.
b: The post-event volume of DMM stocks is calculated as
1
74 ∑
74
i=1αi + βDMM + βpost DMM . For nonDMM stocks it is
1
27 ∑
101
i=75αi+βpost nonDMM∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Multiple DMMs. All analysis in this chapter was carried out conditioning on whether or
not designated market makers are present. A perhaps more natural conditioning variable is the
actual number of DMMs that enter. We have redone all major analyses with a multiple DMMs
dummy as additional conditioning/explanatory variable but did not find it to be significant. It is
for this reason that this chapter is focused on the binary variable: DMMs-or-not.
We believe the main reason for finding little additional information in the actual number of
DMMs is in the nature of some of the DMM sponsorships. As discussed in Section 4.2, some
brokers offered it for free in order to cross-subsidize other services. The value to the issuer of
these DMMs was low as from informal discussions with both Euronext officials and issuing
firms, we understood there typically was one broker that the issuer actively contracted with to
obtain a substantially tighter maximum spread than what Euronext required. The additional
free DMM offerings could straddle their quotes outside those of the ‘lead’ broker and avoid the
cost of a binding constraint. In this case, it is as if there is only a single DMM operating which
explains our results.
Industry-matched analysis. In addition to the unconditional comparison of DMM stocks
and benchmark stocks in the main text, we group stocks into industries and do a comparison
through industry pairs. In spite of the very small sample of only 7 industries, we continue to
find that quoted and effective spread are significantly reduced upon DMM introduction. The
liquidity risk analysis continues to show a significant reduction in βcc liquidity risk for the
quoted spread analysis. These findings show that the liquidity level and risk reduction that
accompany DMM introduction are robust results.
September 2011. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, had a profound and imme-
diate effect on financial markets world-wide. As this event is particularly close to the DMM
introduction day (September, 30, 2011), we have redone all major analyses after removing this
month from the sample. We generally find similar results except for that liquidity risk beta (βcc)
becomes a stronger explanatory factor in the cross-sectional CAR regression and the quoted
spread becomes a weaker explanatory factor. The results therefore tilt in favor of a liquidity risk
as opposed to a liquidity level explanation for abnormal returns.
4.5 Conclusion
We analyze a 22 month window around the event of a Euronext system roll-out to the Ams-
terdam market where small-caps get the opportunity to hire a designated market maker who
guarantees a minimum liquidity supply in their stock. We find that 74 firms sign up for the
service and 27 firms do not. In an event study analysis, we document the following results:
(i) DMM stocks generate a significant cumulative abnormal return of 3.5% in a three week
window that includes the announcement and the effective day. We find that most of it
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occurs in the week after Euronext publishes the list of DMM stocks. In aggregate, this
amounts to a value creation of about e1 billion.33
(ii) Based on what is essentially a difference-in-difference approach (post-event minus pre-
event differenced across DMM and nonDMM stocks), we find that the effective spread
declines significantly. The spread reduction appears to be driven by a realized spread
decline (i.e., gross profit to liquidity suppliers), not by a decline in the adverse selection
component of the spread. We further find that the effective spread covaries significantly
less with market effective spread (i.e., βcc in Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). We therefore
argue that DMMs improve liquidity level and reduce liquidity risk. We report similar
results for the quoted spread measure of liquidity.
(iii) We find that (i) the realized spread change and (ii) the effective spread market covariation
change are both significant in explaining the abnormal returns cross-sectionally. In the
regressions, we use a Heckman procedure to control for a potential selection bias.
(iv) We further find that DMMs are significantly more active on days when the (time-weighted)
quoted spread is high relative to days of low quoted spreads. For example, we find that
they participate in 32% of the trades in the highest decile days relative to a 19% participa-
tion in the lowest decile days. We also find that their gross trading revenue is significantly
reduced on these days and actually turns into a trading loss.
(v) We find that for these highest decile quoted spread days, volume is significantly higher in
the post-event period relative to similar days in the pre-event period. We interpret this as
evidence that investors value the liquidity supply guarantee as they appear to consume it.
(vi) Finally, we find that DMMs reduce daily pricing errors.
It seems that these designated market maker contracts reduce the liquidity friction for small-
caps and therefore reduce their cost of capital. If these firms are indeed an engine for economic
growth, regulators should consider allowing for these type of contracts. We do want to empha-
size though that any such regulatory effort should include a protection against the increased risk
of insider trading.34
3374 stocks * 3.5% * e0.49 billion market cap (see Table 4.1).
34We reiterate that the Dutch regulator AFM only allows for a DMM contract if the broker agrees to report all
her trading in that particular stock to the AFM.
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Appendix 4A: An Example Euronext DMM Contract
Below are excerpts from a designated market maker contract that Euronext has made available
to the authors. The name of the DMM has been changed to XXX to hide her identity. Numerical
content is replaced with YYY.
The DMM obligation is stated as:
XXX will act as a permanent Liquidity Provider, which implies that it will maintain
a spread of firm bid and offer prices during the fifteen (15) minutes preceding the
market opening and then throughout the Trading Day.
XXX shall during Trading Days give Quotes and act as a counter-party for buyers
and sellers of the Shares, whereby XXX shall maintain a maximum spread of firm
bid and offer prices of YYY% for at least YYY shares (minimal amount Euro
YYY).
The fee part of the contract says:
The fee to be paid by the Company to XXX for the liquidity services provided
amounts to YYY Euro per year with a fee holiday for the first year. The fee shall be
payable in advance on the date of commencement of this Agreement and further-
more on or before the first Trading Day of each following year.
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Appendix 4B: List of DMM and nonDMM stocks
We consider all stocks that were eligible for entering a contract with a designated market maker
(DMM) on the day that Euronext rolls out the system from Paris to Amsterdam. We study 74
firms that hire a DMM on the introduction day (10/29/01) and we use the 27 stocks that do not
hire a DMM in the post-event (11/30/01-9/30/02) period as benchmark nonDMM stocks.
Panel A: DMM stocks, N=74
AalbertsIndustries FornixBiosciences Ordina
AccellGroup FoxKidsEurope PetroplusInternational
Airspray Fugro Pinkroccade
Ajax GammaHolding RodamcoAsia
Amstelland Grontmij ScalaBusiness
Arcadis Haslemere Schuttersveld
ASMInternational Heijmans SligroBeheer
BalastNedam ICTAutomatisering SmitInternational
BESemiconductor Imtech SNT
BeterBed KasAssociatie Stork
BlueFoxEnterprise KLM TelegraafHolding
BoskalisWestminster KoninklijkeBamGroep TenCate
BrunelInternational KoninklijkeWessanen TwentscheKabel
Copaco Laurus Unit4Agresso
Corio MacintoshRetailGroup UnitedServiceGroup
CrownvanGelder Magnus vanLanschot
Crucell McGregorFashion VastnedOff\IND
CSM Nedap VastnedRetail
CTAC NedconGroep VendexKbb
DelftInstr Nedloyd VHSOnroerendGoed
DimVastgoed NewSkiesSatellites VolkerWesselStevin
DrakaHolding NieuwSteenInvestments Vopak
Econosto Nutreco Wegener
EurocommercialProperties OCE Wereldhave
ExactHolding OPGGroep
Panel B: nonDMM stocks, N=27
A.O.T HalTrust Ranstad
AABHold Heineken RoodTesthouse
AntonovPLC Hitt SimacTechniek
Athlon IspatInternationa SopheonPLC
Baan ManagementShare TieHolding
CapGemini Newconomy TulipComputers
CardioControl OpenTV UnileverPref
DeutscheBK PharmingGRP VanderMoolen
EVCInt RaboCapFndTrust ViaNetWorks
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 in this dissertation analyze several aspects of two major equity markets
in the world, U.S. NYSE/AMEX market and Dutch Euronext market . Chapter 2 explores a
new dimension of liquidity, namely the liquidity leak event. It is a tail event that securities
are trapped in a persistent illiquid state. Liquileak probability is proposed to measure this tail
event and test whether liquidity leaks are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Chapter 3
examines the relationship between liquidity and returns with a particular focus on the downside
market. The downside illiquidity level and beta are defined conditioning on the market return
and we investigate whether downside liquidity is priced differently in the cross-sectional returns.
Chapter 4 studies how the introduction of designated market makers affects small-caps. In
particular, what are the effects of a designated market maker on firms’ liquidity level, liquidity
risks and cumulative abnormal returns? The second part of Chapter 4 aims to answer what is
the channel for the value creation of designated market makers. The empirical analysis verify
whether a DMM loses money on a binding supply constraint. Since each chapter already contain
a conclusion that summarizes the corresponding findings, in the current chapter I first highlight
the most relevant results, and then provide the policy implications of the findings.
5.1 Summary of the main findings
5.1.1 Liquileaks
Chapter 2 uses NYSE/AMEX common stock data between 1963 to 2008. We measure liquidity
leaks by the liquileak probability estimated from the Markov regime switching model. The
liquileak probability is the interaction of the persistence of the illiquid regime and the frequency
of the illiquid regime. The former is measured by the probability that a stock remains in the
illiquid regime for five subsequent days given it is in the illiquid regime on previous day, and
the latter is measured by the unconditional probability that a stock is in the illiquid regime.
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The conjectured relationship between a stock’s liquileak probability and its required return is
tested in two conventional ways: portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regressions. The portfolio
sort analysis reveals that a trading strategy that is long in high liquileak stocks and short in
low liquileak stocks yields a significant average annual excess return of 3.36%. To explore
whether this positive return is only due to one of the two factors of the liquileak probability (i.e.,
frequency or duration) or just captures the (unconditional) average liquidity level, we double-
sort and find that, still, the return differential across low and high liquileak stocks remains
significantly positive. The Fama-MacBeth regressions enable us to also control for the standard
Fama-French factors and other stock characteristics. Liquileak probability remains significantly
positive. A one standard deviation increase in liquileak probability increases annual returns by
1.33%. These regressions are repeated for the two equal-length sub-periods (1964 through 1985
and 1986 through 2008) and the results indicate that the liquileak probability has become more
important for returns over time whereas, consistent with earlier literature, liquidity level has
become less important.
In the robustness check, we propose an alternative measure of liquidity leaks, which is
calculated directly from raw data without any model specification. We proxy the persistence of
the illiquid regime by the average duration that a stock is in the illiquid regime and the frequency
of the illiquid regime by the percentage of the days that a stock is in the illiquid regime over total
number of trading days. Correspondingly, the interaction of these two variables is the measure
of liquidity leaks. Again, we find consistent evidence that this measure of liquidity leaks also
has a significantly positive relation with stock returns. In addition, our results are robust to the
January effect.
5.1.2 Downside liquidity
Chapter 3 investigates liquidity in a downside market. We set the average market return as a
cutoff level and define a market is in a downside (upside) if its return is lower (higher) than this
cutoff level. Amihud ILLIQ measure is used as our daily illiquidity measure. The downside
(upside) illiquidity level is defined as the average of daily ILLIQ measure in a downside (up-
side) market. The downside and upside liquidity beta is the comovement of stock’s illiquidity
level with the market illiquidity level conditioning on the market return. The mean value of the
downside illiquidity level is 0.33, which is about 3% higher than the mean of the upside illiq-
uidity level. There are considerable variations in the downside and upside illiquidity level, both
in the cross-section and over time. Although the summary statistics of the downside and upside
liquidity beta are similar, their between correlation is 0.59 implying that these two variables are
far from perfectly correlated.
We use two approaches to investigate the relation between the downside liquidity and stock
returns in the cross-section. One is the portfolio sorting approach, which produces easy-to-
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interpret returns on a feasible investment strategy. We sort individual stocks into five quintiles
based on the their downside (and upside) illiquidity level and downside (and upside) liquidity
beta, and find that stocks with high downside illiquidity level and beta have higher returns
than stocks with low downside illiquidity level and beta. For example, a trading strategy that
is long in stocks with high downside illiquidity level and short in stocks with low downside
illiquidity level yield an average monthly excess return of approximately 0.94%. The return
difference between the two extreme downside liquidity beta quintiles is 0.74% per month. To
differentiate the effects of downside and upside illiquidity level and beta, we further conduct a
double-sorting analysis. After control for the upside illiquidity level we still find that the return
spread of portfolios sorted by the downside illiquidity level is significantly positive. Also, the
increasing pattern of return from the low downside liquidity beta to high downside liquidity beta
remains after first sort on the upside liquidity beta. The other approach is the Fama-MacBeth
regression, which allows us to regress cross-sectional excess returns directly on the downside
illiquidity level and beta and enable us to control for other well-known return determinants.
The regression is conducted on the firm level. We find evidence that the downside illiquidity
level and beta have a significantly positive effect on stock returns in the cross-section. For
example, an increase of one standard deviation in the downside illiquidity level would increase
monthly returns by 0.15%. It is approximately 1.8% on an annual basis, which also indicates
economical significance. The downside liquidity beta also has a significantly positive effect
on stock returns. However, when the downside illiquidity level, the upside illiquidity level,
the downside and upside liquidity beta are included jointly in the cross-sectional regression,
only the downside illiquidity level still has a significantly positive coefficient on returns. In the
robustness check, we find that our results are robust to the January effect.
5.1.3 Designated market makers
Chapter 4 studies an exogenous event on October 29 2001 when Euronext rolled out their Paris
limit order market to Amsterdam. They provided small-cap firms an option to contract with
designated market makers, who commit to affirmative obligations of supplying liquidity with-
out informational advantage. An important advantage of this exogenous all-stock migration is
that the analysis does not suffer from an endogenous timing bias that haunts any study based
on sequential introductions. The dataset contains one file that includes the initiation and termi-
nation date of all DMM contracts during that period. We find that 74 out of 101 eligible firms
enter DMM contracts. In addition the intraday dataset contains the best bid and ask quote and
trades of all transactions. We benefit from the unique feature of the data that there is a label in-
dicating whether or not a DMM was involved in the transaction (only their own-account trades
are considered) and, if so, on which side of the trade. This allows us to go deep into the trading
activities of DMMs and enable us to examine whether DMMs are acting as “supplier of last
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resort”.
In Chapter 4 we analyze 11 months before and after the introduction of designated market
makers and find that DMM stocks generate a significant cumulative abnormal return of 3.5% in
a three week window that includes the announcement and the effective day. Most of it occurs
in the week after Euronext publishes the list of DMM stocks. In aggregate, this amounts to
a value creation of about e1 billion. Based on what is essentially a difference-in-difference
approach (post-event minus pre-event differenced across DMM and nonDMM stocks), we find
that the effective spread declines significantly and the effective spread covaries significantly
less with market effective spread (i.e. βcc in Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). We therefore
argue that DMMs improve liquidity level and reduce liquidity risk. Moreover, both the liquidity
level change and the liquidity risk change are significant explanatory variables for the positive
abnormal returns associated with DMM stocks. We further find that DMMs participate in more
trades and incur a trading loss on high quoted-spread days, i.e., days when their constraint is
likely to bind.
5.2 Implications of the findings
Financial markets have experienced several “liquidity crises” over the last decade. For example,
the dry up of liquidity accelerated the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management. The
hedge fund could find no one to trade with when it needed liquidity most. This phenomenon has
become the first concern of market participants and regulators and has drawn a lot of attention
on liquidity in financial market.
It is widely recognized now that investors prefer liquid stocks and demand higher returns
from less liquid stocks. The evidence presented in this dissertation conveys the idea that mar-
ket returns endogenously affect liquidity and liquidity is especially crucial for investors during
market downturns. When market goes down, the aggregate value of securities decreases sub-
stantially and results in a large decline in the collateral value of a trader (e.g. a dealer, hedge
fund, or investment bank). These financial intermediaries who are liquidity suppliers under the
normal market condition turns into liquidity demanders in a declining market. They are forced
to liquidate their positions and the provision of liquidity in the market decreases sharply. The
“fire sale” actions in turn push down asset prices, and thus, make the liquidity problem further
deteriorate. Chapter 3 investigates liquidity explicitly conditioning on the market return. We set
the average market return as a cutoff level. The downside (upside) illiquidity level is the average
of daily ILLIQ measure when market return is lower (higher) than the cutoff level. Analogously,
the downside and upside liquidity beta is the comovement of stock’s illiquidity with the market
illiquidity conditioning on the market return. The results imply that the downside illiquidity
level has an overwhelming explanatory power in the cross-sectional returns.
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In addition, the findings in this dissertation show that the variation and timing of liquidity
is also important for investors besides the average level of liquidity. In Chapter 2 we intro-
duce a measure of liquidity called ‘liquileak probability’. It differs from other commonly used
liquidity measures, such as spread, quoted depth or Kyle’s lambda, as it incorporates the time
dimension of liquidity. It recognizes (i) the frequency of hitting an illiquid state and (ii) the
duration of that state. Liquidity leaks hurt only if both of these are large. Liquidity leaks occur
either because market participants engage in panic selling or financial intermediaries withdraw
from providing liquidity. Stocks that are captured by liquidity leaks are problematic for in-
vestors since they have to wait for significant time before liquidity can restore to their normal
level. Chapter 2 provides evidence that liquidity leaks are associated with significantly positive
return premium. Moreover, in contrast to the diminishing trend of liquidity level premium, the
premium of liquileak probability has increased over time. Therefore, it becomes increasingly
important to realize that investors care not only about the occurrence of low liquidity, but also
about how long such situations will last.
The idea of ‘liquidity leaks’ addresses issues that are very important and relevant for market
participants, stock exchanges and regulators. For market participants, liquidity might not be
a problem in normal market conditions. However, it becomes a first-order concern when the
security is trapped in a persistent illiquid state. Liquidity matters most when investors need to
trade. Investors would prefer firms with relatively predictable liquidity because they are more
certain about the cost of closing a position at the time they make the initial purchase decision.
When a security is likely to enter an illiquid state and stay there for a long time, it increases
the uncertainty attached to a position and limits the potential flexibility for investors . For
example, investors who need to reduce overall exposure may face the situation of either selling
shares at substantially low value or liquidating other positions. In the extreme case, there is no
opportunity to enter or exit a position when liquidity suddenly disappears.
Since the earliest stock exchange was established in 1602 by the Dutch East India Company,
the structure and design of trading mechanism has been subject to dynamic changes. Rising
globalization, deregulation, cross listing have made the competition among exchanges greater
than ever before. The primary function of a stock exchange is to provide liquidity for listed
securities. Normally the performance of exchanges is measured by spreads, depths, volatility
and trading volumes. This dissertation argues that exchanges should not simply focus on those
static measures of liquidity. They should arguably have a strong interest in the dynamics of
liquidity and extreme market conditions such as ‘liquidity leaks’. At the time of liquidity leaks,
the usual liquidity suppliers, for example speculators, would face funding constraints and higher
margin requirement. Then they turn to be liquidity demanders instead of suppliers and market
is absence of investors who are willing to take the other side of positions. Therefore, it is
important to ensure the presence of liquidity suppliers in the market, especially during periods
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like liquidity leaks. Likewise, understanding ‘liquidity leaks’ is helpful for regulators to better
monitor market quality and stability.
One possible solution for ‘liquidity leaks’ could be the designated market maker which is
studied in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Traditionally there are market makers with privileges
in a order-driven market. One important feature of this system is the use of single market
maker and its inherent advantage in terms of unique information over other traders on both the
market orders and the limit order book. The best known example is the specialist in NYSE
stock exchange. Recently some stock exchanges begin to allow firms to directly contract with
market makers who commit to supply a minimum liquidity at all times. This kind of market
makers differs from specialists as they have affirmative obligations of submitting continuous
bid and ask orders by trading on their own account. They do not possess any monopolistic
information and have to compete with investors for order flows. They are usually hired by small
and mid caps with inactive-traded stocks and are subsidized by direct payment from the listed
firms. Chapter 4 in this dissertation provides further understanding of the latter which is called
‘designated market maker’ in Euronext Amsterdam exchange. It is shown that the presence
of designated market makers leads to abnormal returns, both economically and statistically
significant. In essence, designated market makers play a role as a “supplier of last resort” to
insure current shareholders against the idiosyncratic risk of having to trade when liquidity is
low. Their presence reduces not only illiquidity level but also systematic liquidity risk. The
findings show that DMM stocks have more volume and higher DMM participation in these
extreme market conditions. The value of DMMs is basically realized at times of low endogenous
liquidity when the supply constraint binds. Shareholders realize a gain from trade that otherwise
might have met too high transaction cost (in the absence of the minimum supply guarantee).
Firms have to pay DMMs a lump-sum fee in order to get their service of providing the guar-
anteed liquidity. Such service reduces the liquidity friction for firms and therefore brings down
their cost of capital. Thus, listed firms could weigh the costs and benefits of hiring DMMs
and decide on the optimal level of liquidity. Without such arrangement, securities that most
need and benefit from the presence of liquidity providers are usually ignored by market inter-
mediaries. Nowadays, the increasing importance of market makers has become a noticeable
phenomenon. According to the survey of Charitou and Panayides (2006), among twenty major
developed stock exchanges in North America, Europe and Asia only three of them solely rely
on a pure limit order book for liquidity provision. Our results have shown that DMMs are ben-
eficial for small-cap firms. If these firms are indeed an engine for economic growth, regulators
should consider encouraging these type of contracts.
Appendix: Liquileaks
This Appendix of Chapter 2 “Liquileaks” contains the following supplementary material:
(i) Table 2.14 redoes the second subperiod (1986-2008) Fama-MacBeth regressions after
removing the financial crisis period (2007-08). The coefficient on liquileaks is higher in
this new table which indicates that the increase in the coefficient on liquileaks across the
two subperiods was not driven by the financial crisis.
(ii) Tables 2.15 through 2.17 redo the full sample Fama-MacBeth regressions except that the
liquileak event is defined as the probability of finding the security in the illiquid state for
three, ten, and fifteen days respectively.
(iii) Table 2.18 redoes the full sample Fama-MacBeth regressions except that the illiq value
of zero-volume days is set to the highest observed illiq value in the stock-year sample.
(iv) Table 5* and 6* replicate Table 2.5 and 2.6 in the main text except that sorted portfolios
are value weighted.
(v) Table 2’ through 13’ replicate Table 2 through 13 in the main text by using the price-
reversal liquidity measure proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The implementa-
tion details are discussed below.
A daily Pastor-Stambaugh illiquidity measure instead of Amihud’s ILLIQ
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003, p.647) propose a monthly liquidity measure that is based on daily
price reversals. The regression they run by stock-month is:
ri,d+1,m = θi,m+φi,mri,d,m+ γi,msign(ri,d,m)vi,d,m+ εi,d+1,m (6.1)
where i indexes stocks, d indexes days, and m indexes months, r is the stock return, v is dollar
volume, and ε is an independent identically distributed error term. The γ estimate serves as
the liquidity measure. The idea is that large price reversals per dollar traded imply that the
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liquidity supply side required high compensation as prices were significant ‘pressured’, i.e.,
large negative γ estimates indicate low liquidity.
Liquileak identification requires a daily measure of liquidity and the natural Pastor-Stambaugh
alternative to the daily Amihud ILLIQ measure is1 :
psilliqi,d =−
(
ri,d+1,y− θˆi,y− φˆi,yri,d,y
sign(ri,d,y)vi,d,y
)
(6.2)
where θˆi,y and φˆi,y are obtained by estimating the model in equation (6.1) on a sample of daily
observations for stock i in year y. This psilliq measure replaces the illiq measure in the main
text after which all empirical analysis is redone.
1A Pastor-Stambaugh illiquidity (instead of liquidity) measure is trivially defined as minus γ.
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Table 2.14: Fama-MacBeth regressions, 2007-2008 excluded from second sub-period 1986-
2008
This table repeats Tables 2.7 and 2.8 with the 2007-08 financial crisis period removed.
Panel A: liquileak prob and standard control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 12.07**
(3.97)
p1 10.18** 7.13**
(5.36) (3.31)
p511 5.55** 3.22**
(4.13) (2.06)
illiqma 1.02** 0.96** 1.03** 0.99**
(5.25) (5.01) (5.32) (5.14)
βMKT 7.95** 8.46** 7.80** 8.10**
(2.86) (3.03) (2.81) (2.92)
βSMB -2.93 -3.27 -2.82 -3.16
(-1.47) (-1.63) (-1.41) (-1.58)
βHML -1.16 -1.27 -1.12 -1.17
(-0.63) (-0.68) (-0.61) (-0.63)
intercept 2.11 0.76 1.99 1.13
(1.49) (0.53) (1.40) (0.82)
Panel B: liquileak prob and extended set of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 14.63**
(4.44)
p1 9.85** 5.42**
(4.95) (2.36)
p511 6.50** 4.97**
(4.90) (3.23)
illiqma 0.81** 0.78** 0.82** 0.81**
(4.44) (4.29) (4.48) (4.45)
r100 0.66 0.48 0.83 0.56
(0.26) (0.19) (0.32) (0.22)
r100yr -1.61 -1.77 -1.68 -1.79
(-1.02) (-1.12) (-1.06) (-1.13)
lnsize -1.68** -1.47** -1.74** -1.59**
(-3.98) (-3.53) (-4.12) (-3.80)
sdret -2.46** -2.27** -2.52** -2.53**
(-3.09) (-2.84) (-3.18) (-3.19)
divyld 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.31) (0.45) (0.33) (0.32)
βMKT 10.37** 10.54** 10.32** 10.43**
(3.77) (3.82) (3.76) (3.79)
βSMB -4.01** -4.13** -3.95** -4.02**
(-2.03) (-2.09) (-2.00) (-2.04)
βHML -2.28 -2.28 -2.27 -2.27
(-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.30)
intercept 15.88** 12.95** 16.28** 14.65**
(4.66) (3.79) (4.78) (4.36)
#stocks*#months 1672*252
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.15: Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table repeats Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for the full sample while the liquileak event is defined as the
probability of finding the security in the illiquid state for three days.
Panel A: liquileak prob and standard control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 6.85**
(4.18)
p1 6.13** 4.54**
(4.94) (3.07)
p311 2.84** 1.47*
(4.01) (1.72)
illiqma 1.60** 1.57** 1.61** 1.59**
(8.99) (8.80) (9.05) (8.82)
βMKT 5.36** 5.62** 5.29** 5.49**
(2.91) (3.05) (2.88) (2.98)
βSMB -1.58 -1.75 -1.50 -1.68
(-1.34) (-1.48) (-1.27) (-1.42)
βHML -0.61 -0.65 -0.60 -0.65
(-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.54)
intercept 1.10 0.38 0.95 0.42
(1.04) (0.36) (0.89) (0.40)
Panel B: liquileak prob and extended set of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 8.40**
(4.86)
p1 5.63** 2.23
(4.41) (1.45)
p311 3.68** 3.12**
(5.44) (3.82)
illiqma 1.29** 1.27** 1.31** 1.30**
(7.48) (7.33) (7.53) (7.47)
r100 3.13* 3.15* 3.21* 3.11*
(1.69) (1.71) (1.74) (1.68)
r100yr 1.23 1.19 1.15 1.09
(1.07) (1.03) (1.00) (0.95)
lnsize -2.04** -1.96** -2.08** -2.04**
(-7.44) (-7.12) (-7.58) (-7.41)
sdret -4.63** -4.47** -4.69** -4.68**
(-7.96) (-7.63) (-8.05) (-8.07)
divyld 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
(1.10) (1.19) (1.12) (1.08)
βMKT 9.18** 9.27** 9.14** 9.19**
(4.98) (5.03) (4.97) (4.99)
βSMB -2.33** -2.40** -2.30** -2.34**
(-2.03) (-2.08) (-2.00) (-2.04)
βHML -2.34** -2.34** -2.35** -2.35**
(-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.08) (-2.08)
intercept 18.32** 16.86** 18.51** 17.91**
(7.71) (7.08) (7.80) (7.66)
#stocks*#months 1639*540
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.16: Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table repeats Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for the full sample while the liquileak event is defined as the
probability of finding the security in the illiquid state for ten days.
Panel A: liquileak prob and standard control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 8.79**
(3.56)
p1 6.13** 4.04**
(4.94) (2.80)
p1011 4.12** 2.70**
(3.82) (2.18)
illiqma 1.61** 1.57** 1.61** 1.59**
(9.04) (8.80) (9.06) (8.84)
βMKT 5.35** 5.62** 5.31** 5.47**
(2.91) (3.05) (2.89) (2.97)
βSMB -1.52 -1.75 -1.48 -1.68
(-1.29) (-1.48) (-1.25) (-1.42)
βHML -0.61 -0.65 -0.62 -0.65
(-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.52) (-0.54)
intercept 1.23 0.38 1.17 0.59
(1.16) (0.36) (1.10) (0.57)
Panel B: liquileak prob and extended set of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 10.86**
(4.10)
p1 5.63** 2.55*
(4.41) (1.72)
p1011 5.17** 4.44**
(4.85) (3.67)
illiqma 1.30** 1.27** 1.30** 1.29**
(7.48) (7.33) (7.47) (7.43)
r100 3.26* 3.15* 3.36* 3.23*
(1.77) (1.71) (1.82) (1.75)
r100yr 1.37 1.19 1.34 1.24
(1.18) (1.03) (1.16) (1.08)
lnsize -2.07** -1.96** -2.11** -2.05**
(-7.53) (-7.12) (-7.67) (-7.46)
sdret -4.58** -4.47** -4.62** -4.64**
(-7.88) (-7.63) (-7.94) (-7.97)
divyld 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
(1.08) (1.19) (1.09) (1.06)
βMKT 9.15** 9.27** 9.14** 9.19**
(4.97) (5.03) (4.96) (4.99)
βSMB -2.31** -2.40** -2.30** -2.35**
(-2.01) (-2.08) (-2.00) (-2.04)
βHML -2.33** -2.34** -2.34** -2.34**
(-2.06) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07)
intercept 18.54** 16.86** 18.79** 18.08**
(7.82) (7.08) (7.94) (7.73)
#stocks*#months 1639*540
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.17: Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table repeats Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for the full sample while the liquileak event is defined as the
probability of finding the security in the illiquid state for fifteen days.
Panel A: liquileak prob and standard control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 9.60**
(3.28)
p1 6.13** 4.22**
(4.94) (3.02)
p1511 4.56** 3.08**
(3.69) (2.27)
illiqma 1.61** 1.57** 1.62** 1.59**
(9.05) (8.80) (9.07) (8.85)
βMKT 5.37** 5.62** 5.35** 5.49**
(2.92) (3.05) (2.91) (2.98)
βSMB -1.50 -1.75 -1.47 -1.68
(-1.27) (-1.48) (-1.24) (-1.42)
βHML -0.62 -0.65 -0.63 -0.65
(-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.55)
intercept 1.26 0.38 1.20 0.59
(1.19) (0.36) (1.13) (0.56)
Panel B: liquileak prob and extended set of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 11.82**
(3.71)
p1 5.63** 3.13**
(4.41) (2.17)
p1511 5.56** 4.66**
(4.48) (3.43)
illiqma 1.30** 1.27** 1.29** 1.29**
(7.48) (7.33) (7.45) (7.42)
r100 3.33* 3.15* 3.42* 3.25*
(1.81) (1.71) (1.86) (1.76)
r100yr 1.41 1.19 1.39 1.28
(1.22) (1.03) (1.21) (1.11)
lnsize -2.07** -1.96** -2.11** -2.04**
(-7.55) (-7.12) (-7.68) (-7.41)
sdret -4.54** -4.47** -4.57** -4.60**
(-7.81) (-7.63) (-7.84) (-7.89)
divyld 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06
(1.10) (1.19) (1.12) (1.09)
βMKT 9.16** 9.27** 9.15** 9.21**
(4.97) (5.03) (4.97) (4.99)
βSMB -2.31** -2.40** -2.30** -2.36**
(-2.01) (-2.08) (-2.00) (-2.05)
βHML -2.34** -2.34** -2.34** -2.34**
(-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07) (-2.07)
intercept 18.53** 16.86** 18.75** 17.88**
(7.82) (7.08) (7.92) (7.62)
#stocks*#months 1639*540
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.18: Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table repeats Tables 2.7 and 2.8 for the full sample while the illiq value of zero-volume days is set
to the highest observed illiq value in the stock-year sample.
Panel A: liquileak prob and standard control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 7.61**
(3.99)
p1 6.50** 4.75**
(5.22) (3.19)
p511 3.33** 1.78*
(3.98) (1.78)
illiqma 1.34** 1.32** 1.35** 1.33**
(8.36) (8.18) (8.40) (8.19)
βMKT 5.15** 5.45** 5.09** 5.31**
(2.81) (2.97) (2.78) (2.89)
βSMB -1.35 -1.56 -1.28 -1.49
(-1.13) (-1.31) (-1.08) (-1.26)
βHML -0.52 -0.57 -0.52 -0.57
(-0.43) (-0.47) (-0.43) (-0.47)
intercept 1.48 0.62 1.39 0.75
(1.41) (0.59) (1.31) (0.72)
Panel B: liquileak prob and extended set of control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 9.13**
(4.52)
p1 5.64** 2.22
(4.41) (1.46)
p511 4.21** 3.63**
(5.18) (3.77)
illiqma 1.00** 0.98** 1.01** 1.00**
(6.68) (6.55) (6.70) (6.67)
r100 3.39* 3.35* 3.47* 3.36*
(1.83) (1.82) (1.89) (1.82)
r100yr 1.30 1.20 1.24 1.16
(1.12) (1.04) (1.08) (1.01)
lnsize -2.27** -2.17** -2.32** -2.27**
(-8.37) (-7.98) (-8.52) (-8.33)
sdret -4.52** -4.37** -4.58** -4.58**
(-7.80) (-7.50) (-7.90) (-7.92)
divyld 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
(1.00) (1.11) (1.01) (0.96)
βMKT 9.04** 9.15** 9.01** 9.07**
(4.91) (4.97) (4.90) (4.92)
βSMB -2.39** -2.46** -2.37** -2.41**
(-2.08) (-2.14) (-2.06) (-2.10)
βHML -2.27** -2.28** -2.28** -2.29**
(-2.01) (-2.02) (-2.02) (-2.02)
intercept 20.03** 18.39** 20.28** 19.66**
(8.55) (7.82) (8.67) (8.53)
#stocks*#months 1639*540
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 5*: Excess returns single-sorted portfolios, value-weighted portfolios
This table replicates Table 2.5 except that portfolios are value weighted.
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.59 3.06** 0.40 1.47 0.77 2.84**
2 0.72 3.47** 0.52 1.82* 0.90 3.06**
3 0.81 3.76** 0.66 2.14** 0.96 3.18**
4 0.88 3.70** 0.74 2.19** 1.01 3.03**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 1.16 4.58** 0.95 2.72** 1.36 3.74**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.57 4.71** 0.55 3.55** 0.59 3.19**
#stocks*#months 1639*540 1605*264 1672*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 6*: Excess returns double-sorted portfolios, value-weighted portfolios
This table replicates Table 2.6 except that portfolios are value weighted.
Panel A: Controlling for disaster state probability (p1)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.59 4.20** 0.77 3.92** 0.40 2.00**
2 0.77 5.36** 0.94 4.58** 0.60 2.96**
3 0.79 5.32** 0.94 4.56** 0.64 2.97**
4 0.87 5.48** 0.96 4.33** 0.78 3.42**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 1.14 6.56** 1.31 5.47** 0.96 3.81**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.55 6.40** 0.54 4.36** 0.56 4.71**
Panel B: Controlling for disaster state continuation probability (p511)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.64 4.67** 0.86 4.48** 0.42 2.11**
2 0.69 4.71** 0.85 4.15** 0.52 2.49**
3 0.82 5.43** 0.98 4.56** 0.66 3.09**
4 0.96 5.88** 1.09 4.92** 0.82 3.43**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 1.15 6.78** 1.33 5.59** 0.97 3.99**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.51 5.78** 0.47 3.64** 0.55 4.59**
Panel C: Controlling for average liquidity (illiq)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.65 4.68** 0.84 4.39** 0.45 2.23**
2 0.88 5.69** 0.99 4.62** 0.78 3.44**
3 1.01 6.27** 1.09 5.00** 0.93 3.89**
4 1.22 6.97** 1.16 5.13** 1.29 4.77**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 1.75 8.84** 1.59 6.64** 1.92 6.03**
differential (‘5-1’) 1.10 8.41** 0.75 4.42** 1.48 7.37**
#stocks*#months 1639*540 1605*264 1672*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.2’: Likelihood ratio test on one regime vs. two regimes
The table redoes Table 2.2 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
1963-1985 1986-2008
year likelihood % stocks % stocks year likelihood % stocks % stocks
ratio p-value < 0.01 p-value ≥ 0.01 ratio p-value < 0.01 p-value ≥ 0.01
1963 34.34 60.77 39.23 1986 101.93 62.02 37.98
1964 68.36 65.07 34.93 1987 102.01 61.62 38.38
1965 83.17 71.39 28.61 1988 95.63 52.69 47.31
1966 88.84 72.96 27.04 1989 102.42 54.11 45.89
1967 100.80 75.15 24.85 1990 115.11 55.02 44.98
1968 94.75 79.16 20.84 1991 113.29 54.66 45.34
1969 101.84 79.51 20.49 1992 109.00 56.33 43.67
1970 115.21 75.31 24.69 1993 100.69 58.23 41.77
1971 114.51 76.65 23.35 1994 102.57 58.93 41.07
1972 107.10 75.91 24.09 1995 105.43 59.70 40.30
1973 98.77 68.24 31.76 1996 109.23 63.66 36.34
1974 89.51 61.38 38.62 1997 107.08 63.14 36.86
1975 101.05 61.85 38.15 1998 119.76 64.47 35.53
1976 84.44 60.45 39.55 1999 99.32 59.08 40.92
1977 82.63 61.44 38.56 2000 99.98 54.36 45.64
1978 127.45 71.57 28.43 2001 113.47 54.37 45.63
1979 110.95 68.76 31.24 2002 116.15 53.21 46.79
1980 116.33 69.80 30.20 2003 138.38 59.24 40.76
1981 108.39 70.06 29.94 2004 126.18 59.27 40.73
1982 126.54 68.36 31.64 2005 140.05 59.94 40.06
1983 112.93 71.15 28.85 2006 139.67 60.88 39.12
1984 111.35 66.01 33.99 2007 174.45 64.09 35.91
1985 106.90 62.78 37.22 2008 206.39 69.24 30.76
1963-1985 101.22 70.16 29.84 1986-2008 119.00 59.33 40.67
1963-2008 110.14 64.73 35.27
#stocks*#years 1610*23 #stocks*#years 1671*23
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Table 2.3’: Liquileak model estimates
This table redoes Table 2.3 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
Panel A: Mean and variance parameter estimates
µ0 -0.05 0.31 0.14 0.28 -15.59 6.84 -0.00
µ1 1.21 1.88 1.36 1.30 0.00 7.18 0.32
σ0 0.43 1.22 0.73 0.98 0.00 10.89 0.05
σ1 0.81 1.61 1.05 1.23 0.00 12.58 0.16
φ 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.10 -0.46 1.00 -0.00
p00 0.83 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.88
p11 0.39 0.29 0.14 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.34
p1 0.22 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.18
p511 0.11 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00
liquileak prob 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00
Panel B: Between and within correlation parameter estimates
µ1 σ0 σ1 φ p00 p11 p1 p511 liquileak prob
µ0 ρ(between) 0.18* -0.63* -0.29* -0.01 0.47* -0.32* -0.44* -0.19* -0.40*
ρ(within) 0.01* -0.47* 0.12* -0.04* 0.37* -0.17* -0.33* -0.17* -0.34*
µ1 ρ(between) -0.28* -0.30* 0.02 0.63* -0.31* -0.68* -0.04 -0.45*
ρ(within) -0.00 0.12* -0.01* 0.16* 0.03* -0.19* 0.04* -0.06*
σ0 ρ(between) 0.59* 0.04 -0.67* 0.48* 0.66* 0.24* 0.52*
ρ(within) -0.07* 0.09* -0.48* 0.24* 0.49* 0.20* 0.37*
σ1 ρ(between) -0.05* -0.55* 0.33* 0.54* 0.06* 0.30*
ρ(within) -0.05* 0.09* -0.10* -0.11* -0.12* -0.17*
φ ρ(between) -0.09* 0.25* 0.15* 0.27* 0.26*
ρ(within) -0.17* 0.24* 0.33* 0.21* 0.33*
p00 ρ(between) -0.58* -0.95* -0.18* -0.60*
ρ(within) -0.25* -0.82* -0.09* -0.36*
p11 ρ(between) 0.74* 0.80* 0.76*
ρ(within) 0.56* 0.79* 0.56*
p1 ρ(between) 0.37* 0.78*
ρ(within) 0.41* 0.72*
p511 ρ(between) 0.70*
ρ(within) 0.68*
#stocks*#years: 1641*46
a: Based on stock-specific averages, i.e., x¯i = 1Y ∑
Y
y=1 xi,y.
b: Based on deviations from stock-specific averages, i.e., x∗i,y = xi,y− x¯i.
∗: Significant at a 95% level.
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Table 2.4’: Commonality in the liquidity state across stocks
This table redoes Table 2.4 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
Panel A: Filtered probability of the illiquid state
All years 1963-1985 1986-2008
1 9.37 8.74 9.96
2 2.92 2.76 3.08
3 1.75 1.55 1.94
4 1.28 1.22 1.34
5 1.09 1.02 1.15
sum 16.41 15.29 17.48
Panel B: Smoothed probability of the illiquid state
All years 1963-1985 1986-2008
1 10.42 9.78 11.03
2 3.19 3.03 3.34
3 1.89 1.69 2.09
4 1.38 1.33 1.44
5 1.16 1.08 1.23
sum 18.04 16.91 19.12
#stocks*#years 1641*46 1610*23 1671*23
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Table 2.5’: Excess returns single-sorted portfolios
This table redoes Table 2.5 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.44 1.72* 0.55 1.61 0.32 0.85
2 0.55 2.66** 0.60 2.10** 0.49 1.66*
3 0.68 2.66** 0.64 1.93* 0.73 1.84*
4 0.77 2.80** 0.61 1.77* 0.94 2.17**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 1.01 3.19** 0.88 2.19** 1.15 2.33**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.58 4.49** 0.33 2.14** 0.83 4.09**
#stocks*#months 1641*540 1610*264 1671*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.6’: Excess returns double-sorted portfolios
This table redoes Table 2.6 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
Panel A: Controlling for disaster state probability (p1)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.41 2.53** 0.55 2.47** 0.27 1.12
2 0.41 2.69** 0.64 3.00** 0.18 0.82
3 0.63 3.61** 0.51 2.32** 0.75 2.77**
4 0.60 3.48** 0.40 1.91* 0.81 2.93**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.60 2.94** 0.47 1.83* 0.74 2.30**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.19 1.87* -0.08 -0.64 0.47 3.00**
Panel B: Controlling for disaster state continuation probability to the power 5 (p511)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.48 2.63** 0.46 1.99** 0.49 1.75*
2 0.56 3.34** 0.59 2.60** 0.52 2.13**
3 0.63 3.61** 0.51 2.32** 0.75 2.77**
4 0.60 3.51** 0.41 1.95* 0.81 2.94**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.58 2.82** 0.43 1.65* 0.74 2.30**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.10 1.88* -0.04 -0.30 0.25 2.05**
Panel C: Controlling for average liquidity (psilliq)
All months 1964-1985 1986-2008
Rank ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat ret− r f (%) t-stat
1 (lowest liquileak prob) 0.40 2.32** 0.54 2.51** 0.25 0.92
2 0.51 3.05** 0.57 2.67** 0.45 1.73*
3 0.64 3.68** 0.48 2.16** 0.82 2.99**
4 0.66 3.55** 0.53 2.12** 0.79 2.89**
5 (highest liquileak prob) 0.69 3.40** 0.46 1.88* 0.93 2.84**
differential (‘5-1’) 0.29 2.82** -0.09 -0.66 0.69 4.27**
#stocks*#months 1641*540 1610*264 1671*276
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.9’: Which are the high-liquileak stocks?
This table redoes Table 2.9 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
OLS between-OLS within-OLS
prc -0.22** -0.35** -0.04**
(-3.97) (-2.81) (-2.46)
svol -5.16** -9.82 -1.24*
(-2.89) (-1.57) (-1.95)
sdsvol -0.93 -3.92 -0.10
(-0.34) (-0.56) (-0.10)
sdret 26.70** 30.39** 20.14**
(28.64) (16.39) (17.17)
mcap 0.04 0.12 0.02
(0.50) (0.40) (0.94)
btm -0.40 0.09 -0.45
(-0.98) (0.16) (-1.05)
roa -17.88** 15.28 -46.73**
(-2.51) (1.40) (-4.90)
growth asset -0.03** -0.25** 0.05
(-2.28) (-2.89) (1.49)
leverage 0.01 0.05 0.02
(0.18) (0.94) (0.61)
intercept -12.40** -10.98*
(-3.91) (-1.68)
#stocks*#years 1641*46
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 2.13’: Fama-MacBeth regressions, excluding January effects
This table redoes Table 2.13 in the main text for the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure instead of the
Amihud measure.
Panel A: liquileak prob
(1) (2) (3) (4)
liquileak prob 30.52**
(2.69)
p1 3.73** 4.17**
(2.77) (2.70)
p511 5.89* -2.45
(1.90) (-1.01)
psilliqma -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(-0.24) (-0.34) (0.52) (-0.37)
r100 9.30** 8.64** 4.34** 8.60**
(5.50) (5.18) (2.40) (5.14)
r100yr 2.52** 2.39** 1.81 2.38**
(2.07) (2.03) (1.54) (2.02)
lnsize -2.26** -2.13** -2.67** -2.12**
(-9.02) (-8.70) (-10.55) (-8.44)
sdret -3.94** -3.93** -3.83** -3.90**
(-6.53) (-6.55) (-6.47) (-6.52)
divyld 0.08 0.03 0.15** 0.04
(1.23) (0.54) (2.23) (0.58)
βMKT 6.04** 6.45** 7.95** 6.45**
(3.15) (3.39) (4.24) (3.38)
βSMB -2.91** -3.07** -2.04* -3.07**
(-2.45) (-2.61) (-1.78) (-2.60)
βHML -2.45** -2.58** -1.87* -2.57**
(-2.17) (-2.27) (-1.66) (-2.26)
intercept 21.27** 20.13** 22.56** 20.04**
(8.96) (8.77) (9.80) (8.59)
- continued on next page -
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- continued from previous page -
Panel B: raw data proxy for liquileak probability: f req illiq×duration illiq
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f req psilliq×duration psilliq 12.75**
(8.36)
f req psilliq 21.21** 18.76**
(8.04) (6.83)
duration psilliq 3.05** 1.83**
(6.57) (3.84)
psilliqma 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.61) (0.56) (0.82) (0.60)
r100 6.85** 6.78** 7.10** 6.41**
(4.55) (4.51) (4.70) (4.27)
r100yr 1.57 1.55 1.47 1.40
(1.57) (1.55) (1.47) (1.40)
lnsize -1.53** -1.38** -1.79** -0.98**
(-6.22) (-5.47) (-6.97) (-3.70)
sdret -5.02** -4.91** -4.69** -4.85**
(-9.29) (-9.12) (-8.82) (-9.04)
divyld 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
(1.42) (1.44) (1.26) (1.54)
βMKT 7.34** 7.41** 7.14** 7.52**
(3.90) (3.94) (3.83) (4.00)
βSMB -2.98** -3.03** -3.29** -3.17**
(-2.53) (-2.58) (-2.77) (-2.67)
βHML -3.13** -3.13** -3.03** -3.14**
(-2.76) (-2.76) (-2.68) (-2.77)
intercept 16.54** 15.02** 16.45** 11.08**
(6.87) (6.11) (6.80) (4.36)
#stocks*#months 1641*495
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
Appendix: How Do Designated Market
Makers Create Value for Small-Caps?
This Appendix of Chapter 4 “How Do Designated Market Makers Create Value for Small-Caps”
contains the following supplementary material:
(i) Table 4.10 extends Table 4.3 in the main text by including an additional dummy variable
(MuiltiDMM) to examine whether there is an additional effect of multiple DMMs on
liquidity level over the DMMs-or-not binary variable.
(ii) Table 4.11 runs cross-sectional regressions to examine whether there is an additional ef-
fect of multiple DMMs on price discovery, abnormal returns, and DMM trading activities.
(iii) Table 4.12 examines post-event DMM passive trades on days with price downturns and
upturns.
(iv) Table 4.3’ replicates Table 4.3 in the main text but does the liquidity level diff-in-diff at
the (aggregate) industry level as opposed to the stock level.
(v) Table 4.5’ uses the estimation results of Table 4.5 in the main text to conduct a diff-in-diff
analysis for liquidity risk at the industry level.
(vi) Table 4.7’ replicates Table 4.7 in the main text except that changes in all three liquidity
risk betas are included.
(vii) Tables 4.3*, 4.5*, 4.7*, 4.9* replicate the analysis of Tables 4.3, 4.5, 4.7, 4.9 in the main
text respectively, except that the September 2001 month is removed from the data.
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Table 4.12: Post-event DMM passive trades in price downturns and upturns
This table presents an analysis on whether DMMs are suppliers of last resort in the sense that they are
passive buyer (seller) on days with price downturns (upturns). For each stock, we calculate the daily
open-to-close return in the post-event period. We then label days with a negative (positive) open-to-close
return as “price downturn days” (“price upturn days”). We define DMM as a passive buyer if he/she is on
the buy side of a seller-initiated trade. Correspondingly, DMM is defined as a passive seller if he/she is
on the sell side of a buyer-initiated trade. DMM passive buying and selling are measured by the number
of trades, trading volume in shares and trading volume in euros, denoted as trades, shares, and trans
respectively. We use the following panel data regression to test for differences across return regimes:
yit = αi+βdown price downturnit +βup price upturnit + εit
where price downturnit is a dummy for the negative return days and price upturnit is a dummy for the
positive return days. We add t-values in parentheses, where the standard errors are corrected for both
firm and time clustering.
Price downturn Price upturn Difference #Observations
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
DMM passive buy trades 4.71 3.61 -1.09 ** 8,762
(104.20) (46.34) (-8.91)
DMM passive buy shares 3.57 2.34 -1.23 ** 8,762
(83.52) (29.33) (-10.01)
DMM passive buy trans 53.21 35.50 -17.71 ** 8,762
(95.07) (32.83) (-10.55)
DMM passive sell trades 4.05 5.70 1.65 ** 8,459
(64.06) (106.65) (13.15)
DMM passive sell shares 2.44 4.29 1.85 ** 8,459
(34.75) (75.05) (14.15)
DMM passive sell trans 36.28 70.99 34.70 ** 8,459
(22.63) (50.07) (11.30)
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 4.5’: Designated market makers and post-event change in liquidity risk
This table presents the effect of DMMs on Acharya and Pedersen (2005) liquidity risk betas on the
industry level. We use the Standard Industrial Classification Historical (SICH) from the Compustat
Global database of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In total we identify 7 industries that
contain both DMM and nonDMM stocks. We use the estimation results of individual stock beta and
liquidity risk betas in the pre- and post-event period as presented in Table 4.5. Then we calculate the
industry average of these betas and conduct the following cross-sectional regression:
yi = α+β1 posti ∗DMMi+β2 posti+ εi
where i indexes industries, post is a dummy for the post-event period, and DMM is a dummy for DMM
industries. We add t-values in parentheses.
βrr βcc βrc βcr
(×10−2) (×10−4) (×10−4) (×10−4)
Panel A: Effective spread as the liquidity measure
post ∗DMM 21.05 -0.01 0.89 1.76
(1.53) (-0.87) (1.03) (0.12)
post 16.68 0.02* -0.92 1.00
(1.40) (1.90) (-1.23) (0.08)
intercept 37.74** 0.01** 0.14 10.92
(5.49) (2.29) (0.34) (1.49)
#Observations 28 28 28 28
Panel B: Quoted spread as the liquidity measure
post ∗DMM 21.05 -0.02** -0.12 -3.18
(1.53) (-2.49) (-0.49) (-0.35)
post 16.68 0.03** 0.22 13.74*
(1.40) (4.64) (1.00) (1.73)
intercept 37.74** 0.01** 0.45** 5.55
(5.49) (3.68) (3.59) (1.21)
#Observations 28 28 28 28
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
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Table 4.7’: Determinants of cross-sectional dispersion in cumulative abnormal returns
This table replicates Table 4.7 except that changes in all three liquidity risk betas are included.
Panel A: Effective spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆rspreada -2.80 ** -1.75 * -2.09 **
(-3.43) (-1.88) (-2.07)
∆adv selectiona 0.62 1.56 1.43
(0.55) (1.28) (1.16)
∆βcc(×104) -65.63** -53.96* -53.56*
(-2.42) (-1.86) (-1.85)
∆βrc(×104) -0.58 -0.30 -0.40
(-1.33) (-0.68) (-0.88)
∆βcr(×104) -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
(-1.20) (-1.20) (-1.37)
IMR 7.34
(0.87)
intercept 2.76 ** 2.52 ** 2.57 ** -0.04
(2.60) (2.12) (2.18) (-0.01)
R2 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.18
#Observations 101 101 101 98
Panel B: Quoted spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆qspread -2.02 ** -2.32 ** -2.11 **
(-2.40) (-2.42) (-2.08)
∆βcc(×104) 46.11 85.18 79.77
(0.80) (1.46) (1.35)
∆βrc(×104) 1.81 1.95 2.40
(0.95) (1.05) (1.21)
∆βcr(×104) -0.07 -0.04 -0.03
(-1.36) (-0.78) (-0.66)
IMR -5.68
(-0.69)
intercept 2.06 * 2.35 * 2.01 4.04
(1.91) (1.80) (1.57) (1.26)
R2 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.09
#Observations 101 101 101 98
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
a : We prefer to use the two components of effec-
tive spread rather effective spread itself to trace
down which component drives CARs. If, how-
ever, we include effective spread instead, we find
its coefficient to be significantly negative in all
models.
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Table 4.7*: Determinants of cross-sectional dispersion in cumulative abnormal returns
This table replicates Table 4.7 except that the month ‘September 2001’ is excluded when we calculate
the liquidity level and liquidity risk changes.
Panel A: Effective spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆rspreada -2.88 ** -2.61 ** -2.73 **
(-3.46) (-2.96) (-2.71)
∆adv selectiona 1.06 1.46 1.40
(0.81) (1.06) (1.00)
∆βcc(×104) -29.99** -19.82** -19.75**
(-2.59) (-2.01) (-2.00)
IMR 2.02
(0.25)
intercept 2.92 ** 2.17 * 2.71 ** 1.97
(2.72) (1.96) (2.45) (0.62)
R2 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.13
#Observations 98 98 98 98
Panel B: Quoted spread as the liquidity measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆qspread -1.99 ** -1.46 -1.46
(-2.53) (-1.59) (-1.55)
∆βcc(×104) -88.61** -52.34 -52.72
(-2.24) (-1.15) (-1.09)
IMR 0.20
(0.02)
intercept 2.42 ** 3.24 ** 2.94 ** 2.86
(2.26) (2.78) (2.51) (0.88)
R2 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07
#Observations 98 98 98 98
∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.
a : We prefer to use the two components of effec-
tive spread rather effective spread itself to trace
down which component drives CARs. If, how-
ever, we include effective spread instead, we find
its coefficient to be significantly negative in all
models.
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Table 4.9*: Pre- and post-event volume in high quoted spread regime
This table replicates Table 4.9 except that the month ‘September 2001’ is excluded.
Pre-event Post-event
high quoted high quoted Difference
spread regimea spread regimeb
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Panel A: q=0.10 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 34.31** 43.81** 9.50**
(4.21) (5.31) (2.59)
NonDMM stocks 42.11** 37.23** -4.88
(15.90) (3.51) (-0.60)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks -7.79 6.58 14.37*
(-0.74) (0.36) (1.65)
#Observations 6,593
Panel B: q=0.33 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 36.15** 43.18** 7.02**
(5.17) (6.24) (2.63)
NonDMM stocks 38.14** 37.63** -0.51
(15.97) (4.04) (-0.07)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks -1.99 5.55 7.53
(-0.21) (0.34) (1.03)
#Observations 15,984
Panel C: q=0.50 quantile to identify liquidity regimes
DMM stocks 40.99** 48.51** 7.52**
(10.27) (12.45) (2.67)
NonDMM stocks 38.76** 34.88** -3.88
(27.43) (6.60) (-1.00)
DMM stocks - NonDMM stocks 2.22 13.63 11.40**
(0.42) (1.53) (2.47)
#Observations 22,116
a: The pre-event volume of DMM stocks is calculated as
1
74 ∑
74
i=1αi+βDMM . For nonDMM stocks, it is
1
27 ∑
101
i=75αi.
b: The post-event volume of DMM stocks is calculated as
1
74 ∑
74
i=1αi + βDMM + βpost DMM . For nonDMM stocks it is
1
27 ∑
101
i=75αi+βpost nonDMM∗∗: Significant at a 95% level.
∗ : Significant at a 90% level.

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Dit hoofdstuk bevat Nederlandstalige samenvattingen van de hoofdstukken 2 t/m 4 van dit proef-
schrift.
In hoofdstuk 2, stellen we een maatstaf voor liquiditeit voor die liquiditeitslekken afvangt,
en we onderzoeken de prijsstelling in de cross-section van de aandelenrendementen. Bestaande
literatuur suggereert dat de liquiditeit tijd afhankelijk is en er goede redenen zijn om te geloven
dat er een niet-liquide regime en een liquide regime bestaat. Wanneer een aandeel een lange
periode van de niet-liquide regime heeft, zeggen we dat het vast zit in een liquiditeits-lek (of
liquileak) situatie. Liquiditeitslekken hebben dus twee dimensies, een lage liquiditeit niveau
en een lange duur van gebrek aan liquiditeit. Risicomijdende beleggers moeten vragen om een
hoog rendement ter compensatie van de verliezen die zij kunnen realiseren in een liquiditeits-lek
situatie. Wij stellen voor om de liquiditeitslekken te meten door de liquileak waarschijnlijkheid,
dat is de kans dat een aandeel blijft steken in de niet-liquide situatie voor vijf opeenvolgende
beursdagen, geschat door het Markov-regime switching model. De veronderstelde relatie tussen
liquileak waarschijnlijkheid een het vereiste rendement van een aandeel wordt getest op twee
conventionele manieren: portfolio soorten en Fama-MacBeth regressies. De portefeuille soort
analyse toont dat een trading strategie die lang is bij hoge liquileak voorraden en korte bij lage
liquileak aandeel een significant gemiddelde extra rendement op jaarbasis van 3,36% oplevert.
Om te onderzoeken of dit positief rendement alleen te wijten is aan een van de twee factoren
van de liquileak waarschijnlijkheid (dat wil zeggen, de frequentie of duur) of alleen te wijten
is aan de (onvoorwaardelijke) gemiddelde liquiditeit niveau, we dubbel sorteren en vinden dat
het rendementsverschil tussen lage en hoge liquileak aandeel nog steeds duidelijk positief is.
De Fama-MacBeth regressie maakt het mogelijk om de standaard Fama-Franse factoren en an-
dere aandeel karakteristiek te controleren. We vinden een positief rendement premie voor de
Liquileak waarschijnlijkheid. Een een standaarddeviatie verhoging van de liquileak kans ver-
hoogt het jaarlijkse rendement met 1,33%. Deze regressies worden herhaald voor de twee ever
lange sub-perioden en de resultaten geven aan dat de liquileak waarschijnlijkheid belangrijker
is geworden voor rendementen over de tijd terwijl, in overeenstemming met eerdere literatuur,
het liquiditeitsniveau minder belangrijk is geworden.
In de robuustheid cheque, stellen we een alternatieve maatstaf voor liquiditeit lekken, die
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rechtstreeks wordt berekend op basis van ruwe data zonder enige model specificatie. We proxy
het voortbestaan van de niet-liquide regime van de gemiddelde duur dat een aandeel in de niet-
liquide regime en de frequentie van de niet-liquide regime met het percentage van de dagen
dat een bestand is in de niet-liquide regime meer dan het totale aantal handelsdagen. Dien-
overeenkomstig, de interactie van deze twee variabelen is de maatstaf voor liquiditeit lekken.
Ook hier vinden we consistent bewijs is dat deze maatregel van liquiditeit lekken ook een sig-
nificant positieve relatie met aandelenrendementen heeft. Daarnaast zijn onze resultaten zijn
robuust op de januari-effect en de financile crisis periode 2007-2008.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de prijsstelling van de keerzijde liquiditeit. We stellen dat de be-
leggers nadeel markt anders te beschouwen van ondersteboven markt, en aandelen die een hoge
liquiditeit en laag liquiditeitsrisico in nadeel markt zijn bijzonder waardevol voor beleggers.
In een dalende markt, zijn beleggers zeer waarschijnlijk getroffen hun financiering beperking
en moeten hun voorraden liquideren. Dus ze liever bestanden die kunnen worden uitgevoerd
tegen lage kosten in de markt dalingen vast te houden en zou een hoger rendement eisen voor
aandelen die een hoge liquiditeit keerzijde te hebben. We stellen het gemiddelde marktrende-
ment als een cut-off niveau en definiren van een markt is in een nadeel (ondersteboven) indien
haar rendement lager (hoger) dan dit cutoff niveau. Amihud ILLIQ maatregel wordt gebruikt
als ons dagelijks illiquiditeit maatregel. Het downside (upside) de geringe liquiditeit wordt
gedefinieerd als het gemiddelde van de dagelijkse ILLIQ maatregel in een downside (upside)
markt. Het downside en upside liquiditeit beta is de comovement van illiquiditeit voorraad het
niveau met de markt illiquiditeit niveau conditioning op het marktrendement.
We gebruiken twee benaderingen om de relatie tussen de downside liquiditeit en de aande-
lenrendementen in de cross-section te onderzoeken. Een is de portefeuille sorterings benader-
ing, die eenvoudig te interpreteren rendementen geef haalbare bij gangbare beleggingsstrate-
gieen.. We sorteren individuele aandelen in vijf Quintiles op basis van de hun downside (en
upside) iliquiditeit niveau en de upside (en dwonside) liquiditeit beta, en vinden dat de aan-
delen met een hoge downside iliquiditeit niveau en de beta een hoger rendement hebben dan
aandelen met een lage downside iliquiditeit niveau en beta . Bijvoorbeeld, een trading strategie
die long in aandelen met een hoge downside iliquiditeit en short in aandelen met een lage down-
side illiquiditeit niveau leveren een gemiddelde maandelijkse hoger return van ongeveer 0,94%.
Het rendement terugkeer verschil tussen de twee uiterste downside liquiditeit beta Quintiles is
0,74% per maand. Om de effecten van downside en upside iliquiditeit niveau en beta differ-
entiren, we gebruiken we verder een dubbele sortering analyse. Na controle voor de upside
illiquiditeit niveau vinden we nog steeds dat rendement spread van de portefeuilles gesorteerd
op de downside iliquiditeit significant positief is. Ook de toenemende rendement patroon van
lage downside liquiditeit beta naar hoge downside liquiditeit beta blijft na de eerste soort van
upside liquiditeit beta. De andere aanpak is de Fama-MacBeth regressie, die ons in staat stelt om
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cross-sectional excess rendement direct op de downside illiquiditeit niveau en de bta te regress
en ons mogelijk maakt om te controleren voor andere bekende determinante. De regressie wordt
uitgevoerd op bedrijfsniveau. We vinden aanwijzingen dat de downside illiquiditeit niveau en
de beta een significant positief effect op de aandelenrendementen in de cross-section te hebben.
Bijvoorbeeld, een verhoging van een standaarddeviatie in het downside liquiditeit niveau zal
de maandelijkse rendementen met 0,15% verhogen. Het is ongeveer 1,8% op jaarbasis, die
geeft ook de economische betekenis aan. De downside liquiditeit beta heeft ook een significant
positief effect op aandelenrendementen. Echter, wanneer de downside liquiditeit niveau, de up-
side illiquiditeit niveau, de downside en upside liquiditeit beta gezamenlijk worden opgenomen
in het cross-sectional regressie, heeft alleen de downside liquiditeit niveau nog een significant
positieve cofficint op het rendement. In de robuustheid cheque, vinden we dat onze resultaten
robuust zijn op het januari-effect.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we het effect van designated market makers (DMMs) op de
small-caps in de Euronext Amsterdam markt. Bedrijven geven om de liquiditeit van het aandeel
omdat het invloed heeft op de kosten van kapitaal. Small-caps geven hier het meest om om-
dat hun aandelen laagste liquiditeit niveau en de hoogste liquiditeitsrisico vertoont. Euronext
stelt hen in staat een DMM te contracten, die vervolgens minimumliquiditeit onvoorwaardelijk
moeten leveren. In Amsterdam, aanmelden 74 small-caps van de 101 verkiesbaar bedrijven
zich op de introductiedag. Wij analyseren 11 maanden voor en na de introductie van DMMs
en vinden dat DMM aandelen een significant cumulatief abnormaal rendement van 3,5% in een
drie weken venster dat de aankondiging en de effectieve dag bevat te genereren. Het grootste
deel hiervoor doet zich voor in de week na dat Euronext de lijst van DMM aandelen pub-
liceert. In totaal komt dit neer op een waarde creren van ongeveer 1 miljard euros. Op basis van
difference-in-difference approach, vinden we dat de effectieve verspreiding significant daalt en
de effectieve verspreiding covarieerd beduidend minder met de markt effectieve verspreiding
(dat wil zeggen in Acharya en Pedersen (2005)). Wij stellen dat DMMs de liquiditeit niveau
te verbeteren en het liquiditeitsrisico verminderen. Bovendien zijn zowel de liquiditeit niveau
verandering en het liquiditeitsrisico verandering zijn belangrijke verklarende variabelen voor de
positieve abnormale rendementen geassocieerd met DMM aandelen. We zien verder dat DMMs
in meer trades participeren en verlies lopen op hoge quoted-verspreid dagen, dat wil zeggen, op
dagen waarop hun beperking is waarschijnlijk te bindend zijn. Tot slot vinden we dat DMMs
fouten in dagelijks prijsstellingen verminderen.
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